Ketzel vs. Laguna Beach Police Department

all damages caused thereby.” (Id. at pp. 323-324 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

The fifth cause of action alleges LaCilento colluded with opposing counsel to “rig” the Underlying Action and “judicially kidnap [Plaintiff’s] 10-year old boy.” (FAC ¶ 83.) Counsel agreed LaCilento “would do a lousy job representing [Plaintiff]” and “that the putative father would be awarded sole and exclusive custody.” (Id. at ¶ 84.)

As discussed above, the underlying torts of legal malpractice and fraud have not been adequately pled as to LaCilento. The demurrer is sustained as to the fifth cause of action.

Should Plaintiff desire to file an amended complaint that addresses the issues in this ruling, Plaintiff must file and serve within 15 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Defendant LaCilento to give notice.

Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

Defendant Arthur J. LaCilento’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Nicole Dodson’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is DENIED as moot.

In light of the court’s concurrent ruling regarding LaCilento’s demurrer, the motion to strike is denied as moot.

The Case Management Conference is continued to November 19, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Defendant LaCilento to give notice. 7 Ketzel vs. Laguna Defendant City of Laguna Beach moves for summary judgment on the Beach Police Complaint of Plaintiff Hunter Ketzel. For the following reasons, the motion Department is DENIED.

The court OVERRULES Defendant City’s evidentiary objection nos. 3, 6, and 7 to the Ketzel Declaration. The court does not rule on the remainder of objections asserted by Defendant City or Plaintiff, as they are not material to the disposition of this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

Standard on MSJ

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(c), a summary judgment motion shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant meets its burden on summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff cannot prove its causes of action, or by establishing a complete defense to the plaintiff’s causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., 437c(p)(2).) If a defendant does not meet this initial burden, the plaintiff need not oppose the motion and the motion must be denied. (Binder 11

v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) If the defendant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851.)

First Cause of Action (Whistleblower Retalitaion)

The Complaint pleads a single cause of action for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff complained of incidents wherein Plaintiff was instructed to generate an arrest report for arrests that would require Plaintiff to make false statements on those official police reports. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-18.)

Labor Code section 1102.5(b) is California’s general whistleblower statute. (McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 468.) It provides in relevant part that: “An employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, . . . to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, . . . if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5(b).)

In Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., the California Supreme Court explains the standard governing Section 1102.5 claims on summary judgment. (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 717-718.) The court explained that: Section 1102.6 provides the governing framework for the presentation and evaluation of whistleblower retaliation claims brought under section 1102.5. First, it places the burden on the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation for an employee’s protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested employment action . . . .

Once the plaintiff has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity.” (Id. at p. 718.)

Disclosures indisputably made in “the context of internal personnel matters involving a supervisor and her employee, rather than the disclosure of a legal violation,” do not amount to whistleblowing. (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384– 1385 disapproved of on other grounds by Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703.) In Patten, a principal had received complaints from females students of a male teacher peering into the girls’ 12

locker room. (Id. at p. 1382.) The principal disclosed to her district superiors for personnel action. (Ibid.) The principal admitted to merely forwarding complaints “for personnel action.” (Id. at p. 1385.) The Patten court noted that “[t]o exalt these exclusively internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would create all sorts of mischief. Most damagingly, it would thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create a legion of undeserving protected ‘whistleblowers’ arising from the routine workings and communications of the job site. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1385.)

The Complaint alleges Defendants LBPD and City were responsible for assuring their policies complied with relevant federal and state law (see Compl. ¶ 6), Plaintiff complained about incidents violating LBPD policy (see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 23, 27), and the incidents involved, among other things, Plaintiff’s being ordered by superiors to make false statements on police reports.

Penal Code Section 118.1(a) provides in relevant part that: “Every police officer who, in their capacity as a peace officer, knowingly and intentionally makes, or causes to be made, any material statement in a peace officer report, . . . regarding the commission or investigation of any crime, knowing the statement to be false, is guilty of filing a false report, punishable by imprisonment . . . .”

Here, Plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he engaged in protected activity and retaliation for that protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination. Unlike the situation in Patten where a high school principal merely forwarded to district supervisors the reports she had received from students regarding school personnel, Plaintiff here was ordered to perjure himself on official police reports (see Ptfl.’s Sep. St. No. 7 [citing among others Ketzel Decl. ¶¶ 6-7]), refused to do so (see Ketzel Decl. ¶ 7), and reported the incident to a superior officer (Ketzel Decl. ¶ 7).

Defendant City fails to meet its shifted burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, independent reasons.

The undisputed facts show Plaintiff was evaluated each day by his assigned Field Training Officer (“FTO”), and those evaluations are memorialized in daily observation reports (“DORs”). (See Pltf.’s Sep. St. No. 12.) The DOR has 27 different categories, with ratings from one to four. A score of reflects the trainee “Exceeds Standards,” a score of two is “Meets Standards,” a score of three is “Needs Improvement,” and a score of four is “Unacceptable.” (See id.) During his training, Plaintiff was evaluated by at least eight FTOs. (See Pltf.’s Sep. St. No. 13.)

There are triable issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, independent reason. Defendant argues and submits evidence showing Plaintiff received mixed marks during his tenure at the department. 13

(Yacoubian Decl., Ex. A, B, C.) The “Needs Improvement” marks were reported in DORs as early as 04/19/2024 and continued in June, July, and August. (Yacoubian Decl., Exs. A, B, C, E, H, J.) Plaintiff, however, submits evidence that DORs and supervisor weekly reports most critical of Plaintiff’s performance are unreliable because they were created after the protected activity. Plaintiff reported incidents starting no later than 06/26/2024. (See Ketzel Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.) The supervisor weekly reports created on or after 06/26/2024 contain significant critical comments and reflect subpar marks on multiple categories, whereas weekly reports created prior to 06/26/2024 are less critical and reflect satisfactory performance. (See Def.’s Ex. 5.)

This is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the reports are unreliable or set up the stage for pretextual termination. In sum, there are triable issues of fact as to whether there was a legitimate, independent ground for Plaintiff’s termination.

The court will DENY the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff to give notice. 8 Bubonic vs. Park Plaintiff Mary Ann Denise Bubonic’s motions to compel Defendants Bakar Newport LP Properties, Inc.’s and Park Newport LP’s further responses to Plaintiff’s demand for inspection of documents, set one, and requests for sanctions is OFF CALENDAR.

On 8/14/26, Plaintiff filed a notice of withdrawal stating that both of the foregoing motions are withdrawn in their entirety, including the accompanying requests for monetary sanctions of $3,000.00.

Defendants Bakar Properties, Inc.’s and Park Newport LP’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED. Defendants contend that Plaintiff owes sanctions pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (h) and Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (i) because Plaintiff failed to adequately meet and confer prior to filing the instant motions. However, the court finds that Plaintiff’s meet and confer attempt was sufficient. (See Teppara Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 5).

Plaintiff shall give notice.

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