County of Santa Barbara v. Lexington National Insurance Corp.

Here, Defendants argue that punitive damages and attorney fees are not properly alleged, among other issues.

"In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the Plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the Defendant." (Civ. Code, Sec. 3294, subd. (a).)

"Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim." (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

" 'Malice' means conduct which is intended by the Defendant to cause injury to the Plaintiff ...." (Civ. Code, Sec. 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

"In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a Plaintiff." (Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.)

The complaint alleges a boundary dispute between the parties. The complaint alleges that Defendants have taken the position that doctrine of estoppel or adverse possession may support Defendants' position that the existing fencing should demarcate the boundary between the parties' property. The complaint alleges the parties historically agreed on repairs to the fencing and that the legal boundary became disputed more recently in 2025. The complaint alleges that the parties dispute the results of the Survey.

The complaint does not, without more, allege intentional acts by Defendants designed to cause harm to Plaintiff (i.e., malice). Plaintiff must allege facts, assuming their truth, "that Defendants intentionally, as opposed to negligently or mistakenly, disregarded Plaintiff's right to possession ...." (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 317.)

The Court will grant the motion to strike with leave to amend as to allegations of punitive damages. The Court will deny the motion to strike as to the prayer for attorney fees based on the statutory rights under the Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, Sec. 15657.5, subd. (a).) The Court will otherwise deny the motion to strike for the reasons set forth above pertaining to the ruling on Defendants' demurrer.

Tentative Ruling: County of Santa Barbara v. Lexington National Insurance Corp. Tentative Ruling: County of Santa Barbara v. Lexington National Insurance Corp. Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 06/24/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Bail Agent Superior Bail Bonds to Set Aside Summary Judgment on Bond Forfeiture Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff County of Santa Barbara: Rachel Van Mullem, Kristen M. Cortez, Office of the County Counsel For Defendant Lexington National Insurance Corp. and Bail Agent Superior Bail Bonds: Daniel Moaddel RULING For all reasons stated herein, the motion of bail agent Superior Bail Bonds to set aside summary judgment on bond forfeiture is denied. The Court declines to rule at this hearing on the request for attorney fees set forth for the first time in Plaintiff County of Santa Barbara's opposition. Plaintiff may file a motion for attorney fees on regular notice.

Background

This action pertains to the forfeiture of Bail Bond No. 2023DD010350 (Bail Bond) in favor of Plaintiff County of Santa Barbara (County) related to the failure to appear by Nautica Singleton (Singleton), Defendant in the underlying criminal matter, People of the State of California v. Nautica Singleton, Santa Barbara Superior Court, Case No. 23CR08667 (Criminal Case). As evidenced by the filings in this action:

On October 22 and October 27, 2023, respectively, Superior Bail Bonds (SBB) as bail agent of Lexington National Insurance Corp. (Lexington) issued and filed the Bail Bond in the Criminal Case. (Sum. Judg. on Bail Bond Forfeiture, March 20, 2026, attach.) The Bail Bond states that Singleton was ordered to appear in the Criminal Case on December 22, 2023, pertaining to charges against Singleton under Penal Code section 476 [forgery], Penal Code section 459.5 [shoplifting], and Penal Code section 182 [conspiracy]. (Ibid.) Although no designation was made in the misdemeanor/felony section of the Bail Bond, the charges against Singleton are referenced with the suffix "--M" and appear to be described in the Bail Bond as misdemeanor charges. (Ibid.)

On June 6, 2024, Singleton did not appear at a scheduled Court hearing (June 6 Hearing) in the Criminal Matter, but was represented by a public defender at that June 6 Hearing. (Motion, Ex. A.) The Court's minutes refer to seven misdemeanor charges and two felony charges. (Ibid.) The Court continued this hearing and the Bail Bond obligations to July 25, 2024. (Ibid.) The Court's minutes noted that "good cause [was] found to continue." (Ibid.)

On January 15, 2025, Singleton failed to appear at a subsequent Court hearing (January 15 Hearing) in the Criminal Case, a bench warrant was ordered, and the Bail Bond was forfeited as of January 15, 2025. (Sum. Judg. on Bail Bond Forfeiture, March 20, 2026, attach; Motion, Ex. C.) On January 17, 2025, a notice of forfeiture of surety bond and bail bond demand letter were issued in the Criminal Case as to the Bail Bond. (Sum. Judg. on Bail Bond Forfeiture, March 20, 2026, attach; see also, Motion, Ex. B.)

On August 14, 2025, according to the County, SBB requested in the Criminal Case an extension of the appearance period under Penal Code section 1305.4 and the Court extended the appearance period through February 10, 2026. (Opp., p. 2, ll. 23-26.)

On March 20, 2026, in this action, the Court entered summary judgment on Bail Bond forfeiture (Judgment) in favor of the County and against Lexington in the amount of $2,500 plus intertest and costs. (Sum. Judg. on Bail Bond Forfeiture, March 20, 2026; Motion, Ex. C.) The Judgment provided that Lexington issued the Bail Bond, Singleton failed to appear at the January 15 Hearing, the Bail Bond was forfeited pursuant to Penal Code sections 1305 or 1306, and that this forfeiture was not set aside within the period allowed by Penal Code section 1305. (Ibid.) Therefore, "pursuant to Penal Code [section] 1306, it [was] ordered and adjudged that the County ... recover from [Lexington] the sum of $2,500.00 together with the interest ... plus costs ... pursuant to Government Code [section] 1603.5." (Ibid.)

On April 9, 2026, SBB filed this motion to set aside the Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). SBB argues that the Court (1) failed to make mandatory findings supporting the waiver of personal appearance by Singleton at the June 6 Hearing under Penal Code section 977, subdivision (b), (2) failed to make sufficient findings of good cause for the continuance of the Bail Bond obligations from the June 6 Hearing, and (3) failed to make specific findings under Penal Code section 1305 pertaining to Singleton's absence at the June 6 Hearing. According to SBB, these failures rendered the Judgement void for lack of jurisdiction. The County opposes this motion and requests that the Court award attorney fees to the County under Penal Code section 1305.3.

Analysis

(1) Statutory Framework

"When a Defendant released on bail fails to appear as required, the trial Court must declare a forfeiture of the bail bond in open Court. [Citation.] Within 30 days of the forfeiture, a notice of forfeiture is served by the Court clerk. If the amount of the bond exceeds $400, the notice of forfeiture must be served by mail on the surety. [Citation.] Thereafter, the surety has a 180-day period, plus five days for service by mail (i.e., 185 days), within which to obtain relief from the forfeiture on certain statutory grounds ... including that the criminal Defendant has appeared in Court or has been surrendered into custody by the bail agent within the 185-day period. [Citations.] This 185-day period is commonly known as the exoneration period or the appearance period...." (People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 999-1000 (US Fire).)

"Under section 1306, subdivision (a), when 'the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the Court which has declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment' against the surety in the amount of the forfeited bail bond plus costs. Section 1306, subdivision (c), sets forth the 90-day time frame within which the summary judgment must be entered: 'If, because of the failure of any Court to promptly perform the duties enjoined upon it pursuant to this section, summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.' " (US Fire, supra, 242 Cal.App.4 th at p. 1000.)

(2) Declaration of Forfeiture Under Penal Code Section 1305

"A Court shall in open Court declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a Defendant fails to appear for any of the following: [P.] (A) Arraignment. [P.] (B) Trial. [P.] (C) Judgment. [P.] (D) Any other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the Defendant's presence in Court is lawfully required. [P.] (E) To surrender himself or herself in execution of the judgment after appeal." (Pen. Code, Sec. 1305, subd. (a)(1).)

"Whenever a Defendant fails to appear in Court on one of the occasions enumerated in section 1305, the Court must declare a forfeiture, unless 'the Court has reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear.' " (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 45, 48-49 (Indiana Lumbermens).)

(3) Continuance of Bail Obligations Under Penal Code Section 1305.1

"If the Defendant fails to appear for arraignment, trial, judgment, or upon any other occasion when his or her appearance is lawfully required, but the Court has reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear, the Court may continue the case for a period it deems reasonable to enable the Defendant to appear without ordering a forfeiture of bail or issuing a bench warrant. [P.] If, after the Court has made the order, the Defendant, without sufficient excuse, fails to appear on or before the continuance date set by the Court, the bail shall be forfeited and a warrant for the Defendant's arrest may be ordered issued." (Pen. Code, Sec. 1305.1.)

"If the Court has reason to believe that a sufficient excuse may exist, it may continue the case for a reasonable period to enable the Defendant to appear without ordering forfeiture of the bond. [Citation.] If the Court has no information that a sufficient excuse may exist so as to justify a continuance pursuant to section 1305.1, the Court must declare a forfeiture." (Indiana Lumbermens, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.)

"In most situations involving a section 1305, subdivision (b) [now section 1305.1] determination[,] the only reasons before the trial Court are the evidence or representations furnished by Defendant's counsel. The cases demonstrate that the Courts have cooperated with defense counsels' requests and have liberally relied on their representations." [Citation.] [P.] By way of example, sufficient excuse has been found where defense counsel represented that Defendant's mother was dying of cancer [citation]; in a situation where 'there may be an emergency [Defendant] attended to, and he may be ... available tomorrow morning' [citation]; where defense counsel's 'client had told him that he had gone to Stockton for medical treatment due to severe internal bleeding' [citation]; and where defense counsel stated, '[T]here's a possibility [Defendant] might be in the San Francisco area' because '[t]here's also another action pending in San Francisco' [citation].

Even vague representations by counsel have been found sufficient--i.e., where a Defendant had never previously failed to appear and defense counsel was 'concerned something has happened.' " (People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 473, 479-480, internal quotation marks omitted.)

However, "[t]he factual basis for the sufficient excuse finding must appear somewhere in the trial Court record--in the minutes or in the reporter's transcript." (Id. at p. 478.)

(4) Personal Appearance Under Penal Code Section 977

"Except as provided in subdivision (c), in all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be physically present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be physically or remotely present at all other proceedings unless they waive their right to be physically or remotely present, with leave of Court and with approval by Defendant's counsel." (Pen. Code, Sec. 977, subd. (b)(1).)

"The waiver of a Defendant's right to be physically or remotely present may be in writing and filed with the Court or, with the Court's consent, may be entered personally by the Defendant or by the Defendant's counsel of record. [P.] ... [P.] (B) A waiver of the Defendant's physical or remote presence may be entered by counsel, after counsel has stated on the record that the Defendant has been advised of the right to be physically or remotely present for the hearing at issue, has waived that right, and agrees that notice to the attorney that the Defendant's physical or remote presence in Court at a future date and time is required is notice to the Defendant of that requirement." (Pen. Code, Sec. 977 subd. (b)(2).)

"In all cases in which the accused is charged with a misdemeanor only, they may appear by counsel only," subject to certain exceptions for cases involving domestic violence or driving under the influence. (Pen. Code, Sec. 977, subd. (a).)

(5) Strict Construction of Bail Statutes

"The law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extends to forfeiture of bail. Thus, Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306 dealing with forfeiture of bail bonds must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture. [P.] The standard of review, therefore, compels us to protect the surety, and more importantly the individual citizens who pledge to the surety their property on behalf of persons seeking release from custody, in order to obtain the corporate bond. Sections 1305 and 1306 are said to be 'jurisdictional prescriptions.' Failure to follow the jurisdictional prescriptions in sections 1305 and 1306 renders a summary judgment on the bail bond void." (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 945, 950-951.)

(6) Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, Subdivision (d)

"The Court may ... on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (d).)

" 'A trial Court has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void.' [Citation.]" (Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563-564.)

"Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting." (Evid. Code, Sec. 500.)

"While the provisions of Penal Code section 1305 'must be strictly followed or the Court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction' ... '[t]he burden is upon the bonding company seeking to set aside the forfeiture to establish by competent evidence that its case falls within the four corners of these statutory requirements." (People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 959, 974 (Safety National).)

(7) SBB Did Not Carry Its Burden to Establish Non-Compliance with Penal Code Section 977 at the June 6 Hearing

SBB argues that the Court failed to create a sufficient record under Penal Code section 977 that Singleton waived her right to appear in person at the June 6 Hearing. As the Court understands the arguments by SBB, because there was no proper waiver on the record at the June 6 Hearing, SBB argues the Court was required to either forfeit the Bail Bond or exonerate the Bail Bond at the June 6 Hearing rather than continue the Bail Bond obligations to a later date. As argued by SBB, because the Court took neither of those actions at the June 6 Hearing, the Court no longer had jurisdiction over the Bail Bond and the Judgment resulting from Singleton's failure to appear at the subsequent January 15 Hearing is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Assuming without deciding that a waiver of personal appearance was required at the June 6 Hearing under Penal Code section 977 and is a basis for voiding the Judgment, the Court minutes submitted by SBB indicate that Singleton was represented by a counsel, a public defender, at the June 6 Hearing. (Motion, Ex. A.) A waiver of personal appearance in a felony hearing "may be entered by counsel, after counsel has stated on the record that the Defendant has been advised of the right to be physically or remotely present for the hearing at issue, has waived that right, and agrees that notice to the attorney that the Defendant's physical or remote presence in Court at a future date and time is required is notice to the Defendant of that requirement." (Pen. Code, Sec. 977 subd. (b)(2)(B).)

Assuming arguendo its legal argument is valid and the charges were felonies, SBB has the burden to demonstrate that the discussion at the June 6 Hearing by counsel was insufficient to comply with Penal Code section 977 as to any required waiver of personal appearance at a felony hearing. (Pen. Code, Sec. 977 subd. (b)(2)(B); Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (d); Evid. Code, Sec. 500; Safety National, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)

"It is presumed that official duty [undertaken by the Court] has been regularly performed." (Evid. Code, Sec. 664.) SBB does not submit evidence to establish what was discussed at the June 6 Hearing between counsel for Singleton and the Court. (Motion, Exs. A-C.) SBB does not address the notation in the June 6 Hearing minutes that good cause was found to continue the Bail Bond obligations. (See Motion, Ex. A; Penal Code Sec. 1305.1.)