Malkiat Mand v. Albertsons Companies, Inc.

"The words " 'trail' " and " 'path' " are synonymous. (Rodale, The Synonym Finder (1978) Rodale Press, Inc., p. 1249.) Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.1995) at page 1251 defines a trail as " 'a marked or established path or route. . ..' " (Italics added.) We hold that the Path qualifies as a " 'trail' " under subdivision (b)." (Carroll v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 606, 609, (Carroll).) "Subdivision (a) [of Government Code section 831.4] speaks of unpaved roads, while subdivision (c) refers to paved trails.

It is therefore logical to interpret subdivision (b)'s reference to " 'any trail' " to mean just that, i.e., any trail, whether paved or unpaved." (Carroll, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 609.) "The words of a statute are to be accorded their usual, ordinary import. Moreover, they are to be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and purpose of the statute in which they appear, and the various parts of a statute are to be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citation.]

Unlike subdivision (a) of section 831.4, which refers specifically to " 'unpaved' " roads, and subdivision (c), which refers specifically to " 'paved' " trails, paths, etc., subdivision (b) refers to " '[a]ny' " trail. The logical inference of the all-encompassing " 'any' " in subdivision (b), particularly in relationship to the limiting adjectives in its sister subdivisions, is that the nature of the trail's surface is irrelevant to questions of immunity." (Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 418.) " ' " 'The plainly stated purpose of immunity for recreational activities on public land is to encourage public entities to open their property for public recreational use, because ' "the burden and expense of putting such property in a safe condition and the expense of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such areas to public use." ' " ' " [Citation.] " 'Trail immunity applies to all manner of defects in the trail's condition.' " ([Citation]; see Amberger-Warren v.

City of Piedmont (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1084 (Amberger-Warren) [" 'It is well established that the immunity covers negligent maintenance of a trail' "]; Treweek v. City of Napa (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 221, 227 [" ' "It is . . . clear that the state is absolutely immune from liability for injuries caused by a physical defect of a trail" ' "].) (Helm, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1226.) By way of his opposition, Plaintiff does not make any cogent argument, or provide any authority, for his position that the walkway is not a trail.

Pursuant to every description of what constitutes a "trail", contained in the Case Law, the walkway is unquestionably a recreational trail. The SAC clearly establishes this as well by alleging several times that the trail is used to access the beach from the parking lot. Plaintiff's argument regarding not "recreating" is, as was explained in the ruling on the demurrer to the FAC, without merit. Government Code section 831.4 does not create any exception for a volunteer. Courts have consistently found that persons utilizing recreational trails for purposes other than recreation are barred from bringing actions against public entities for any defects in the condition of trails and walkways. (see Montenegro v.

City of Bradbury (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 924; Arvizu v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 760; Burgueno v. Regents of University of California (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1052.) To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the trail was improperly maintained: " '[T]o fulfill its purpose, trail immunity must extend to claims arising from the design of a trail, as well as its maintenance.' " [Citations.] " '[L]ocation, no less than design, is an integral feature of a trail, and both must be immunized for the same reasons.' " [Citation.]

This immunity is absolute. [Citation.]" (Leyva v. Crockett & Co., Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1109, italics added.) The demurrer will be sustained. Plaintiff has had three opportunities to plead facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and has not provided any persuasive argument or facts that would tend to show there is any possibility of amending the complaint further to bring his claims outside of the trail immunity that protects the State from liability. As such, Plaintiff will not be given leave to amend.

Tentative Ruling: Malkiat Mand v. Albertsons Companies, Inc. Tentative Ruling: Malkiat Mand v. Albertsons Companies, Inc. Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time Wed, 07/29/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendant for Judgment on the Pleadings Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Malkiat Mand: Self-represented For Defendant Albertsons LLC: Gregory E. Stone, Amy W. Lewis, Stone Dean LLP RULING The motion of Defendant Albertsons LLC, for judgment on the pleadings is granted, with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file and serve his amended complaint, if any, no later than August 12, 2026.

Background

As alleged in Plaintiff's complaint in paragraph GN-1: Defendant Albertsons LLC (Albertsons), sued as Albertsons Companies, Inc., owned and operated the Albertsons store located at 7127 Hollister Ave #27, Goleta, California (the Property). On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff Malkiat Mand entered the Property at 7 a.m. to shop and went to the restroom. Because of the lack of signage indicating a wet floor, Mand slipped and fell, causing injuries to his foot, ankle, and shoulder. Plaintiff exited the restroom to complain to management when a patron came from behind and punched Plaintiff in the right shoulder in an unprovoked attack.

Plaintiff believes the instigation by a store clerk caused this patron to attack Plaintiff in a violent manner. Plaintiff also believes that employees of Albertsons made false statements in an attempt to conceal the crimes that occurred inside the Property. On September 8, 2025, Mand filed his complaint in this action against Albertsons. On April 8, 2026, the Court granted a motion to strike the punitive damages portion of Plaintiff's complaint, and Plaintiff was ordered to file and serve a first amended complaint no later than April 23, 2026.

He failed to do so. On May 4, 2026, Albertsons answered the complaint with a general denial and 18 affirmative defenses, including the affirmative defense that the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On June 30, 2026, Albertsons filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the action is time-barred pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions. Plaintiff was properly served with the motion on June 30, 2026, but has not filed opposition or any other response to the motion.

Analysis: A Defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings if "[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that Defendant." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) "The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the Court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion is based on a matter of which the Court may take judicial notice pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, the matter shall be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points and authorities, except as the Court may otherwise permit." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (d).) "Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed." (Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1174.) "All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law; judicially noticeable matters may be considered. [Citations.]" (Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins.

Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.) "An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another" must be commenced within two years. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 335.1.)