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25CV473914·santaclara·Civil·Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
Hearing in about 3 hoursGRANTED

Gyorgy Sofalvi v. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation et al.

Petition to compel arbitration

Hearing date
Aug 20, 2026
Department
10
Prevailing
Moving Party

Motion type

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Parties

PlaintiffGyorgy Sofalvi
DefendantFord Motor Company
DefendantFFBH Motors LLC

Attorneys

Trina Claytonfor Defendant

Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

DATE: August 20, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 24CV451704 Teresa Bucciarelli et al. v. Click LINE 1 or scroll down for ruling. Alem Imru et al. Line 2 24CV453289 American Express National Click LINE 2 or scroll down for ruling. Bank v. Olga Buchonina Line 3 25CV471047 Hang Sheng et al. v. Defendants Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. and Preg San Prometheus Real Estate Antonio Apartments, LP’s motion to compel further responses to Group, Inc. et al. (1) form and special interrogatories, set one, against plaintiff Hang Sheng; and (2) special interrogatories, set one, against plaintiff Chao Xu.

Notice is proper and the motion is opposed by plaintiffs. Defendants’ meet and confer declaration regarding e-mail messages sent to plaintiffs does not comply with the current version of Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040, subdivision (a), which requires “facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Italics added.) Defendants’ motion also lacks the separate statement required for a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(2).) The court declines defendants’ request to overlook those deficiencies. The motion to compel is denied. The court will prepare the order. Line 4 25CV473914 Gyorgy Sofalvi v. Ford Click LINE 4 or scroll down for ruling. Motor Company, a Delaware corporation et al.

Calendar Line 4 Case Name: George Sofalvi v. Ford Motor Company et al. Case No.: 25CV473914

Plaintiff George Sofalvi (Plaintiff) purchased a 2023 Ford F150 (Subject Vehicle) in October 2022 from FFBH Motors LLC (Dealership). (Complaint at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges the Subject Vehicle manifested defects covered by express written warranties. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff delivered the Subject Vehicle for repair. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges Dealership failed to repair the Subject Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff sued Dealership and Ford Motor Company in August 2025 for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

At issue is Dealership’s petition to compel arbitration, based on the Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC) signed by Plaintiff and Dealership when Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff filed three copies of a declaration instead of filing an opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the language of the RISC’s arbitration provision and the circumstances of its execution, the court will grant the petition and stay the action.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs the arbitration provision based on the language of the provision and because the agreement affects interstate commerce. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at pp. 6:17-19.) The arbitration provision states “[a]ny arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” (Declaration of Trina Clayton [“Clayton Decl.”], Ex. A at p. 5.) Under the FAA, the court’s role is limited to determining “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Chiron Corp. v.

Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) To determine “whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists,” courts apply “ordinary state law principles that govern contract formation.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1093, citations omitted.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 provides: “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or [¶] (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.”

In determining the threshold question of whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the court employs a three-step burden shifting analysis. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere); Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the initial burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show a factual dispute regarding the agreement’s existence. If the opposing party does so, then the burden shifts back to the proponent of arbitration to show the existence of a valid agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.)

ANALYSIS

There is a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate

The arbitration provision in the RISC provides, in relevant part:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, any allegation of waiver of rights under this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Clayton Decl., Ex. A at p. 5.) Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the RISC when he purchased the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff signed and acknowledged the following notice of the arbitration provision: “Agreement to Arbitrate. By signing below, you agree that pursuant to the Arbitration Provision on page 5 of this contract, you or we may elect to resolve any dispute by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. See the Arbitration Provision for additional information concerning the agreement to arbitrate.” (Id..

Ex. A at p. 1.) The RISC further drew the arbitration provision to Plaintiffs’ attention through the following disclaimer: “YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE READ BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONTRACT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION ON PAGE 5, BEFORE SIGNING BELOW.” (Id., Ex. A at p. 6.) Plaintiff’s signature on those sections of the RISC indicates express assent to the arbitration provision. (See Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 777 [“ ‘ “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.” ’ ”].)

“The moving party ‘can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature. Alternatively, the moving party can meet is burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion.’ ” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, internal citations and quotations omitted.) Here, Dealership attached a copy of the RISC signed by Plaintiff as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Trina Clayton. Dealership has also set forth the terms of the arbitration provision in the motion itself. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at pp. 3:10-4:3.)

To the extent Plaintiff argues he was unaware of the arbitration provision, he nevertheless acknowledges signing the RISC. (Declaration of George Sofalvi at ¶¶ 3, 4.) “An arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) The general rule is that “one who assents to a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language.” (Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373, 383.) Furthermore, the arbitration provision was contained in an outlined box with bold and capitalized font on page five of the RISC. There is a valid agreement to arbitrate. 7

The Scope of the Arbitration Agreement Covers Plaintiff’s Claims

The scope of the arbitration provision covers Plaintiff’s claims. The arbitration provision broadly applies to “[a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise..., between you and us..., which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship.” (Clayton Decl., Ex. A at p. 5.) Plaintiff has sued Dealership for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; the complaint does not differentiate between defendants, meaning all causes of action are alleged against all defendants.

These are statutory claims relating to the condition or purchase of the vehicle following repair by the Dealership. Plaintiff and Dealership are the parties to the transaction. That the alleged repair occurred after the parties signed the RISC is ultimately irrelevant because the arbitration provision states it applies to both “this contract” and “any resulting transaction or relationship” between the parties. Plaintiff’s claims against Dealership are covered by the arbitration provision.

It appears that Plaintiff’s unfiled opposition argues manufacturer warranties are not part of the sale, and the claims are not rooted in the purchase agreement. (Reply at p. 5:23-26 [citing Opposition at p. 6:17-9:5].) Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122, determined that manufacturer warranties are not part of a purchase agreement with a dealership. That opinion is distinguishable. Ford Motor Warranty Cases involved an attempt by an automobile manufacturer to compel arbitration based on a sales contract between a buyer and a dealership to which the manufacturer was not a party.

The Supreme Court rejected the manufacturer’s attempt to compel arbitration on a third party equitable estoppel theory. (Id. at p. 1126.) By contrast, here the entity petitioning to compel arbitration is a party to the contract containing the arbitration provision. The RISC is an agreement Plaintiff entered into with Dealership. As the dealership and a party to the agreement, Dealership may compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims.

The petition to compel arbitration is granted. The court does not reach Dealership’s arguments about lack of waiver and lack of unconscionability.

This Action is Stayed in its Entirety

Dealership requests a stay of the entire action. As Dealership notes, Plaintiff has sued two entities, Ford Motor Company and Dealership, for the same causes of action. Dealership argues, “[g]iven those allegations, clearly countless issues will overlap between the arbitration and this action, should the Court retain jurisdiction of the claims against Ford.” (Reply at pp. 8:26-9:1.) Only Plaintiff’s claims against Dealership are subject to arbitration. The claims against Ford Motor Company are not subject to arbitration under the RISC. But to avoid inconsistent rulings, a stay of these proceedings is proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4 and 9 U.S.C. § 3. The court STAYS this action in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.

CONCLUSION

The petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This action is STAYED in its entirety pending the outcome of arbitration.

The trial setting conference scheduled for August 25, 2026, is vacated. The court will hold a case status review regarding arbitration on August 5, 2027, at 11:00 a.m. in Department 10.

The court will prepare the order.

- oo0oo -

9

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