Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. RC's Towing

attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2033.280(c).) Splendore requests discovery sanctions in the amount of $960.00 in connection with each discovery motion. This total comprises 1 hour to prepare each Motion, 1 hour to prepare a Reply, and 1 hour to attend the hearing at counsel's hourly rate of $300.00. (See e.g. SROGs Barseghian Decl., P. 8.) Splendore also incurred a $60.00 filing fee for each motion. (See id.)

The Court awards Splendore discovery sanctions of $840.00. The Court finds 1.5 hours to prepare 4 routine, substantially similar discovery motions and 0.5 hours to remotely appear at the hearing and counsel's hourly rate is reasonable. The Court also awards the filing fees. Brockett is ordered to pay Plaintiff's counsel $840.00 on or before September 30, 2026. VI. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Splendore's Motions to Compel SROGs, FROGs, and RFPs. The Court GRANTS Splendore's Motion to Deem RFAs Admitted.

Brockett is ordered to provide responses without objection on or before September 4, 2026. Brockett's counsel is ordered to pay Plaintiff's counsel $840.00 on or before September 30, 2026. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 19, 2026 Hon. Michael R. Amerian Judge, Superior Court | [1] All statutory references are to California codes unless stated otherwise.

default judgment for the following reasons: 1. Statement of Damages requirement is unsatisfied. A Statement of Damages is not filed with the Court nor mentioned in the 585 declaration. Thus, it appears it was not served prior to entry of default as required. The SOD must be served on Defendant and default requested again because the Court will be striking entry of default.

2. Evidence regarding loss of earnings/future earnings is insufficient. The submitted evidence does not support a conclusion Plaintiffs have incurred losses in earnings or future earnings due to any reputational harm. In addition, the Court will issue a separate order denying Plaintiff's Application to Seal. In short, while the Court finds the allegedly defamatory statements are so inflammatory that allowing them to remain public will serve to advance Defendant's allegedly malicious intent to defame Plaintiffs more than allowing them to remain public will serve the right of public access, Plaintiff's request is not narrowly to Plaintiffs' interest. That separate order will provide further detail on which information should and shouldn't be redacted. Case Number: 26VECV00828 Hearing Date: August 19, 2026 Dept: O SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff, vs. RC'S TOWING; and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, Defendant. |)))))))))))))) | CASE NO.: 26VECV00828 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT | I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Creditors Adjustment Bureau, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), a collection agency, filed this breach of contract action against RC's Towing. Plaintiff alleges State Compensation Insurance Fund ("SCIF") assigned Defendant's account to it. Plaintiff alleges Defendant became indebted to SCIF for failure to pay the balance owed in connection with three consecutive workers' compensation insurance policies issued by SCIF to Defendant. Defendant moves to set aside the default entered against it. /// II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February

9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging three causes of action for breach of contract. On April 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint to correct Defendant's name to RC's Towing, Inc. AKA RC's Towing Inc. On June 26, 2026, the Court entered default against Defendant. On July 8, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion. On August 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. As of August 12, 2026, no reply has been filed. III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Discretionary or Mandatory Relief - Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 473(b) "The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken..." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 473(b).) [1] Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 473(b) "provides for both discretionary and mandatory relief. [Citation.]" (Pagnini v. Union Bank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 298, 302.)

For discretionary relief, "[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken." ¿ (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 473(b).) A moving party need only establish "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" by a preponderance of the evidence. (Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 62.) Excusable neglect exists where counsel or the party acted as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances. (See Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206; See also Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.)

IV. ANALYSIS Defendant requests relief from default on grounds of excusable neglect. (See Mot. at 5:6.) Defendant contends that when his principal and agent for service of process, Roni Corado ("Corado"), learned of this action from an employee, Corado was dealing with health issues abroad and his illness materially impaired his ability to recognize the significance and urgency of the documents. (See Mot. at 3:11-16, 5:10-12.) Corado attests he has been abroad since August 6, 2025, during which he was diagnosed with acute stress, diabetes, and high blood pressure. (See Declaration of Roni Corado filed July 8, 2026 ("Corado Decl."), P.P. 3-4.)

Corado attests he misunderstood the nature of Plaintiff's claim "and did not understand that a lawsuit had been filed requiring a formal legal response within a specific time" or that "failure to respond could result in a default being entered against RC's Towing, Inc." (Id., P.P. 6-7.) Upon learning of the default, Corado secured counsel. (See id., P. 9.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant's conduct, as in Goodson, cannot constitute mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect warranting relief under the statute. (See Opp. at 5:12-22, citing Goodson v.

Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 40.) Plaintiff argues the summons plainly states, in bold type, that a written response must be filed within 30 calendar days after service and suggests that the party "call an attorney referral service" or consider free legal services. (See Opp. at 5:25-26, 6:10-14.) Plaintiff argues a party's failure to read the summons and ascertain that deadline is not the type of mistake or neglect warranting relief under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 473. The Court agrees with Plaintiff and will deny the Motion.

Goodson is applicable to the facts here. Goodson holds, "If, having received the cross-complaint, plaintiff, as he claims, did not 'understand its significance' or know 'of the requirement that (he) file an answer thereto,' he should have consulted a lawyer. As said in Berset v. Berset, 126 Cal.App.2d 684, 687, 272 P.2d 868, 870, 'There was no substantial showing of excusable neglect to make an appearance in the action. A defendant who has 'no confidence in his ability to decipher legal jargon' in a summons, even 'if it were read by him,' knows that he should consult a lawyer.

If he neglects to do so he cannot plead ignorance of the contents of the summons.' Moreover, a motion for relief from a default judgment under section 473 ordinarily will be denied unless it appears that in arranging for his defense a party has exercised such reasonable diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon an important business matter. [Citation.]" Goodson, 252 Cal.App.2d at 40 [citation omitted]; see also McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 414-15 [duty to "take timely and adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an undesirable judgment."].)

Similarly here, Corado states he misunderstood the nature of the documents served on him, believing they were nonurgent and corresponded to an outstanding billing dispute. However, there is no showing of excusable neglect here where Corado failed

to understand the nature of the documents and failed to consult an attorney until after default had been entered against him. This evidence shows the absence of ordinary care. Further, although Corado attests he was managing health issues at the time he learned of this action, there is no evidence Corado's illness caused him to be unable to understand he was served with process. (See Corado Decl., P. 6; see also Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App. 2d 196, 207-208.) Although the Court is sympathetic to Corado's health issues, that he was preoccupied with the same is not ground for relief as he had the duty to promptly retain or consult counsel.

Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 19, 2026 Hon. Michael R. Amerian Judge, Superior Court | [1] All statutory references are to California codes unless stated otherwise. Case Number: 26VECV01958 Hearing Date: August 19, 2026 Dept: O SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT ISRAEL ALCANTARA, an individual, SUSANA PAROCUA, an individual, DANNY SEBASTIAN ALCANTARA, an individual, LOPEZ EMMANUEL ALEXANDER, an individual, ROCHA DIAZ JORGE ARMANDO, an individual, ANTONIO ZOQUITECATL ORTIZ, an individual, Plaintiff, vs.

CNC PROPERTIES, LLC, a California limited liability company, ATLANTIC STAR, LLC, a California limited liability company, KYUNG MI CHOI, an individual, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants. |))))))))))))