Francisco Maciel Garcia, et al. v. FCA US LLC, et al.

The parties are directed to view and follow the instructions contained in the two memos on the Court's website (https://www.lacourt.org/courtroominformation/COM/E) regarding instructions on how to prepare for trial in Department E. [1] The exhibits referenced are attached to the Declaration of Jovanni Villa filed in support of Hyundai's Motion. [2] Rosas and Naston's declaration are nearly identical; where reference is made to one, the same language/declared facts exists in the other. [3] It is undoubtedly true that "manufacturer vehicle warranties that accompany the sale of motor vehicles without regard to the terms of the sale contract between the purchaser and the dealer are independent of the sale contract." (Ford Motor Warranty Cases, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1334.)

The warranty at issue here, though independent of the sale contract, remains a realization of a benefit offered via the sale transaction. (See Civ. Code Sec. 1792.1(a)(1)("'Express warranty' means [a] written statement arising out of a sale to the consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the consumer good or provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance"); see also Comm.

Code Sec. 2313 ("Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise").) [4] The Court notes here that the warranty agreement is not unenforceable in its entirety for lack of sufficient consideration. What is unenforceable is the addition of an arbitration agreement, which addition differs from the parties' contemplations when entering into the sales agreement, without any consideration.

OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT FRANCISCO MACIEL GARCIA AND ABRAHAM MACIEL, Plaintiffs, vs. FCA US LLC; HADDAD DODGE RAM; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |)))))

)))))))))) | CASE NO: 25CMCV01878 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT FCA US, LLC'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DATE: August 19, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Party: Defendant FCA US, LLC Responding Parties: Plaintiffs Francisco Maciel Garcia and Abraham Maciel Notice: OK SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED. SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT I. BACKGROUND This is a Song-Beverly action regarding an allegedly defective 2022 Ram 250 (the "Subject Vehicle").

Plaintiffs Francisco Maciel Garcia and Abraham Maciel (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") allege that the Subject Vehicle was warranted, manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant FCA US, LLC ("FCA"). On or about May 25, 2022, Plaintiffs entered a warranty contract with FCA regarding the Subject Vehicle, but Plaintiff alleges that various defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested within the applicable express warranty period. And Plaintiffs allege they delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant Haddad Dodge Ram ("Haddad") on at least one occasion, but that Haddad breached duties owed to Plaintiffs to repair the Subject Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.

On November 4, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint against Defendants FCA, Haddad, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive (collectively, the "Defendants"), alleging causes of action for: (1) Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (2) Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (3) Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civ. Code, Sec. 1791.1; Sec. 1794; Sec. 1795.5); (5) Negligent Repair; and (6) Fraudulent Inducement Concealment.

On July 17, 2026, 2026, FCA filed the instant Motion for Sanctions. On July 31, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition. On August 12, 2025, FCA filed its Reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 871.26 mandates that a defendant in a Song-Beverly Act matter provide initial disclosures to the plaintiff (and vice versa) "[w]ithin 60 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 871.26(h).) Unless the party failing to provide initial disclosures shows good cause, and notwithstanding any other law and in addition to any other sanctions imposed, Section 871.26 [1] mandates the imposition of sanctions in an amount ranging from $1,500 to $2,500, to be paid within 15 business days. (Id., Sec. 871.26(j).)

III. ANALYSIS A.

Discussion

FCA argues Plaintiffs were required to provide all mandatory disclosures by April 10, 2025 [2] but have failed to do produce the documents required by Section 871.26(f) and failed to provide complete information in response to Section 871.26(g). Accordingly, FCA moves for $1,500.00 in sanctions pursuant to Section 871.26(j)(1).

In opposition, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have not complied with Section 871.26 and dispute FCA's motion "only to the extent it seeks an order compelling immediate production of documents and information that Plaintiffs have been unable to locate despite diligent, ongoing efforts" and instead request a 30-day continuance "to complete their search and supplement their disclosures." (Opp., p. 2:4-8.)

FCA does not request an order compelling production of documents or an order compelling Plaintiffs to provide complete information; FCA only requests monetary sanctions as required pursuant to Section 871.26(j)(1) for Plaintiff's failure to complete the initial disclosures. As Plaintiffs do not dispute that the have failed to comply with Section 871.26, the Court finds monetary sanctions are mandatory and warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

FCA's Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $1,500.00. The awarded sanctions are against Plaintiff's counsel only and are ordered to be paid to FCA's counsel no later than September 15, 2026.

Unspecified Section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

The dates provided by FCA are incorrect. FCA's counsel declares that FCA filed its responsive pleading "[o]n February 9, 2025" making "Plaintiff's mandatory disclosures [] due on or before April 10, 2025." (Lopez Decl., P.P. 2-3.) But this matter was not filed until November 4, 2025. (See Complaint, filed 11/4/25.) And FCA's Answer was filed on February 9, 2026, not February 9, 2025. (See Answer, filed 12/8/25.) Although counsel's attested dates and calculations are incorrect, the Court is able to discern the correct dates from the Court's docket, the parties' pleadings and the attached exhibits. Accordingly, the Court continues with its analysis using the corrected dates.

Case Number: 25CMUD01035 Hearing Date: August 19, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT BUSINESS PURPOSE FUNDING, INC., Plaintiff, vs. FLOR ANTONIO; GLORIA ANGELICA URIZAR, IGNACIO SANCHEZ, DOES 1 TO 10; ET AL., Defendants. |))))))))))))) |