DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 25 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept25 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 1342 1868. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

APPEARANCE REQUIRED.

The Court issues the following ruling on the OSC re: preliminary injunction. Plaintiff Disabled American Veterans Sacramento Chapter # 6, a California nonprofit organization (“Plaintiff” or “DAV Sacramento”) commenced this action on December 29, 2025, by filing its verified complaint against Defendant Disabled American Veterans National, a Kentucky nonprofit corporation. On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed the operative verified first amended complaint (“1AC”), alleging claims against Disabled American Veterans National, a Federal Nonprofit Corporation (“Defendant” or “DAV National”).

Plaintiff alleges that this action arises from Defendant’s “attempt to coerce Plaintiff . . . into surrendering a completed charitable trust distribution by threatening revocation or suspension of Plaintiff’s charter.” (1AC, ¶ II, emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff alleges that the funds at issue ($39,873.73) were lawfully distributed on August 26, 2024, pursuant to a final probate distribution order from the Margaret Seneshen Revocable Living Trust, and the distribution was completed, approved by court order, and is final. (1AC, ¶ 1.)

According to Plaintiff, Defendant was not a named beneficiary of the trust, nor did Defendant participate in the probate proceedings, object to the distribution, or otherwise appeal the final order. (1AC, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that despite this, Defendant now asserts, based solely on internal bylaws and a regulation adopted after the distribution, that Plaintiff must surrender the funds or face suspension or revocation of its charter. (1AC, ¶ 3.)

Through this action, Plaintiff seeks:

 A judicial declaration that DAV National has no legal authority to override a final charitable trust distribution, and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

 An injunction prohibiting DAV National from using its superior organizational position to coerce surrender of charitable assets through charter threats.

(1AC, ¶ 4, emphasis omitted.)

On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed its ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and order to show cause re: injunctive relief and for an order shortening time to apply for relief. On January 2, 2026, the Court (Hon. Peter K. Southworth) denied the request without prejudice to its resubmission, finding “[n]o showing of irreparable harm.” (1/2/2026 Order.)

On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed another parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and order to show cause re: injunctive relief and for an order shortening time to apply for relief. In its ex parte application, Plaintiff sought an order restraining and enjoining Defendant, and all persons acting in concert with Defendant, from:

1. Suspending, threatening to suspend, or otherwise interfering with Petitioner’s charter or operation due to its lawful retention of charitable assets from the Margaret Seneshen Revocable Trust;

2. Demanding, coercing, or compelling Petitioner to surrender, transfer, or otherwise relinquish possession or control of the $39,873.73 charitable distribution issued pursuant to the trust and probate court order; and

3. Making any adverse actions or representations concerning said funds that undermine Petitioner’s ability to administer them consistent with donor intent.

(Notice of Ex Parte Application at 2:5-14.) On January 7, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s ex parte application:

The Court DENIES the ex parte application, as Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing that a temporary restraining order is needed to preserve the status quo pending a full evidentiary hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has not made a showing of irreparable harm or irreparable injury if a temporary restraining order does not issue.

(1/7/26 Order.) The Court also issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) re: preliminary

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

injunction to show cause why Defendant should not be enjoined in the manner requested by Plaintiff. (Ibid.)

Legal Standard

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim[s]. [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554, citations omitted.) “The purpose of such an order ‘is to preserve the status quo . . . . It ‘does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305, citations omitted.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 526 provides in pertinent part:

(a) An injunction may be granted in the following cases: (1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.

(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.

(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.

(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.

(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.

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25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

Additionally, “the issuance of an injunction involves ‘ . . . the exercise of a delicate power, requiring great caution and sound discretion, and rarely, if ever, should [it] be exercised in a doubtful case. [Citations.]’” (Paiva v. Nichols (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1021-1022, citing Fleishman v. Sup. Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 350, 355-356.) Among the factors to be considered when injunctive relief is sought is whether the moving party will, absent such relief, suffer great or irreparable harm for which pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief or where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §526(a)(2), (4), (5); Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 457.)

“A superior court must evaluate two interrelated factors when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749; see also Amgen Inc. v. Health Care Services (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 716, 731; Doe v. Regents of University of California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 766, 773.)

Although an OSC directs the defendant “to show cause” why a preliminary injunction should not issue, the burden is on plaintiff (moving party) to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (See O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Discussion

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

One well-established prerequisite for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief is that the moving party must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claims asserted in the party’s pleadings. (See, e.g., Jay Bharat Developers, Inc. v. Mindis (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 437, 443; White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.)

Plaintiff contends that it is likely to prevail because the governing trust instrument and court orders expressly support Plaintiff’s position that a final order is binding upon all interested parties; Defendant’s actions are ultra vires, unauthorized, and/or contrary to

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25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

law; and declaratory relief is necessary to resolve an actual, present controversy. (Mov. MPA, p. 15:13-17.)

In opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot meet its burden because it knowingly violated mandatory reporting obligations, concealed a bequest naming “Disabled American Veterans” as the beneficiary, retained those funds for nearly a year without disclosure, and refused repeated lawful demands to remit the funds. (Opp’n, p. 5:7-9.) Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Bequest Reporting Program (“BRP”), which was in effect at the pertinent time, Defendant had no knowledge of the Trust bequest nor the probate proceedings. (See Hall Decl., ¶ 11.)

For this reason, Defendant’s subsequent actions of demanding remission of the $39,873.73 Plaintiff obtained, and the eventual revocation of the charter under National Bylaws, were not arbitrary, but rather a direct response to Plaintiff’s breach of its fiduciary and organizational duties. Accordingly, as Defendant argues, Plaintiff cannot show any likelihood of success on the merits of its claim

On reply, Plaintiff emphasizes that a final court order adjudicated its right to the bequest, and the court’s distribution order is a final judgment conclusive of the parties’ rights. (Reply, p. 7: 27-28, citing Prob. Code, § 11605.)

Through this action, in its first cause of action, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that: (1) “DAV is not a beneficiary of the Margaret Seneshen Trust”; “The August 26, 2024 distribution to Plaintiff was valid, final and consistent with owner intent”; (3) “Defendant has no authority to compel surrender of the funds”; and (4) “Defendant’s internal bylaws and regulations cannot retroactively impair a final court-approved distribution.” Based on the allegations above, Plaintiff also pleads claims for injunctive relief and for unlawful interference with charitable trust administration.[1]

Here, Plaintiff proffers that on August 26, 2024, it received a charitable distribution in the amount of $39,873.73 from the Margaret Seneshen Trust (the “Trust”), pursuant to a probate court order approving the distribution. (Tafoya Decl. (ISO “Resubmitted” Request, filed 1/6/26), ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) Plaintiff maintains that this order constituted a final judgment which Defendant did not challenge, object to, appeal, or otherwise seek to vacate. Plaintiff further proffers that on October 2, 2024, a Request for Dismissal was filed in the Trust matter, thus closing the Trust. (Id., at ¶ 4, Exh. 2.)

Probate Code section 11605 provides that, “[w]hen a court order made under this chapter becomes final, the order binds and is conclusive as to the rights of all interested

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

persons.” While certain notice requirements are set forth in Probate Code section 11701, Probate Code section 11705(b) expressly states: “[w]hen the court order becomes final it binds and is conclusive as to the rights of all interested persons.” The language of these statutes strongly suggests a degree of finality once a distribution order becomes final.

Based on the Probate Code, the Court finds that there is some possibility of success regarding Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief to the extent they assert that the final order of the Probate Court is binding and conclusive and that the initial distribution to Plaintiff was in accordance with such an order.

Nevertheless, the inquiry does not end there, as such a finding would not necessarily entitle Plaintiff to the injunctive relief sought in this motion. Rather, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief amounts to a request that the Court conclude that Plaintiff can keep the bequest and continue with its Charter, despite conduct that appears to expressly violate the requirements of the Defendant, the National Organization to which Plaintiff is subordinate and which has the power to grant or revoke charters. Nothing in any distribution correspondence or court order appears to address the obligations between Plaintiff and Defendant pursuant to the applicable Constitution, Bylaws, rules, mandates, or regulations.[2] Plaintiff does not meet his burden with respect to these issues.

Defendant contends that it is a federally incorporated nonprofit organization and was incorporated by an Act of Congress on June 17, 1932. (Opp’n, citing 36 U.S.C § 50301.) Defendant’s governing documents include the National Constitution, the National Bylaws, and the Regulations of the National Executive Committee, to which all subordinate entities are obligated to obey. (Hall Decl., ¶ 3.) Defendant proffers that pursuant to the National Bylaws, Defendant may grant or revoke charters of state departments and chapters. (Hall Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. A at p. 23, Article 6 [stating “The National Executive Committee may grant or revoke charters of state departments and chapters in any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any territorial possession of the United States.”].) Specifically, Section 6.4 of the Bylaws provide, in relevant part:

(d): The National Commander, in his or her sole discretion, may revoke the charter of a subordinate unit for violations of the Constitution and Bylaws of the Organization, or refusal to comply with his or her lawful orders, the lawful orders of the National Convention, the National Executive Committee, the state

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

commander or the department executive committee, or for losing and failing to retain its tax-exemption issued by the Internal Revenue Service. In all cases, the National Commander shall notify such unit by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, of his or her decision, giving the reasons therefor. If the subordinate unit’s charter is revoked due to losing and failing to retain its tax-exemption with the IRS, the decision is final. Otherwise, the National Commander will advise such unit that it may, within thirty days after receipt of notification, file a request by Certified Mail, Return Requested, with the National Adjutant, asking that it be allowed to appear before the National Executive Committee to present evidence why its charter should not be revoked.

If such a hearing request is filed within the thirty day period, the National Adjutant shall schedule the date, time and place for the hearing before the National Executive Committee and shall notify such unit by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, of this information. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the National Executive Committee shall either adopt or reject the National Commander’s decision for the charter revocation. In the event that such unit does not file a written request, in the manner herein provided, for a hearing before the National Executive Committee, no such hearing shall be held.

(Hall Decl., Exh. A at pp. 25-26, emphasis added.)

Defendant further proffers that each subordinate entity operates within the framework and standards established by the national organization and is accountable through the Disabled American Veterans chain of command to Defendant. (Hall Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff, as a chapter chartered by the Disabled American Veterans, is subordinate to both Defendant and the Disabled American Veterans California State Department. (Hall Decl., ¶ 7.) Pursuant to Plaintiff’s Certificate of Amendment of Original Articles of Incorporation, filed with the California Secretary of State on March 27, 1991, Plaintiff affirmed its “allegiance to the said National Organization, its Constitution, Bylaws and all rules, mandates and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.” (Hall Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. C.)

Defendant presents evidence that, effective October 1, 2020, Defendant implemented the BRP, which requires departments and chapters to “inform the national organization whenever there is a notification of a new bequest.” (Hall Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. D.) Through a July 23, 2020 Memo from the National Adjutant, “departments and chapters will be required to inform the national organization whenever there is notification of a new bequest.” (Id.) The Memo described the reporting process and noted that if the bequest is intended to go to a chapter, it will be remitted to that organization, but that if there is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

ambiguity regarding bequest designation, “the national organization will assist the affected parties in working out a compromise.” (Id.) Subsequently, the National Adjutant sent a memo explaining that “compliance with the Bequest Reporting Program is not discretionary.” (Exh. E to Hall Decl. [emphasis added]) The National Adjutant noted that in circumstances where the chapter has already received a monetary distribution, “the chapter or department may have already spent the funds and is now in a position where it has to pay back the national organization.” (Ibid.)

Despite these directives and an outline for the Step-by-Step Process for Review of Testamentary Gifts to Departments/Chapters sent in March 2024 (see Hall Decl., ¶ 10 Exhs. F), unbeknownst to Defendant, on August 26, 2024, Plaintiff received the distribution at issue from the Trust. Defendant presents evidence that, Defendant did not learn of the distribution until nearly one year later, after August 21, 2025, when Plaintiff filed its Annual Financial Report. (Hall. Decl. ¶ 11.)

Upon review, Defendant “confirmed that the Trust (Section 7.6.3) specifically designated ‘DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS’ as the beneficiary.” (Hall Decl., ¶ 12, Exh. H[3].) Subsequently, counsel for the Trustee of the Trust informed Defendant that there were “no representations about a specific chapter of DAV” and requested confirmation regarding which Chapter will be receiving the distribution.” (Hall Decl., ¶ 14, Exh. J.)

In this case, the Court finds that, based on the above evidence, Plaintiff received multiple mandates regarding the handling of bequests from the National Adjutant (who serves as the organization’s CEO), on behalf of Defendant. Defendant presents evidence, that is not disputed, that Plaintiff failed to comply with these mandates by failing to report the bequest at all until approximately August 2025. The Court also found that the directives indicated that Defendant would be involved in the determination of donor intent in distribution of the any bequests between the national organization and chapters/departments.

Plaintiff’s conduct was directly contrary to this policy. Based on the record before the Court, the Court does not find that the directives in this case were unlawful. Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff submitted itself to the “Constitution, Bylaws, and all rules, mandates and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.” (Hall Decl., Exh. C.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s failure to follow the mandates of the Bequest Reporting Program invoke Defendant’s ability to revoke the Plaintiff’s charter and all consequences flowing from that.

Indeed, the letter notifying Plaintiff of the revocation of charter noted that “the Chapter has failed to report receiving funds from the Margaret Seneshen Trust (Trust) to the Bequest Reporting Program which became effective on October 1, 2020.” (Hall Decl., Exh. M.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

Considering the proffered evidence, for purposes of this preliminary injunction, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood, nor even some probability, of prevailing on the merits with respect to the issues required to support the injunctive relief requested.

B. Irreparable Harm/Injury

Irreparable harm is another prerequisite for preliminary injunctive relief and this requirement is typically satisfied by a showing that monetary compensation would not afford adequate relief or that it would be difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 526(a)(4), (5).) Relief is unlikely unless someone will be significantly hurt in a way that cannot later be repaired. (People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 863, 870-871.)

The threat of “irreparable harm” must be imminent. “An injunction cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future. . . [i]t must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084.)

Plaintiff primarily contends that it will suffer irreparable harm, absent a preliminary injunction, as the revocation of its charter and an order to cease operations would inflict upon it injuries which would threaten “the life of the organization” (Reply, pp. 6:5-17, 7:14-16.)

In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff must show harm that is imminent, substantial, and not compensable by money damages, and Plaintiff cannot meet this burden. (Opp’n, p. 17:2-3.) Further, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s alleged injury arises entirely from the revocation of Plaintiff’ charter following Plaintiff’s admitted failure to comply with mandatory organizational rules and lawful orders. (Opp’n, p. 17:3-5.) According to Defendant, any purported harm flowing from that revocation – such as loss of use of the Disabled American Veterans name, suspension of chapter activities, or reputational consequences – is economic and organizational in nature, and therefore compensable through damages or internal administrative remedies. (Opp’n, p. 17:5-8.)

As such, Defendant concludes that “Plaintiff makes no showing that it faces existential harm or irreversible consequences absent injunctive relief.” (Opp’n, p. 17:15-16.)

In this case, the Court finds that the any injury at issue is not irreparable or irreversible.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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As an initial matter, the Court notes that the revocation of the charter is not yet final, as Plaintiff can request a hearing within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice of revocation and request a hearing before the National Executive Committee. (Hall Decl., Exh. A at § 6.4(d).) However, even if the decision were final, there is no evidence before the Court that the revocation could be rendered invalid if Plaintiff were to prevail.[4] Further, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant, as the national organization, cannot continue to provide services to the Sacramento area in the absence of the charter while this litigation proceeds.

Indeed, Defendant presents evidence that Defendant will assign all chapter members (except Gilbert Tafoya) to a new chapter nearest their home (or elsewhere if they choose) after revocation is final (and that Gilbert Tafoya will be in the National At-Large Chapter). (Hall Decl., ¶ 18.)

More importantly, though, this matter appears to revolve around the entitlement to the money from the bequest. The Court notes that injunctions of any kind (even prohibitory) will rarely be granted where a suit for damages provides a clear remedy. (Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307; Pacific Decision Sciences Corp v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110.) “An injunction will not issue where ‘only money is involved’” because “there is no threat of irreparable harm, because monetary losses are compensable in damages.” (Doyka v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1136.) To obtain a preliminary injunction Plaintiff must demonstrate that monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy for the alleged wrongdoing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526(a)(4).) Plaintiff has not made such a showing.

Considering the proffered evidence, for purposes of this preliminary injunction, the Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden regarding irreparable injury/harm.

Disposition

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff does not expressly reference this cause of action in the

moving papers, set forth the elements of such a cause of action, nor discuss the facts

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25CV031509: DISABLED AMERICAN VETERENS SACRAMENTO CHAPTER #6, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION vs DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS NATIONAL, A KENTUCKY NONPROFIT CORPORATION 02/04/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction in Department 25

that would support its ability to prevail on such a cause of action. [2] The Court also notes that nothing in the evidence presented by Plaintiff shows an

express finding made regarding donor intent, vis-a-via Plaintiff and Defendant. [3] The Court notes, based on the Defendant’s redactions, it is unclear whether any

additional beneficiaries were listed in the Trust. [4] Plaintiff’s citation to Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (“Duarte”) (1986) 178

Cal.App.3d 1035, 1067 is distinguishable, as it addressed a request for a permanent injunction, after trial, not a preliminary injunction. After finding that the Plaintiff prevailed on the merits, the Court held that the “injury cause and perpetuated by International’s sex discrimination is both ‘great and irreparable’ and cannot adequately be compensated by money.” (Ibid.) Duarte does not stand for the proposition that any revocation of a charter is necessarily irreparable injury; rather, it was the policy of sex discrimination leading to the revocation that was great and irreparable. Plaintiff has not made such a showing here.

Similarly, in American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 292-293, the Court held that a trial court’s school board’s decision to revoke a charter school’s charter created irreparable harm where the plaintiff demonstrated “it would lose its faculty and student body” and students at the schools “would be deprived of the opportunity to obtain an education” at schools with higher test scores. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the “removal of elected leadership” during the pendency of this litigation does not create the same sort of harm.