BYRD vs TESLA INC., A TEXAS CORPORATION

25CV137572: BYRD vs TESLA INC., A TEXAS CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Tesla Inc., a Texas corporation (Defendant) CRS# 690015760996 in Department 19

Tentative Ruling - 08/17/2026 Joscelyn Jones

The Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Tesla Inc., a Texas corporation on 03/30/2026 is Granted.

The Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration by Defendant Tesla Inc. is GRANTED.

Plaintiff entered a Motor Vehicle Order Agreement (“the Agreement”) in which she agreed to arbitrate “any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla”. The claims asserted in this case fall within the scope of that arbitration agreement. Tesla moves to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration provision of the Agreement.

The Agreement contains an opt-out provision, and it states that if Plaintiff elects not to opt out of the Agreement, the Agreement overrides any different arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Tesla, including any arbitration agreement in a lease or finance contract. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not opt out of the Agreement. Therefore, the arbitration provision in the Retail Installment Sale Contract attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Raymond Kim is irrelevant to this motion.

Plaintiff’s opposition brief appears to dispute that she was aware of the arbitration agreement when she ordered her vehicle. However, Plaintiff has not submitted any admissible evidence (i.e., her own declaration) denying that when she ordered her Tesla vehicle, the website expressly informed her that by clicking the “Place Order” button, she was agreeing to the terms and conditions of the Agreement, including the arbitration provision. Plaintiff further fails to submit any admissible evidence disputing that the terms of the Agreement, including the arbitration provision, were readily available for review at the time she ordered her Tesla vehicle by clicking a hyperlink next to the “Place Order” button.

Plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because the Agreement is unconscionable. In order to oppose enforcement of an arbitration agreement based on unconscionability, Plaintiff must show that the agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (See, e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910.) Plaintiff fails to do so.

Plaintiff’s opposition brief argues that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion and she had no opportunity to negotiate its terms, which were not adequately disclosed. However, Plaintiff did not present any competent evidence (i.e., her own declaration) attesting that she had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the Agreement or that she was surprised by any language in the Agreement, including the arbitration provision. Nor could Plaintiff credibly claim to be surprised by the arbitration provision, which appears on page 3 of the 4 page Agreement, separated from the other text of the Agreement by a box, and following a boldface heading stating “Agreement to Arbitrate”. 25CV137572: BYRD vs TESLA INC., A TEXAS CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Tesla Inc., a Texas corporation (Defendant) CRS# 690015760996 in Department 19 Furthermore, the Agreement expressly gave Plaintiff the right to opt out of the arbitration agreement, but she did not do so.

An arbitration agreement is not adhesive if there is an opportunity to opt out of it. (Mohamed v. Uber Technologies Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 848 F.3d 1201, 1211.)

This case is distinguishable from Sanchez, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 913-915, because in Sanchez the defendant did not dispute that the contract at issue was adhesive, leading the court to conclude that plaintiff had demonstrated “some degree of procedural unconscionability.” Here, Tesla has not conceded that the Agreement was adhesive. Moreover, the Agreement expressly gave Plaintiff the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration provision, but Plaintiff did not avail herself of that opportunity.

Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Agreement or its arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable, the Court does not need to reach the issue of whether the Agreement is substantively unconscionable. However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any substantive unconscionability in the Agreement.

Plaintiff first argues that the class action waiver is substantively unconscionable because “it eliminates Plaintiff’s only realistic means for enforcing their rights.” Plaintiff cites no case holding that a waiver of the right to bring a class action for alleged violations of the Song Beverly Act is substantively unconscionable. Moreover, Plaintiff makes no evidentiary showing that a class action is the “only realistic means” of enforcing consumer rights under the Song Beverly Act. As Plaintiff’s counsel is surely aware, Song Beverly cases are typically brought on behalf of individual plaintiffs (as in this case), not as class actions.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement does not prevent Tesla from pursuing judicial remedies against Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff cites no language in the Agreement authorizing Tesla to pursue judicial remedies against Plaintiff. To the contrary, the Agreement states “any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator” administered by the AAA.

Third, Plaintiff refers to a purported fee splitting provision in the Retail Installment Sale Contract. That provision is irrelevant, because the operative arbitration provision is in the Agreement, not the Retail Installment Sale Contract. The Agreement clearly states that Tesla “will pay all AAA fees for any arbitration”.

The Court observes that the Declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel Lillian Lawrence is almost entirely inadmissible based on lack of personal knowledge or foundation. Lawrence demonstrates no personal knowledge that Plaintiff’s vehicle is (purportedly) defective; that Plaintiff took the vehicle to a repair facility; that Plaintiff had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the Agreement; or that neither party has a true and correct copy of the check-out screen from the time of Plaintiff’s order. The Court also observes that Exhibit A to Lawrence’s declaration cuts out the text at the bottom of the page and is therefore incomplete and inadmissible.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV137572: BYRD vs TESLA INC., A TEXAS CORPORATION 08/19/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by Tesla Inc., a Texas corporation (Defendant) CRS# 690015760996 in Department 19

Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate the claims asserted in this case, before the American Arbitration Association, pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in Plaintiff’s Motor Vehicle Order Agreement. This action is STAYED pending completion of the parties’ arbitration, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4.

The Initial Case Management Conference currently scheduled for September 1, 2026 is CONTINUED to August 31, 2027 at 3:00 p.m. in Department 19. By no later than August 16, 2027, the parties shall file a joint status report indicating whether the arbitration has been completed, or if not, the anticipated completion date for the arbitration.

The Initial Case Management Conference scheduled for 09/01/2026 is continued to 08/31/2027 at 03:00 PM in Department 19 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.