DOE vs RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME STRANDBOGE vs MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS CITRUS GRILLE CVRI2303356 COUNSEL FOR JENNIFER MANAGEMENT STRANDBOGE COMPANY, LLC. Tentative Ruling:

The motion to be relieved as counsel is granted. Counsel is relieved as counsel of record for client effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order being served upon client. If the proof of service is not filed, counsel will remain counsel of record for all purposes related to this action.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR SUMMARY DOE vs RIVERSIDE JUDGMENT OR IN THE CVRI2400625 UNIFIED SCHOOL ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY DISTRICT ADJUDICATION ON 3RD AMENDED COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling:

“[I]n order to avert summary judgment the plaintiff must produce substantial responsive evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact on the merits of the defendant’s showing. [Citations.] For this purpose, responsive evidence that gives rise to no more than mere speculation cannot be regarded as substantial, and is insufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.” (C.C.P. § 437c(h).)

The purpose of the declarations required by § 437c(h) is to inform the Court of outstanding discovery necessary to resist the summary judgment motion: “To be entitled to a continuance, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must show that its proposed discovery would have led to facts essential to justify opposition.” (Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307, 325-326.) Accordingly, the opposing party’s declaration in support of a motion to continue the hearing should show the

following: (1) facts establishing a likelihood that controverting evidence may exist and why the information sought is essential to opposing the motion; (2) the specific reasons why such evidence cannot be presented at the present time; (3) an estimate of the time necessary to obtain such evidence; and (4) the specific steps or procedures the opposing party intends to utilize to obtain such evidence. (Johnson v. Alameda County Medical Center (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 521, 532.)

However, the Fourth District favors continuing summary judgment motions to resolve matters on their merits, even where the need for a continuance is due to the party’s own lack of diligence and the request does not fully comply with the standards set forth in § 437c(h). (See Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 399-400 [holding that even if the need to continue a hearing on a motion for summary judgment to conduct outstanding discovery was due to a party’s lack of diligence, “the policy favoring disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy favoring judicial efficiency.”]; Levingston v.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 309 [finding that the trial court had erred in denying a request to continue a summary judgment motion even where the request was made at the hearing and the party had not met the standard for a continuance under C.C.P. § 437c(h)].)

In her Opposition, Plaintiff requests a continuance under C.C.P. § 437c(h) to conduct further discovery, specifically depositions of District’s employees who submitted declarations in support of District’s MSJ (Wilson, Ralston, and Ayala), and aides for Plaintiff and L.H.’s classrooms. (Opp., pp. 23-25; Rudin Decl. ¶ 27-36.) Plaintiff’s counsel attests that Plaintiff previously attempted to depose District’s employees, but that District could not produce them before Plaintiff’s opposition was due because District could not produce non-administrative employees, including Plaintiff’s teacher, Wilson, until after the summer break ended on August 6, 2026. (Rudin Decl., ¶ 29 and 31.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently established that facts essential to justify her opposition to the MSJ may exist but cannot, for the above reasons stated, be presented in order to justify a continuance of the MSJ and trial in this matter. (C.C.P. § 437c(h).) Although the Court previously denied the parties’ joint stipulation to continue the MSJ, MSC, and trial based on the same arguments above, Plaintiff’s prior request to continue the MSJ and trial was not made under C.C.P. § 437c(h), as it is now.

Given the Fourth District’s liberal policy of continuing MSJs in favor of resolving cases on their merits, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request to continue the MSJ and trial in this matter.

The parties’ earlier stipulation agreed to continue trial and the MSJ for 60 to 90 days. As such, the Court continues the MSJ to October 12, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., and the Jury Trial to November 20, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., to allow Plaintiff to conduct outstanding discovery to oppose the MSJ, specifically, to take the depositions of District’s employees, including Wilson, Ralston, Ayala, and the aides in Plaintiff and L.H.’s classrooms.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.