| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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Motion to compel binding contractual arbitration
A judgment . . . when based upon . . .the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court . . . for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment: (2) a judgment. . . not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.
In this case, there was a jury trial. The jury found that defendant engaged in conduct with malice. (ROA 923). Thereafter, the jury awarded punitive damages. (ROA 924).
Therefore, the judgment rendered was consistent with the special verdict.
Defendant’s motion argues that there was not sufficient evidence to support the award of punitive damages due to plaintiff’s failure to present sufficient evidence of defendant’s overall financial condition.
But Section 663 does not allow the court to re-weigh evidence. Section 663 “authorizes simply the substitution of the judgment that should have been given as a matter of law upon the findings of fact in the case where the judgment already given is an incorrect conclusion from such findings. The court cannot on such a motion in any way change any finding of fact. The sole remedy in the trial court of a party who is aggrieved by any finding of fact is a motion for a new trial.” Jones v. Clover (1937) 24 Cal. App. 2d 210, 212. Here, the “judgment for [plaintiff] was consistent with and fully supported by the jury’s special verdict which found [defendant] was engaged [with malice] at the time of the accident. The special verdict itself cannot be attacked under Code of Civil Procedure section 663.” Acosta v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1995) 31 Cal. App. 4th 471, footnote 7.
Section 663 can only be used where “the trial judge draws an incorrect legal conclusion or renders an erroneous judgment upon the facts found by [the jury] to exist.” County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 730, 738.
Here, the judgment is consistent with the special verdict rendered by the jury.
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The motion is therefore DENIED.
Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling.
54. Mutton v. Defendants Osborne Homes, Inc. and Michael Osborne’s Osborne motion to compel plaintiff Matthew Mutton to submit his Homes, Inc. claims against them to binding contractual arbitration is GRANTED.
2025- Under Code of Civ. Proc. §1281.2, the first thing the Court 01516957 must decide is whether there was an agreement to arbitrate. (Mitri v. Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1169.) “In determining the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the trial court must employ a three-step burden shifting process. The party seeking to compel arbitration bears an initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate; that burden can be met by providing a copy of the alleged agreement. If that initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement's existence, thereby shifting the burden back to the arbitration proponent.
At that point, and “[b]ecause the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 51 [cleaned-up].)
Defendants submitted the TriNet dispute resolution protocol that contained an arbitration clause. In response, plaintiff presented evidence that TriNet ceased serving as the PEO for defendants prior to the dispute that gives rise to this litigation. Plaintiff argues that the TriNet agreement was no longer in effect, citing Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB (1991) 501 U.S. 190, 205-006. (“A postexpiration grievance can be said to arise under the [expired] contract only where it involves facts and occurrences that arose before expiration, where an action taken after expiration infringes a right that accrued or vested under the agreement, or where, under normal principles of contract interpretation, the disputed contractual right survives expiration of the remainder of the agreement.”)
Defendants counter that the TriNet arbitration agreement had a survivorship clause, which places plaintiff’s claims within the type of disputes that Litton permits. The survivorship clause reads: “This DRP will survive the termination of the employment relationship. With only the exceptions described below in subsection (b), arbitration will be used instead of going before a court (for a judge or jury trial) and even in the situations described below, NO JURY TRIAL WILL BE PERMITTED (unless applicable law does not allow enforcement of a pre-dispute jury trial waiver in the particular circumstances presented).”
The plain reading of this text shows that arbitration would be compelled in a situation where the employee’s employment with OHI ends. Such is the case here.
Thus, defendants have demonstrated that the expired agreement that contained the arbitration clause remains in effect based on the language quoted above, and the reasoning of Litton.
Plaintiff also argues novation, but has failed to demonstrate that the new agreement between ADP, plaintiff and defendants involves the same parties as the TriNet agreement. Civ. Code § 1531.
Defendants’ evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff is ordered to arbitrate his claims.
This matter is STAYED pending completion of the arbitration.
The case management conference is vacated.
The court sets a status conference regarding the arbitration for January 22, 2027 in Department C28 at 9:00 a.m. Five days before the status conference the parties are ordered to submit a joint statement concerning the arbitration.
Defendants shall give notice of this ruling.
55. Rosas v. Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion to Tax American Costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Honda Motor Defendant seeks an order striking Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Co., Inc. Costs (seeking $1,036.65 in costs) in its entirety or, 2025- alternatively, taxing it by $323.30. 01455312 Code of Civil Procedure § 1032, subdivision (b) states: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033.5 sets forth the items that are allowable as costs. Items not mentioned in section 1033.5 may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion. Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(c) states that allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount and “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.”
“If items on their face appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.) Once the opposing party makes such a showing, in support of a motion to tax costs, the challenged items are put in issue and the burden shifts back to the party claiming them as costs. (Ibid.) But conclusory assertions alone are not enough to cause this