Celia Rodriguez, individually and as successor in interest of Antonio Rodriguez, et al. v. Toll Brothers, Inc., et al.

RELIEF REQUESTED: An order relieving Nathan Mubasher as counsel for Defendants Gabriel O. Castillo and Best Choice Hospice Service, Inc. RULING: The motion is denied without prejudice.

On 6/29/26, attorney Nathan Mubasher filed the instant motion seeking an order relieving him as counsel for Defendants Gabriel O. Castillo and Best Choice Hospice Service, Inc. On the same date, attorney Mubasher filed a proof of service which indicates that on 6/29/26, the motion was electronically served on counsel for Plaintiff David Kreuz. On 8/6/26, Plaintiff David Kreuz (Plaintiff) filed and served an opposition to the motion. On 8/12/26, attorney Mubasher filed and served a reply to the opposition. The proof of service attached to the reply also indicates that it was electronically served only on counsel for Plaintiff.

All documents in support of a motion to be relieved as counsel must be served on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case. See CRC 3.1362(d). Here, attorney Mubasher has not filed a proof of service showing that the motion papers were served on the clients. Additionally, No. 4.b. in the notice of motion, reflecting that one of the clients is a corporation, is not marked. Further, No.6 in the proposed order does not set forth all of the necessary information for the clients. Instead, it refers to the notice of motion and an attachment thereto. All of the contact information for the clients must be set forth in the proposed order or an attachment to the order itself.

While the foregoing procedural defects require that the motion be denied without prejudice, the opposition does not set forth any viable basis to deny the motion on the merits. The authority cited in the opposition addresses the denial of motions to be relieved as counsel when such would prejudice the client, not the adverse party. See Ramirez (1994) 21 CA4th 904, 915; Flake (2017) 9 CA5th 223, 230. The fact that a corporation will be left without counsel, and therefore cannot appear before the court, does not prevent the granting of a motion to be relieved as counsel. See Gamet (2001) 91 CA4th 1276, 1284 fn.5.

Attorney Mubasher's Request for Judicial Notice is denied. While records of another court are subject to judicial notice. The ruling of another trial court in a similar, but unrelated case, has no bearing on the Court's rulings in this case.

Date: 8/19/26 Case #25CHCV03660 DEMURRER TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Demurrer filed on 2/13/26.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant Valencia Management Group RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Celia Rodriguez, individually and as successor in interest of Antonio Rodriguez; Anthony Rodriguez and Christie Rodriguez Demurrer is to 1 st, 2 nd and 4 th causes of action: 1. Negligence - Premises Liability 2. General Negligence 3. Statutory Liability/Dangerous Condition of Public Property (not alleged against Valencia Management Group) 4. Survival Claim (CCP 377.34) RULING: The demurrer is overruled. Answer is due within 20 days.

SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of an incident that occurred on 9/2/24 when Antonio Rodriguez (Decedent) was riding his bicycle on Ricasoli Way, approximately 22 feet north of Red Hawk Lane in Northridge, when he collided with a steel barrier gate and was killed. (Complaint P.P. 8, 10). Plaintiffs Celia Rodriguez, individually and as successor in interest, Anthony Rodriguez, and Christie Rodriguez (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action on 10/13/25 against the developer, Toll Brothers, Inc., the City of Los Angeles, Valencia Management Group (VMG), Archon Protection, Inc., and Doe defendants.

After meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues VMG had with Plaintiffs' complaint, on 2/13/26, VMG, through attorney Jennifer Ryu of Swedelson Gottlieb filed and served the instant demurrer to the 1s, 2 nd and 4 th causes of action in the complaint on the grounds that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to state each cause of action and each cause of action is uncertain. CCP 430.10(e), (f). The demurrer was originally s scheduled for hearing on 7/17/26. On 7/6/26, Plaintiffs filed and served an opposition to the demurrer.

With regard to VMG, the proof of service shows that the opposition was served on attorneys at the Swedelson Gottlieb law firm. However, on 6/9/26, VMG filed and served a Substitution of Attorney indicating that it had substituted in Art H. Nguyen of Homan, Stone & Rossi, APC as its counsel in place of Jennifer H. Ryu of Swedelson Gottlieb. No reply to the opposition had been filed with regard to the 7/17/26 hearing date. To ensure that VMG's counsel received the opposition and had an opportunity to file and serve a reply, if they so choose, the hearing on the demurrer was continued to 8/19/26.

On 7/22/26, VMG filed and served a reply to the opposition.

ANALYSIS In ruling on a demurrer, a court assumes the truth of all properly pleaded material facts, but does not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law. Blank (1985) 39 C3d 311, 318. A complaint is sufficient if it pleads ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts. Doe (2007) 42 C4th 531, 550.

The elements of a premises liability cause of action are: (1) the defendant owned, leased, occupied or controlled the property; (2) the defendant was negligent in the use, maintenance, or management of the property; (3) the plaintiff was harmed, and defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. CACI 1000. In order to establish negligence and premises liability, a plaintiff must prove defendant owed a legal duty of care, defendant breached that duty and that breach proximately caused injury.

Kesner (2016) 1 C5th 1132, 1158. It has been held that allegations that the named defendants owned, leased, occupied, maintained or controlled the property together with allegations of injury and that the defendants knew or should have known of the dangerous condition is sufficient to state causes of action for negligence and/or premises liability. See Martin (2023) 96 CA5th 681, 689. The complaint in this action meets the foregoing pleading requirements and VMG's attempt to distinguish this case from Martin, supra, is unavailing. (See Complaint P.P.8, 17-19, 22, 25-27).

With regard to the negligence cause of action, the complaint also alleges that VMG was in a special relationship with Decedent and assumed a duty of care to him, that VMG undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to avoid, remedy, or abate the dangerous condition and failed to exercise reasonable care in doing so, and that VMG's conduct resulted in breach, causation, and damages. (Complaint P.P.24-25, 39-35). Such allegations are sufficient to state a negligence cause of action. See Artiglio (1998) 18 C4th 604, 613.

The survival cause of action depends on the premises liability and negligence causes of action. Since those causes of action are sufficiently pled, so is the survival cause of action. Similarly, the complaint is not so uncertain that VMG cannot respond to the claims alleged against it. Therefore, the demurrer based in uncertainty also fails. See Lickiss (2012) 208 CA4th 1125, 1135. Moreover, any ambiguities can be resolved through discovery. VMG has also failed to establish that allegations regarding the City of Los Angeles' ownership and control of the roadway establish as a matter of law that Plaintiffs cannot also establish a liability against VMG. Finally, VMG's argument that it had no relationship to the property cannot be resolved on demurrer.

CONCLUSION The demurrer is overruled. Answer is due within 20 days. | Home -->)" -->