BOSWELL-JEUNG v. FCA, US, LLC

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: AUGUST 18, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

GM opposes, arguing that the motion is moot since the only active cause action remaining is fraudulent inducement-concealment, which is not affected by any decision in Price; that the motion does not comply with the California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306; and that plaintiff’s motion fails to meet the burden of establishing that the balance of equities favors a stay. GM provides a declaration from its counsel that states that plaintiff’s law firm initiated 958 Song-Beverly actions between January 1, 2025 and May 15, 2026.

He estimates that approximately 203 cases implicated either the statute of repose, statute of limitations, or both under the new time limits of Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21. (Decl. of Hightower at ¶¶ 3, 4.) “Since January 1, 2025, Defendant GM has devoted significant time, effort, and resources to exercise every available tool to meet the statutory timelines of the new Song-Beverly amendments in the matters SLP has initiated. A stay of those proceedings would prejudice GM.” (Decl. of Hightower at ¶ 10.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Plaintiff moves for a stay pending a decision in the Second District Court of Appeals involving a different case but related to this Court’s interpretation of the new statute of limitations and repose which now applies in Song-Beverly cases. The Court does not find that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing that staying this action would be in the interests of justice or promote judicial efficiency. “[T]he suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.

Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” (Landis v. N. Am. Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 255.) This Court made its rulings on GM’s demurrers and does not find that staying this action pending the eventual – but potentially long-delayed – decision in the Price case would promote judicial efficiency.

No. 24CV03485

BOSWELL-JEUNG v. FCA, US, LLC

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR TERMINATING AND/OR EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS AND MONETARY SANCTIONS

The motion for terminating and evidentiary sanctions is denied. The motion for monetary sanctions is granted.

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: AUGUST 18, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

On April 14, 2026, this Court adopted its tentative ruling, granting defendants’ motion to compel plaintiff’s deposition. The parties were ordered to meet and confer and set a date for plaintiff’s deposition, which was to occur within 30 days from April 14, 2026.

Defendants bring this motion for terminating sanctions, or in the alternative, evidentiary sanctions prohibiting plaintiff from testifying at trial, as well as monetary sanctions against plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of $2,660.00. The motion references a declaration from defendants’ attorney Felicia Borrero, but that declaration does not appear to have been filed with the Court. Defendants assert in their memorandum of points and authorities that after the Court’s order granting the motion to compel, the parties agreed to a deposition date of May 7, 2026. Plaintiff then objected; the parties agreed to a new deposition date of July 3, 2026. Plaintiff’s counsel served an objection but stated plaintiff would be produced for deposition on that date; plaintiff, however, did not appear on July 3, 2026, and a certificate of nonappearance was taken.

In opposition, plaintiff does not dispute that she failed to appear on January 13, March 20, May 7, and July 3, 2026 for her deposition. No reason is provided for her failure to appear. Plaintiff’s counsel also acknowledges that their office failed to respond to two requests for available dates that defense counsel sent in July and August. Plaintiff asserts she has offered deposition dates of August 14, 2026, August 17, 2026, and August 18, 2026 for her deposition. (Decl. of Rucker at ¶ 8.)

Given that plaintiff has failed to comply with only one prior order, the Court is not inclined to grant terminating and/or evidentiary sanctions at this time. Disobeying a court’s prior discovery order is a misuse of discovery for which sanctions may be imposed. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (g).) “[A] more severe sanction is disfavored if a lesser sanction is available. [Citation.]” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 63.) “Before imposing a ‘terminating’ sanction, courts should usually grant lesser sanctions ... .” (Weil & Brown Civ.

Proc. Before Trial (TRG 2025) §8:2235.) “The discovery statutes thus ‘evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.’ [Citation.]” (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.)

With these parameters in mind, the Court will award monetary sanctions against plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of $1,330.00, to be paid within 20 days from the date of this hearing. The Court is awarding half of the amount sought since FCA failed to provide any evidence in support of its motion, forcing the Cour to resort to plaintiff’s own evidence. The Court has not previously levied monetary sanctions against plaintiff or her counsel for failure to comply with a discovery order. The Court orders plaintiff’s deposition to take place within 14 days from the date of this hearing. If plaintiff fails to appear, the Court will strongly consider evidentiary and/or terminating sanctions upon a noticed motion.