| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
|---|
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DISMISSAL UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473(B)
4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT ALVARADO VS TRI- TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO CVRI2501059 VALLEY MEDICAL SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET GROUP CORPORATION ONE Tentative Ruling: Continued by stipulation to July 13.
5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME ESTRELLA VS MAGAVE MOTION TO COMPEL CVRI2503126 CARE, INC. ARBITRATION Tentative Ruling: Appearances requested. In addition to the Ayala-Ventura case, counsel should be prepared to discuss Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 91.
6. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME JIMENEZ VS SKECHERS MOTION TO STAY DUE TO CVRI2504527 U.S.A, INC. PENDING OVERLAPPING ACTIONS Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling, appearances requested.
7. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME ESTRELLA VS MAGAVE MOTION TO COMPEL CVRI2504676 CARE, INC. ARBITRATION Tentative Ruling: See related tentative ruling.
8. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME FRIENDS OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM CVRI2505311 RIVERSIDE'S HILLS VS DISMISSAL UNDER CODE OF CIVIL CITY OF RIVERSIDE PROCEDURE SECTION 473(B) Tentative Ruling: Petitioner moves for relief from dismissal of the CEQA cause of action under California Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), arguing that the failure to file the request for a hearing within 90 days was the result of inadvertence or excusable neglect. Real Party argues that petitioner has changed its explanation from that
asserted in the opposition to the motion to dismiss, that it has failed to show excusable neglect, and has not been diligent in prosecuting the action.
The petition was filed on September 29, 2025, so the 90-day time limit for filing a request for hearing under California Public Resources Code § 21167.4 expired on December 29 (the 90th day was a Sunday). Petitioner’s request was filed on January 13, 2026, 15 days late.
Under § 473(b), the court may relieve a party from a dismissal taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Section 473 is applied liberally where the party seeking relief moves promptly, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 681, 695. The standard is whether a “reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances might have made the same error.
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CEQA does not bar relief under § 473 where the failure to timely request a hearing constituted excusable error. Comunidad en Accion v. Los Angeles City Council (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 1116, 1132. Although Real Party contends that courts apply a heightened standard for requests under CEQA, this does not appear to be the case. In Miller v. City of Hermosa Beach (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 1118, 1136, the court explained that section 473 is generally applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly for relief and the opposing party will not suffer prejudice, and very slight evidence is required to justify relief.
Petitioner’s counsel states that on December 18, she discussed drafting and filing a request for a hearing with co-counsel and determined that it might be premature because of ongoing efforts to complete the administrative record. She sent a meet and confer letter to counsel for the city indicating this. A request for hearing was drafted and petitioner’s counsel intended to file it once the discussions concerning the record were complete. The following week, which of course included the Christmas holiday, petitioner’s counsel and co-counsel were out of the office for the holidays. The deadline was not reflected in the firm’s calendaring system and Counsel mistakenly thought the request for a hearing had been filed. The request was promptly filed when the issue came to Counsel’s attention. The issue was raised in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Had the request been timely filed, it is unlikely that a hearing date would have been set until the record was complete. Counsel appears to have been diligent in prosecuting the action except for the 15-day delay in filing the request. Any prejudice is minimal and is more related to the motion to dismiss than the 15-day delay in making the hearing request.
Grant.