DAVID BERNARD PARVIN VS. SANDEEP KHANNA, ET AL.

May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 17 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 10 25-CIV-00194 DAVID BERNARD PARVIN VS. SANDEEP KHANNA, ET AL.

DAVID BERNARD PARVIN NELSON W GOODELL SANDEEP KHANNA PRO SE

MOTION TO REVOKE NON-MONETARY STATUS OF PLATINUM RESOLUTION SERVICES, INC. PURSUANT TO CIVIL CODE §29241 AND C.C.P. §473

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Revoke Nonmonetary Status (the “Motion”) is GRANTED. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. Defendant’s Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 1 is OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection No. 2 is SUSTAINED.

Background

According to the allegations of this wrongful foreclosure case, Plaintiff inherited in 2009 a condominium located at 425 Mountain View Drive, Apt. 4, Daly City, CA (the “Property”), which was Plaintiff’s primary residence at all relevant times. Defendant Pointe Pacific Homeowners’ Association (the “HOA”) was the homeowners’ association for the Property. Defendant ASAP Collection Services was the foreclosure sale trustee, and Defendant Platinum Resolution Services, Inc., was the foreclosure sale trustee’s agent.

On December 5, 2022, the HOA recorded a Notice of Assessment Lien on the Property, claiming a debt of $13,788.99. However, allegedly the amount demanded by the HOA was unlawful and inflated. Furthermore, Plaintiff would not have been in default had he not been forced by the Defendants to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees, to which they claimed they were entitled in relation to Case No. CLJ530144 of this Court. The HOA actually was not entitled to those fees because they were not the prevailing party in that case, which is now subject to mandatory dismissal because it was filed in 2014.

Plaintiff alleges that the HOA decided to foreclose on the property nonjudicially, and that the HOA claimed that Plaintiff was in default on a debt of $40,390.72 as of the date that the Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded (April 30, 2024). As alleged, this number is again inaccurate and inflated because it includes the $20,000 in attorney’s fees to which the HOA is not entitled.

The trustee’s sale occurred on October 16, 2024, selling the Property to Defendant Sandeep Khanna, who does not plan to occupy the Property, for $532,700.00, which is at least $200,000.00 less than its worth. On October 23, 2024, the HOA recorded a Certificate of Sale by Trustee Subject to Redemption (the “Certificate”) in the Official Records of the County of San Mateo. As alleged, the 90-day redemption period to re-purchase the Property expired on January 14, 2025, but the foreclosure sale was void and invalid for many reasons, and must be set aside.

Of particular relevance here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to comply with Civil Code section 2924m by failing to post notice of the sale as required, by failing to accept bids after

May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 18 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Defendant Khanna purchased the Property, and by recording the Certificate before the post-sale period during which a bid could have been submitted had expired. Moreover, though Plaintiff sought such information through discovery, no Defendant has provided information showing compliance with the governing statutes.

On April 7, 2025, Defendant Platinum Resolution Services, Inc. (hereinafter, “Defendant”) filed a Declaration of Non-Monetary Status, noting that it was named in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”) solely in its capacity as the trustee agent for the HOA and not because the FAC alleged that it had committed any acts resulting in liability on its part. Through his Motion to Revoke Nonmonetary Status (the “Motion”), Plaintiff asks the Court to revoke Defendant’s nonmonetary status under Civil Code section 2924l, asserting Defendant’s liability for violations of Civil Code section 2924m and wrongful foreclosure, and Plaintiff’s right to recover damages against Defendant.

The Motion Is Granted.

The Civil Code provides that: In the event that a trustee under a deed of trust is named in an action or proceeding in which that deed of trust is the subject, and in the event that the trustee maintains a reasonable belief that it has been named in the action or proceeding solely in its capacity as trustee, and not arising out of any wrongful acts or omissions on its part in the performance of its duties as trustee, then, at any time, the trustee may file a declaration of nonmonetary status. (Civil Code, § 2924l, subd. (a).) Defendant filed such a declaration in this action on April 7, 2025 (the “DNS”).

The governing statute also provides that: In the event of a timely objection to the declaration of nonmonetary status, the trustee shall thereafter be required to participate in the action or proceeding. (Id., § 2924l, subd. (e).) Defendant asserts that no objection to the DNS was filed. If a timely objection had been made, Defendant’s participation simply would have been required, without further analysis.

However, the statute further provides that: Additionally, in the event that the parties elect not to, or fail to, timely object to the declaration of nonmonetary status, but later through discovery, or otherwise, determine that the trustee should participate in the action because of the performance of its duties as a trustee, the parties may file and serve on all parties and the trustee a motion pursuant to Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure that specifies the factual basis for the demand. Upon the court’s granting of the motion, the trustee shall thereafter be required to participate in the action or proceeding, and the court shall provide sufficient time prior to trial for the trustee to be able to respond to the complaint, to conduct discovery, and to bring other pretrial motions in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. (Ibid.)

The pertinent part of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 provides that, “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading

May 19, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 19 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, ... .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).)

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he later determined through discovery that Defendant should participate in the instant action because of the performance of its duties, and accordingly brings the instant Motion, specifying in detail the factual bases for his demand. (See, e.g., Goodell Decl., ¶¶ 7-67.) Since no trial date has been set, Defendant, if required to participate, clearly will be provided sufficient time to do so.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, the Court exercises its discretion in the furtherance of justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) However, Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion generally sounds in demurrer, as Defendant argues that the fifth cause of action of the TAC fails as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s Reply also sounds in demurrer, devoting significant energy to arguing that the TAC does plead causes of action against Defendant.

The standard appropriate to the instant Motion is not whether the TAC pleads a cause of action against Defendant, nor whether Plaintiff is likely to prevail on such cause. The slim reed on which to depend such arguments from the statutes governing the Motion is that the Court may allow a party to be added in furtherance of justice, and it would be unjust to require Defendant to participate in the litigation if it were utterly clear a priori that it could have no liability. That such is not utterly clear here is demonstrated by the arguments offered at length by both Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Court is further aware that public policy considerations favor the use of the Court’s discretion to grant a party’s request for leave to amend a pleading, as reflected in California case law. For example, the Supreme Court of California in Norton stated that “In the matter of amending pleadings, this court has always counseled and sanctioned great liberality. No discussion upon so plain a proposition is necessary.” (Norton v. Bassett (1910) 158 Cal. 425, 426–27.)

Plaintiff’s Requests for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) and Supplemental RJN are GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d), & § 453). However, judicial notice of the seven documents in the Court’s records to which the RJN are directed is limited to their existence, content, and authenticity, and does not extend to the truth of the factual matters contained therein. (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.)

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare for the Court’s signature a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the California Rules of Court.