Young vs. Gunlei Corporation

whether Defendants Savant Construction, Inc. and Central City Wrecking, Inc. are liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Verganza Chavez. Given this central common question, consolidation serves the purpose of judicial efficiency.

Defendant is ordered to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.350(c), which states: “An order granting or denying all or part of a motion to consolidate must be filed in each case sought to be consolidated.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(c).) Thereafter “any subsequent document must be filed only in the lead case.” (Ibid.)

Defendant to give notice.

11 Young vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Gunlei Corporation Motion to Vacate

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants William and Jennifer Young move to vacate the Court’s October 22, 2025, order entered in favor of Defendants and Cross-Complainants and striking JBY Enterprise, Inc. as an improper Cross-Defendant from the Cross-Complaint. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Plaintiffs seek to vacate or modify the Court’s minute order dated October 22, 2025. The October 22, 2025, order denied without prejudice Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend and granted Defendants and Cross-Complainants Gunlei Corporation, Egreen Transport Corporation, Hong Chen, Jing (Amy) Song, Yu Wang (Monica), Wen Chen, and Elaine Huang’ Motion to Strike Cross- Defendant JBY Enterprise, Inc.’s Answer to the Cross-Complaint.

Plaintiffs do not challenge the portion of the October 22, 2025, order relating to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. After all, they have subsequently been granted leave to amend and filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 23, 2026. (ROA 809.)

Instead, Plaintiffs claim that JBY Enterprise, Inc. has assigned all of its contractual rights, obligations, and liabilities to Plaintiffs individually. Thus, Plaintiffs contend that “the October 22, 2025, Order should be vacated under Code of Civil Procedure §473(d), and JBY Enterprise, Inc. should be stricken as an improperly named Cross Defendant pursuant to § 436(a) and §389(b).” (ROA 759.)

Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d) provides:

The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.

Plaintiffs have not shown that the October 22, 2025, contains clerical mistakes or is void in any way that justifies relief under Code Civ. Proc. § 473(d). The fact that Plaintiffs caused JBY Enterprise, Inc. (“JBY”) to assign its assets and liabilities to Plaintiffs does not change the contract underlying the Cross-Complaint, which identifies JBY. (ROA 516.) Nor does it necessarily release JBY from its contractual obligations.

Plaintiffs also cite to Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a), which provides that a Court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Aside from the fact that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated compliance with the procedural requirements of a motion to strike (see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 and CRC Rule 3.1322(a)), Plaintiffs have not established that JBY is an improper Cross-Defendant.

Finally, Plaintiffs cite to Code Civ. Proc. § 389(b). Section 389 governs compulsory joinder of parties Section 389(b) provides:

(b) If a person as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 389(b).)

Plaintiffs do not provide any reasoned argument as to how Section 389(b) is relevant to their motion.

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants William and Jennifer Young shall give notice of this ruling.

12 Do vs. Pham TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons set forth below, Cross-Defendant Nguyen Nhu Nguyen’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication is DENIED.

Defective Proof of Service

As a preliminary matter, Cross-Defendant Nguyen only filed a proof of service for the separate statement, which shows that it was served on 10/31/26. (See ROA 185). There is no proof of service for the motion, the memorandum of points and authorities, or the declaration of Mr. Nguyen. Nevertheless, Cross-Complainant Pham opposed the motion on the merits and did not raise this defect. Thus, the court will address the merits.

Statement of Law

“Summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at 851.)

A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies the initial burden by submitting undisputed evidence “showing that a cause of action has no merit [because] one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-51.) However, “[t]he defendant must indeed present ‘evidence’."”(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 855, italics original.)

In addition, if a plaintiff has pleaded several theories, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 889.) If a defendant fails to meet this initial burden, the plaintiff need not oppose the motion and the motion must be denied. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Dix v.