PENALOZA, ROBERTO JR vs MERCER FOODS LLC

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22: CV-25-011473 - PENALOZA, ROBERTO JR vs MERCER FOODS LLC - Defendant Mercer Foods LLC's Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Class Claims, and Stay Action - GRANTED.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, dismiss Plaintiff's class claims, and stay of the instant action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

Defendant Mercer Foods LLC dba Thrive Foods ("Thrive Foods") moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (the "FAA"), and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.4, and also to dismiss Plaintiff's class claims, and to stay this action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings. Plaintiff Robert Penaloza responds that the FAA does not apply and instead California law applies, that California law bars compelled arbitration of labor code wage claims, and that the arbitration agreement proffered by Defendant (the "Arbitration Agreement") is not valid and therefore cannot be enforced.

Whether the FAA applies to requires arbitration "The FAA applies to any 'contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce' that contains an arbitration provision." (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238 [quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2].) "The party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects [interstate commerce], and failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable." (Ibid.) "[T]he Supreme Court held that a contract involves commerce under section 2 of the FAA simply if the transaction, in fact, involves interstate commerce." (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286.)

Defendant attests, through the Declaration of Kristi Imfeld, that it receives materials from outside of California, creates goods, and then sells and ships to customers outside of California and other parts of the world. (Imfeld Declaration, ¶ 2.) Defendant also attests that Plaintiff Penaloza's duties included performing tasks that allow Defendant to use the materials received from out-of-state suppliers to produce freeze dried goods that are sold and shipped by Defendant to out-of-state customers. (Ibid., ¶ 3.) Based on the foregoing, the Arbitration Agreement is subject to the FAA. (Nguyen v. Applied Medical Resources Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232, 246 [holding that "plaintiff's employment with defendant bears on interstate commerce such that it falls within the scope of the FAA" where "[declarant] attested that defendant designs and manufactures surgical products, which it sells and distributes worldwide, and that plaintiff worked on the production line for those products"]).

Defendant submitted an Arbitration Agreement signed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement encompasses Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff argues that he does not remember signing the Arbitration Agreement, but does not dispute that he did in fact sign it. Because Defendant has made a showing of a valid agreement to arbitrate and also that the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue, the FAA requires arbitration of Plaintiff's claims. (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218 ["By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed."]; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff's individual claims.

Whether the class action waiver in the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable The Arbitration Agreement contains a class action waiver. Plaintiff does not dispute that such a waiver is enforceable under the FAA. The FAA requires courts to enforce the terms of the arbitration agreements. (Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 510 ["the [FAA] . . . require[es] us to enforce, not override, the terms of the arbitration agreements before us"].) Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's class claims.

Whether the case should be stayed pending arbitration The Federal Arbitration Act requires that "the court . . ., upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had[.]" (9 U.S.C. § 3.) Because Plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to stay the instant action pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23: ***There are no tentative rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24: CV-18-003129 - OVRAHIM, NARMELIN vs UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY - Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on Order Granting Summary Judgment - GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.

The Court finds that the majority of Plaintiffs' arguments improperly seek to re-litigate issues previously raised and considered in connection with Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to revisit prior arguments or to correct perceived judicial error. Instead, the court may grant reconsideration only if presented with " 'new or different facts, circumstances, or law.' (Crotty v. Trader (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 765, 770-771.) A motion for reconsideration, which requires the moving party to offer new or different facts, circumstances, or law that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been previously discovered, will be denied absent a strong showing of diligence.”(Forrest v. Department of Corporations (2007), 150 Cal.App.4th 183). A party seeking