Sonya Daniels v. Obaida Batal, M.D., et al.

well as for a monetary sanction." The court "shall" grant the motion to deem requests for admission admitted "unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.280, subd. (c).)

Defendant Hans Joerg Dau ("Defendant") served Plaintiff Javier Napoles ("Plaintiff") with his Requests for Admissions, Set One, on January 15, 2026. (Mot., Hancock Decl. P.P. 2, 3.) Responses were due on or before February 16, 2026, and defense counsel communicated with Plaintiff to obtain responses after the deadline. (Mot., Hancock Decl. P. 3.) To date, no responses have been received. (Mot., Hancock Decl. P.P. 2, 3.)

Accordingly, Defendant Hans Joerg Dau's Motion for Order Deeming Admitted the Truth of Facts and Genuineness of Documents Alleged in Defendant's Requests for Admissions, Set One, Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections [sic] 2033.280 is GRANTED. The matters identified in Defendant Hans Joerg Dau's Requests for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted as of the date of entry of this order.

Defendant requests $1,560 in monetary sanctions for the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.280, subd. (c).) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040, "[a] request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought." Defendant made no request for sanctions in the notice of motion. For that reason, Defendant Hans Joerg Dau's Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED.

Defendants Obaida Batal, M.D., and Batal Medical, Inc.'s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED. The Amended Second Amended Complaint filed on March 16, 2026 is deemed the operative pleading in this action. Defendants Obaida Batal, M.D., and Batal Medical, Inc. shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiff Sonya Daniels' Amended Second Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).) Defendants Obaida Batal, M.D., and Batal Medical, Inc. to give notice.

First Cause of Action: Violations of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civil Code section 56 et seq.)

The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), codified at Civil Code section 56.35, provides a cause of action for "a patient whose medical information has been used or disclosed . . . and who has sustained economic loss or personal injury therefrom."

In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants sent a text message on September 19, 2022 containing Plaintiff's preoperative medical video, which depicted Plaintiff "basically without clothing," without her consent. (SAC, p. 2.) Plaintiff further alleges that in October 2023, Defendants contacted Plaintiff, threatening to post the video online, and between September 2022 and November 2024, Defendants sent the video to other unauthorized third parties, relaying information from Plaintiff's patient filed to third party Robert Hashemiyoon without consent, and made jokes and comments about Plaintiff while sharing information in Plaintiff's file with unauthorized third parties. (Ibid.)

Defendants also allegedly made several phone calls threatening to post Plaintiff's information online, they shared information with unauthorized third party Marcus Cato, and they left a voicemail on October 6, 2023, making derogratory remarks using Plaintiff's confidential medical information. (SAC, p. 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that the personal information was sent from her phone to Defendants' phone while she was sedated. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that she suffered emotional distress and damages as a result of this conduct. (SAC, p. 5.)

In an "Amended" version of the SAC, Plaintiff further alleges that the video was posted on Defendants' Facebook page without her consent, tagging Plaintiff, and information shared included her driver's license number, social security number, medical videos, and results; offensive comments were made to third parties Elyssa Geinfeld, Jessica Gil, and Robert Hashemiyoon; and third party Marcus Cato received a copy of the video. (Am. SAC, pp. 2-3.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for violation of the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. Notably, if Defendants had sufficiently met and conferred with Plaintiff, this dispute could have avoided court intervention because Plaintiff proceeded to address the points in Defendants' demurrer in the Amended SAC she filed on March 16, 2026. Rather than try to resolve the issues, Defendants opted to file this demurrer three days later, perhaps because they had already drafted it and had no intention of resolving the issues with Plaintiff informally. Again, the Court will not reward this conduct, and it opts to avoid entertaining an unnecessary third demurrer where the issues are addressed in the amended filing.

Accordingly, Defendants Obaida Batal, M.D., and Batal Medical, Inc.'s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint is OVERRULED. The Amended Second Amended Complaint filed on March 16, 2026 is deemed the operative pleading in this action. Defendants Obaida Batal, M.D., and Batal Medical, Inc. shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiff Sonya Daniels' Amended Second Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of entry of this order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)

Case Number: 26SMCV02165 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: N TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendants ACSB, LLC; Jacaranda Healthcare Group, LLC; and Aspen Skilled Healthcare, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. The proceedings are hereby stayed pending the conclusion of arbitration. Defendants ACSB, LLC; Jacaranda Healthcare Group, LLC; and Aspen Skilled Healthcare, Inc. to give notice.

On January 5, 2026, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Defendants which provides, in part, as follows: [B]y signing this contract you are agreeing to have any issue of medical malpractice decided by neutral arbitration and you are giving up your right to a jury or court trial. . . . [B]y signing this contract you are agreeing to have all claims, including claims other than a claim for medical malpractice, decided by arbitration and you are giving up your right to a jury trial or court trial and you agree that no party shall adjudicate any claim on a class action basis. Mot., Rosales Decl. P. 4, Ex. A, capitalization omitted.)

The agreement also provides that residents are not required to sign the Arbitration Agreement as a condition of admission to the facility or to continue receiving care at the facility, and it states that it encompasses Defendant ACSB, LLC's owners, investors, operators, officers, directors, administrators, staff, employees, agents, any management and administrative services company and all related entities and individuals. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed this agreement. However, she argues that she did not have a power of attorney for Decedent John Harp, Jr. and could not bind him to an arbitration agreement and lacked agency to so bind him. She further argues that the agreement is unconscionable, and her wrongful death claim cannot be compelled to arbitration.

Notably, Plaintiff represented in the agreement that she was Decedent's legal representative and agent, but she now seeks to disavow this statement. This argument is not well taken, as Defendants provide evidence that they explained that entry into the agreement was not mandatory (Mot., Rosales Decl. P. 11), and Plaintiff voluntarily signed this agreement while representing that she had the authority to act as Decedent's agent. It would be unjust to allow Plaintiff to so represent then seek to avoid enforcement of this agreement where she chose to enter into the agreement and made no argument that Decedent himself should do so or had the capacity to do so.

As to unconscionability, Plaintiff argues that the agreement is unenforceable because it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As to unconscionability, it is axiomatic that "a party opposing the petition [to compel arbitration] bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. [] In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination." (Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc., supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.)

"Courts analyze the unconscionability standard in Civil Code section 1670.5 as invoking elements of procedural and substantive unconscionability." (McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 76, 87 (McManus).) "The procedural element of unconscionability focuses on whether the contract is one of adhesion" and "whether there is oppression arising from an inequality of bargaining power or surprise arising from buried terms in a complex printed form." (Ibid., quotation marks omitted.) "The substantive element addresses the existence of overly harsh or one-sided terms." (Ibid.) "An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both the procedural and substantive elements are satisfied." (Ibid.) "Procedural unconscionability pertains to the making of the agreement; it focuses on the oppression that arises from unequal bargaining power and the surprise to the weaker party that results from hidden terms or the lack of