Lauren Peralez v. Lyons Aircraft LLC

DISCUSSION

Moving Party's Argument

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a first amended complaint ("FAC") to allege specific dollar amounts for damages. Plaintiff argues that Enchant Christmas will not be prejudiced by Plaintiff's proposed amendment because it is currently unrepresented by counsel and has not indicated that it intends to retain counsel or defend this action. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that there is no pending discovery such that no litigation strategy will be affected. Plaintiff argues that she is promptly bringing this motion following the restoration of her case to the active civil docket.

Opposing Party's Argument

No opposition was filed.

Reply Argument

Plaintiff notes that the instant motion is unopposed and argues that there has been no undue delay and Enchant Christmas will have a full and fair opportunity to respond to the proposed FAC.

Merits of the Motion

Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to allege specific dollar amounts as damages. Plaintiff's counsel declares that this proposed amendment "is necessary and proper to support a potential default judgment. " (Hames Decl., P. 9.)

Plaintiff 's counsel points to the procedural history of Plaintiff's action, noting that Enchant Christmas's Motion to Compel Arbitration was previously granted, after which the parties proceeded to arbitration, the American Arbitration Association issued a written notice confirming that the arbitration matter was closed as withdrawn, and the court subsequently granted Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stay and Restore Case to Active Civil Docket. (Hames Decl., P. P. 3- 7.)

Plaintiff's counsel declares that "a default is a real possibility" because Enchant Christmas " is currently unrepresented by counsel, has made no appearance in this action since the stay was lifted and has not indicated that they intend to retain counsel or participate in these proceedings." (Hames Decl., P. 9.)

Plaintiff's counsel further declares that Enchant Christmas will not be prejudiced by Plaintiff's proposed amendment because there is no pending discovery, there has been no undue de lay, no trial date has been set, and Enchant Christmas has a fair opportunity to respond to Plaintiff's proposed FAC if Enchant Christmas chooses to appear. (Hames Decl., P. 10.)

The court finds that Plaintiff has substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 3.1324 by attaching a copy Plaintiff's redlined complaint and a copy of the proposed FAC to Plaintiff's counsel's declaration as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively.

Plaintiff's counsel's declaration explains that the effect of the proposed FAC is to allege specific dollar amounts for damages, which is necessary to support a potential default judgment, and Plaintiff was unable to amend while the proceedings in Plaintiff's action were stayed pending resolution of arbitration.

Given that the substance of Plaintiff's complaint will remain unchanged, with the only changes concerning the specific dollar amounts alleged by Plaintiff as damages, the court finds that Enchant Christmas will not be prejudiced by Plaintiff's filing of her proposed FAC.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to separately file the first amended complaint, serve Defendant with the new complaint, and timely file a proof of service.

Case Number: 25TRCV02169 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: P Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. P |

LAUREN PERALEZ,¿ | Plaintiff | Case No.: |

| vs. | | [Tentative] RULING RE:¿¿ MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION ¿ | LYONS AIRCRAFT LLC; BARRINGTON MILES,¿ ¿ | Defendants. | | | LYONS AIRCRAFT LLC, vs. BARRINGTON K MILES; D AND G SUPPLY; and ROES 1-20, inclusive, | Cross-Complainant, Cross-Defendants. | | | Hearing Date: August 1 8, 202 6 Department P, Judge David K. Reinert¿ Motion to Quash Service of Summons on Cross-Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Moving Part y: Defendant and Cross-Defendant Barrington Miles Responding Party: None RULING The c ourt considered the moving papers. The Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

O n July 1, 2025, Plaintiff Lauren Peralez ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against Lyons Aircraft LLC¿("Lyons")¿and Barrington Miles ("Miles"), alleging two ¿causes of action for (1) Negligence and (2) Strict Products Liability.

On September 22, 2025, Miles filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction regarding Plaintiff's complaint. On November 12, 2025, the court granted the motion and denied Plaintiff's request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

On October 7, 2025, Lyons filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Miles, D and G Supply, and ROES 1 through 20, inclusive, alleging five causes of action for: (1) Express and/or Equitable Indemnification; (2) Apportionment of Fault; (3) Contribution; (4) Indemnity; and (5) Contribution.

On June 25, 2026, Miles filed the instant motion regarding the Cross-Complaint.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that o n July 23, 2023, a Beech H3 airplane, N365B, (the "Subject Airplane")¿was¿substantially damaged¿when it was involved in an accident near Georgetown, Texas. (Complaint, P. 8.)¿ Plaintiff alleges that the pilot, Miles, and two passengers, including Plaintiff, also suffered significant injuries. (Complaint, P. 8.)¿ Plaintiff alleges that Miles reported that the run-up, takeoff, climb out, and cruise¿portion¿of the return flight¿proceeded¿normally, but when he¿attempted¿to increase engine power for landing, the engine did not respond. (Complaint, P. 10.)¿ ¿ Plaintiff alleges that a irplane maintenance records revealed that the fuel pump was replaced with an overhauled unit about 18 months prior to the accident by Lyons. (Complaint, P. 13.)

Plaintiff alleges that, u pon information and belief, the fuel pump¿contained¿improper, nonstandard, and unauthorized parts and was not properly adjusted by Lyons when put back on the airplane engine. (Complaint, P. 13.)¿ ¿ Plaintiff alleges that Miles ¿purchased¿the Subject Airp lane from a California seller about one month before the accident. (Complaint, P. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that the Subject A irplane was flown from California to Texas by a friend of Miles. (Complaint, P. 9.)

Lyons alleges in its cross-complaint that "had Miles kept or returned the Aircraft in the prescribed maximum glide configuration, the Aircraft would have glided to the cleared surface of the airport environment, if not the hard surface runway Miles was attempting to reach. (Cross-Complaint, P. 14.) Lyons alleges that Miles "failed to enrichen the fuel/air mixture ahead of landing at Georgetown Executive Airport," and Miles did not 'sump' the fuel tanks on the Aircraft prior to the accident flight." (Cross-Complaint, P.P. 15-16.) Lyons alleges that there were no mechanical anomalies present in the Subject Airplane's engine, fuel pump, or metering valve that would have caused the accident. (Cross-Complaint, P. 17.)

LEGAL STANDARD

"A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her." (Code Civ. Proc. Section 418.10(a).)¿The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made¿pursuant to¿Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc. Section 581(h).)¿¿¿ ¿ "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."¿ (Code Civ. Proc. Section 410.10.)

The exercise of personal¿jurisdiction¿is constitutionally permissible only if the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state so that the exercise of¿jurisdiction¿"does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Internat. ¿Shoe Co. v. Washington¿ (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316; accord, ¿Pavlovich v. Superior Court ¿(2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.) The defendant's contacts with the forum state must be such that the defendant had "fair warning" that its activities might subject it to personal¿jurisdiction¿in the state. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz¿ (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472.) "In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." (Calder v. Jones ¿(1984) 465 U.S. 783, 788.)¿

¿ "A plaintiff opposing a motion to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction has the initial burden to demonstrate facts establishing a basis for personal jurisdiction." (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court¿ (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, ¿ 1167.) The plaintiff must¿establish¿the facts of¿jurisdiction¿by a preponderance of the evidence." ¿ (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. ¿(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th¿556, 568.)¿

DISCUSSION

Moving Party's Argument

Miles argues that he lacks the requisite minimum contacts with California to justify being hailed into court in California. Miles argues that the court lacks general jurisdiction over him because he is not a citizen of California or a resident in California. Miles argues that the court lacks specific jurisdiction over him because there is no factual nexus between the accident in Texas involving Miles and the state of California.

Request for Judicial Notice

Miles requests that the court take judicial notice of Miles's September 22, 2025 motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction and the court's minute order regarding the motion. The court may take judicial notice of its own records pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452(d). Accordingly, Miles's request for judicial notice is GRANTED in its entirety.

Merits of the Motion

General Jurisdiction

"A court may assert general¿jurisdiction¿over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) defendants to hear¿ any and all ¿claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so "continuous and systematic" as to¿render¿them¿essentially at¿home in the forum State." (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown ¿(2011) 564 US 915, 919.) The cause of action need not be related to the defendant's contacts. (Thomson v. Anderson ¿(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 265-266.)¿ ¿ Here, Miles declares the following: Miles (1) does not maintain any address or mailbox in California; (2) does not own any real estate in California; (3) does not own any bank account, trust, safe deposit box, or other monetary asset in California; (4) does not own or keep any personal property in California; (5) does not lease any properties or storage units in California; (6) has not conduct ed any business in California in the last ten years; and (7) has never sold anything to anyone in California. (Miles Decl., P.P. 2-8.)

Miles also declares that he resides in Austin, Texas. (Miles Decl., P. 11.) The court finds that Miles's evidence indicates that he is not "at home" in California, such that the court lacks general jurisdiction over Miles.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

If a nonresident defendant's contacts with California are insufficient for general jurisdiction, the nonresident may be subject to specific jurisdiction if: (1) the nonresident has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the state's laws; (2) the controversy arises out of the nonresident's contacts with the state; and (3) it would be fair and just to assert jurisdiction. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz ¿(1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472;¿ Pavlovich v. Superior Court ¿(2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.)

Miles argues that the court lacks specific jurisdiction over him because Miles has not purposefully availed himself of the benefits of California's laws, there is no substantial connection between Miles's alleged activities in California and Lyons's claims, and the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Miles would not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court agrees.

Miles declares that when he purchased the Subject Airplane, he "did not travel to California to pick it up. Rather, it was flown and transported to Texas by a friend of [his]." (Miles Decl., P. 9.) Miles further declares that he did not travel to California to see the Subject Airplane before purchasing it, but rather "saw the airplane on www.controller.com where it was listed for sale, " after which Miles purchased the Subject Airplane in Texas. (Miles Decl., P. 10.)

As Miles points out, the Cross-Complaint incorporates by reference the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint, which alleges that the Subject Airplane was flown from California to Texas by a friend of Miles. (Cross-Complaint, P. 5; Complaint, P. 9.) The court finds that Lyons has not met its burden of establishing a basis for specific personal jurisdiction over Miles. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED. Moving party is ordered to give notice of ruling. | Home -->)" -->