Nekissa Zareh v. FCA US LLC, et al.

(Van Nuys Courthouse East: Dept. NWI) August 18, 2026 DEPARTMENT NWI LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

I.

Background

On June 24, 2025, Plaintiff Nekissa Zareh ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against Defendants FCA US LLC ("FCA"), Shaver Jeep of Thousand Oaks ("Shaver Jeep"), and Does 1 to 10 alleging six causes of action: (1) violation of Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1793.2(d); (2) violation of Civ. Code Sec. 1793.2(b); (3) violation of Civ. Code Sec. 1793.2(a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) negligent repair; and (6) fraudulent inducement through concealment. On June 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel FCA's initial responses. On August 5, 2026, FCA filed its opposition. To date, Plaintiff has not filed a reply. II.

Legal Standard

CCP Sec. 871.26 provides for expedited discovery procedures in lemon law actions. Specifically, CCP Sec. 871.26(h) provides for various documentation which a defendant must provide to a defendant within 60 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading. (See CCP Sec. 871.26(h). CCP Sec. 871.26(j)(2) provides, in pertinent part, the following: "Unless the party failing to comply with this section shows good cause, notwithstanding any other law and in addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this chapter, a court shall impose sanctions as follows . . . two-thousand five-hundred-dollar ($2,500) sanction against the defendant's attorney . . . paid within 15 business days for failure to comply with the document production requirements as prescribed in subdivision (b)." (CCP Sec. 871.26(j)(2).) III.

Discussion

FCA filed its initial demurrer on September 25, 2025, requiring FCA to comply with CCP Sec. 871.26(h) by November 24, 2025. (See Demurrer.) However, Plaintiff argues, FCA has failed to "provide complete, verified, and unfiltered disclosures. FCA's production is deficient in multiple material respects, and the deficiencies are not inadvertent oversights but rather systematic omissions that conceal critical evidence bearing on the number of repair attempts and the nature of FCA's internal warranty administration." (Motion at 5:9-15.) In opposition, FCA argues that, on June 16, 2026, in response to Plaintiff's meet and confer efforts and before Plaintiff filed this motion, FCA produced compliant, complete production. (Opposition at 1:17-24.) Plaintiff has not filed a reply.

The Court finds that FCA complied and served discovery requests prior to this motion, in good faith, after Plaintiff's meet and confer efforts. IV.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED as MOOT. Moving party to give notice. Case Number: 26VECV03413 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: NWI 26VECV03413 KAMRAN GOHARI vs VITALIY KRUGLIAKOV, et al. August 18, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. Van Nuys Courthouse East, Dept. I Tentative Ruling - Demurrer I.

Background

On June 8, 2026, Plaintiff Kamran Gohari ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against Defendants Vitaliy Krugliakov ("Krugliakov"), Autoport, and Does 1 to 10 alleging one cause of action for unlawful detainer. On July 7, 2026, Krugliakov filed the instant demurrer. On August 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On August 14, 2026, Krugliakov filed his reply. II.

Legal Standard

A demurrer is a pleading that may be used to test the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. Sec. 430.10.) There are two types of demurrers: general demurrers and special demurrers. (See McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 77.) General demurrers can be used to attack pleadings for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (CCP Sec. 430.10(e); McKenney, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 77.)

Such demurrers can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable; evidence or extrinsic matters are not considered. (CCP Sec.Sec. 430.30 and 430.70; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) To test the sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court admits "all material facts properly pleaded" and "matters which may be judicially noticed," but does not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation]." (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.)

The Court gives these facts "a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context." (Ibid.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d