Michelle Broza v. City of Los Angeles and Charles Lamont

the 5/18/26 order, setting the motion for hearing on 10/01/26. Because 10/01/26 is after the scheduled trial date, Defendant made an ex parte application to advance the hearing on the motion. The Court granted the application on 7/08/26, setting the motion for hearing on 8/18/26.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, contending her vehicle was produced for inspection on 6/04/26 but conceding the second session of her deposition has not yet gone forward. She contends she is ready, willing, and able to sit for the second session of her deposition and has offered dates for the deposition, such that terminating sanctions are not appropriate. The Court wishes to hear from the parties, at the time of the hearing, concerning the status of Plaintiff's deposition. The case is set for trial on 9/08/26, such that time is of the essence. If the parties submit on the tentative, the Court will presume the parties have resolved their issues and the motion will be denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Facts Plaintiff, Michelle Broza filed this action against Defendants, City of Los Angeles and Charles Lamont for damages arising out of a trip and fall on a sidewalk owned by the City and adjacent to the property owned by Lamont. Plaintiff filed her complaint on 10/15/26. Plaintiff filed proof of service on Lamont by substitute service on 11/03/25; the POS indicates Plaintiff's registered process server served Lamont by substitute service on Maria Ann Howell, the co-occupant of 941 W. 29 th St., on 10/30/25, with the papers mailed thereafter. The City answered and filed a cross-complaint against Lamont on 12/22/25.

2. Motion to Vacate Default a. Default On 1/28/26, Plaintiff attempted to have Defendant's default entered, but the Clerk rejected the request due to Plaintiff's failure to include a declaration re: diligence. On 2/03/26, Plaintiff filed a declaration re: diligence, which shows efforts were made to serve Defendant on 10/25/25 and 10/27/25 before substitute service was effectuated on 10/30/25. On 2/04/26, at Plaintiff's request, the Clerk entered Defendant's default.

b. Default Judgment On 5/29/26 and 6/01/26, Plaintiff filed papers in support of a request for judgment against Defendant. The Court has not, to date, entered judgment. Indeed, a default judgment prove-up hearing is scheduled for 12/04/26, three days before the jury trial in the action.

c. Ex Parte Application On 6/26/26, Defendant filed an ex parte application to set aside the default entered against him. On 6/29/26, Plaintiff filed opposition to the application. The hearing on the application was continued, and ultimately the matter was set for hearing on 8/20/26. The Court's minute order was not expressly clear on this issue, but it appears the ex parte moving and opposition papers are intended to serve as the motion and opposition papers.

d. Notice of Motion Defendant's notice of motion indicates he moves to vacate the default entered against him pursuant to CCP Sec.473(b). His points and authorities, however, cite not only Sec.473(b), but also Sec.473(d) nd Sec.473.5.

e.

Analysis

Defendant declares his address is a multi-unit building, and he does not reside in the same unit as Howell, the person who was served on his behalf. He declares Howell did not tell him of the summons and complaint, and he was never personally served with the summons and complaint. Defendant does not expressly indicate he did not receive the mail-served copy of the summons and complaint, does not explain whether the building has unit numbers, and does not indicate how he learned of the lawsuit filed against him.

Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, indicates the summons and complaint were served at Defendant's usual mailing address and were mailed thereafter, which is all that is required to effectuate substitute service. Plaintiff's opposition does not include any evidence and relies solely on the proof of service to support the conclusion that service was appropriate. In light of the strong policy in favor of trial on the merits, the Court is inclined to grant the motion and vacate the default. There is no meaningful prejudice to Plaintiff in the event the motion is granted, especially because the case remains pending against the City and Plaintiff must prepare for trial regardless of the outcome of this motion.

f. Proposed Responsive Pleading CCP Sec.473(b) requires the moving papers to be accompanied by a proposed responsive pleading. The Court cannot locate a proposed responsive pleading. Plaintiff notes this failure at page 1, line 27 of the opposition. The Court is not inclined to deny the motion on this ground, but will require Defendant to file a responsive pleading prior to the hearing if Defendant wishes to have relief granted.

g. Attorneys' Fees The more difficult issue is whether to impose an attorneys' fees award or not. As noted above, Defendant's notice of motion indicates the motion is brought per CCP Sec.473(b), which contemplates an award of fees, but the points and authorities also rely on Sec.473(d) and Sec.473.5, neither of which have a similar fee provision. Because Plaintiff noticed his motion under Sec.473(b), the Court will analyze the fees issue under that section. Sec.473(c) provides the Court with discretion, when granting a motion per Sec.473(b), to impose a penalty of no greater than $1000 upon the offending attorney or party, director the offending attorney to pay an amount not to exceed $1000 to the State Bar fund, and/or grant other relief as appropriate.

On balance, the Court is inclined to grant Plaintiff's request that Defendant pay a penalty of $1000 based on Defendant's failure to meaningfully explain the details of service and/or of how he ultimately learned of the lawsuit.

h.

Conclusion

If the parties submit on the tentative, the motion will be granted and Defendant will be ordered to pay Plaintiff $1000 in sanctions. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, Defendant must file a proposed responsive pleading prior to the hearing if Defendant wishes to have the Court grant the motion on its merits.

i. Notice Defendant is ordered to give notice. Case Number: 26LBCV00731 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: S27 Moving Party: Plaintiff, Kimberly Farrar Opposing Party: Defendant, Queen's View Commons Homeowners Association Notice: OK

1. Complaint Plaintiff, Kimberly Farrar filed this action against Defendants, Queen's View Commons Homeowners Association, Paragon Equities, Inc., and Yoyyann Hawkins for nuisance, negligence, breach of contract/governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, IIED, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. The crux of the complaint is that Farrar lives immediately below Hawkins, who has repeatedly allowed her unit to flood and cause damage to Farrar's unit over the course of many years. 26LBCV00721 has been deemed related to this case. In 26LBCV00721, Andrew Donato has sued the same defendants, alleging damage to his unit (which is adjacent to Farrar's unit) due to Hawkins's conduct. Donato and Farrar have jointly