Andrea Deras and Mariana Deras v. Jonathan M. Anderson Aviles and Uber Technologies, Inc.

allegations that Defendant's conduct was specifically targeted at California consumers. Therefore, the first prong is not satisfied. (See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472

In opposition, Plaintiff cites numerous cases that purport to support its position. However, many of those cases are distinguishable or do not support Plaintiff's position. For instance, Secrest Machine Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 664 involved the direct sale of a product by an out-of-state manufacturer to a California business for use in the state. (See id. at p. 670 ["The cause of action before us now, unlike that involved in World-Wide Volkswagen, arises out of a direct sale of a product by its Virginia manufacturer to a California business for use in California."].)

The same dynamic is present in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 893, 904, wherein the outside manufacturer was directly selling products to a California company for use in the state. ["In the present case, it is clear that defendant derives substantial economic benefit from the sale and use of its products in California; it currently derives about $30,000 annually in gross sales revenues from its direct sales of certain pressure tanks to the Cochin Manufacturing Company plant in South San Francisco."].)

The same can be said about Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (2021) 592 U.S. 351, wherein Ford "had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both States for many years" and "conceded 'purposeful availment' of the two States' markets." (Id. at p. 365.)

As You Sow v. Crawford Laboratories, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1859 also does not assist Plaintiff because the defendant there "purposefully consummated business arrangements with California companies on 16 separate occasions so it could profit from the products' use in California." (Id. at p. 1871.)

Lastly, Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 72 F.4th 1085, does not support Plaintiff's position because the defendants operated their own online storefront and directly sold goods to Arizona residents as part of their regular course of business. (See id. at p. 1095 ["Defendants expressly aimed their conduct at Arizona because they allegedly sold products to Arizona residents via an interactive website in their regular course of business and caused those products to be delivered to the forum."].)

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant targeted or purposefully directed its activities at California residents. For this reason, the first prong in establishing specific jurisdiction is not satisfied. (See Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273; see also (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462.) Accordingly, specific jurisdiction cannot be established. (See Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Lid. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons established above, Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Summons is GRANTED. This case is dismissed without prejudice.

Case Number: 26STCV15139

Hearing Date: August 18, 2026

Dept: 316

BACKGROUND

This case is centered on a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs Andrea and Mariana Deras allege that Defendant Jonathan M. Anderson Aviles, while driving for Uber, caused a motor vehicle accident which injured Plaintiffs.

On May 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Jonathan M. Anderson Aviles and Uber Technologies, Inc. On June 29, 2026, Defendant Aviles filed a demurrer. On August 4, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On August 11, 2026, Defendant filed a reply.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant's demurrer to the 1 st cause of action is OVERRULED. Defendant's demurrer to the 2 nd cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

LEGAL STANDARD

"[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint." (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].)

For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (See Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (See Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

¿ Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy ¿ (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; ¿ see also Lewis v. YouTube, LLC ¿ (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, "[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend." (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. ¿ (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). ¿¿

DISCUSSION

I. Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring or moving party shall meet and confer with the party who has filed the pleading ¿ in person, by telephone, or by video conference. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.41, subd. (a).) ¿ Furthermore, the ¿ demurring or moving party ¿ must ¿ file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.41, subd. (a)(3).) ¿¿

Here, the parties discussed the demurrer by telephone. (See Walker Decl., P. 3.) Therefore, the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.41, subd. (a).)

II. Negligence (Cause of Action No. 1)

The Court overrules Defendant's demurrer to the first cause of action. To ¿ state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) ¿ " the existence of a legal duty of care, " ¿ (2) ¿ " breach of that duty, " ¿ and (3) ¿ " proximate cause resulting in an injury. " ¿ (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC ¿ (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was "driving carelessly and with reckless disregard for the safety of others." (Compl., P. 7.) As a result, Defendant crashed into Plaintiffs' vehicle on Silver Lake Boulevard and Parkman Avenue in Los Angeles. (See id. at P.P. 2, 8.) The crash caused multiple injuries to Plaintiffs. (See id. at P. 8.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' allegations are too vague to support their negligence claim. (See Demurrer, p. 4:3-9.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently plead that Defendant breached his duty of care by driving carelessly and/or recklessly and injuring Plaintiffs. (See id. at P.P. 2, 8.) When assumed as true, these allegations give Defendant notice as to the basis for Plaintiff's claim and sufficiently state a cause of action for negligence. The demurrer to this cause of action is overruled.

III. Negligence Per Se (Cause of Action No. 2)

Negligence per se can be invoked when: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; ¿ (2) that violation caused an injury or death; ¿ (3) said death or injury resulted from occurrence which the law was designed to prevent; ¿ and ¿ (4) the person suffering the injury or death was one of the class of persons for whose protection the law was adopted. ¿ (See Urhausen ¿ v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 254, 267; see also Evid. Code, Sec. 669, subd. (a).)

However, negligence per se is not an independent cause of action; it is simply an evidentiary doctrine embedded within a general negligence claim. (See Epochal Enters., Inc. v. LF Encinitas Props., LLC ¿ (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 44, 58 [" Negligence ¿ per se ¿ is an evidentiary doctrine, rather than an independent cause of action. "]; ¿ Jones v. Awad ¿ (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1210 ["Negligence ¿ per se ¿ is an evidentiary doctrine, rather than an independent cause of action. "]; ¿ Johnson v. Honeywell Intern. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555 ["'negligence ¿ per se ¿ is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. '"].)

For this reason, Plaintiffs cannot pursue an independent cause of action for negligence per se. (See Epochal Enters., Inc. v. LF Encinitas Props., LLC ¿ (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 44, 58; Jones v. Awad ¿ (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1210; Johnson v. Honeywell Intern. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION ¿

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's demurrer to the 1 st cause of action is OVERRULED. Defendant's demurrer to the 2 nd cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant is ordered to file and serve an answer to the complaint within twenty days of the Court's order. | Home -->)" -->