Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Xclusive Auto Collision, Inc., et al.

amened complaint pending the outcome of the instant motion. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is now ordered to be filed and served no later than August 31, 2026. A Case Management Conference is set for October 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. E.

[1] Unspecified Section reference are made to the Government Code. [2] Habashy's supplemental declaration arguably submits "new" evidence that should have been submitted with Garrett's moving papers. Upon review, the Court determines that Habashy's supplemental declaration, rather than providing "new" evidence, addresses and provides further specification regarding evidence submitted with Garrett's moving papers and as to which Compton raised issue in its Opposition.

OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Plaintiff, vs. XCLUSIVE AUTO COLLISION, INC.; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES; DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |)))))))))))) | CASE NO: 25CMCV01923 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION DATE: August 18, 2026

TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Party: Plaintiff Santander Consumer USA, Inc. Responding Party: Defendant Xclusive Auto Collision, Inc. Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff's Application for Writ of Possession is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT I. BACKGROUND This is an action for claim and delivery, conversion, quiet title and declaratory relief.

Plaintiff Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "Santander") alleges that it became the owner of a financing agreement (the "Contract") by which the registered owner of the subject 2021 Toyota RAV4 motor vehicle (the "Subject Vehicle") agreed to make payments to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that, at all times, it has been the legal owner and had a perfected security interest in the Subject Vehicle. Per Plaintiff, the registered owner had the Subject Vehicle transferred to Defendant Xclusive Auto Collision, Inc.'s ("Xclusive") body shop, causing a large lien to be owed on the Subject Vehicle in default of the Contract. Plaintiff alleges it made demand upon Defendants for surrender of possession of the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff, but Defendants have failed, refused, or neglected to return possession of the Subject Vehicle.

On May 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Xclusive, the California Department of Motor Vehicles, and Does 1 to 10, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Claim and Delivery of Personal Property; (2) Conversion; (3) Quiet Title; and (4) Declaratory Relief. On January 13, 2026, Xclusive filed its Answer. On July 15, 2026, Santander filed the instant Application for Writ of Possession. On August 13, 2026, Xclusive filed its Opposition.

Xclusive's Opposition, presented without seeking leave of Court and with no declaration setting forth good cause for the late filing, is untimely. (See Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1005(b)(All papers opposing a noticed motion must be filed with the court and served on all other parties "at least nine court days ... before the hearing").) The Court exercises its discretion to refuse to consider untimely filed papers. (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1300(d); Mackey v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657.) II.

ANALYSIS A.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the following are the requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no writ shall be issued under this chapter except after a hearing on a noticed motion. (b) ...¿ The plaintiff's application for the writ shall satisfy the requirements of Section 512.010 and, in addition, shall include a showing that the conditions required by this subdivision exist. A writ of possession may issue if the court finds that the conditions required by this subdivision exist and the requirements of Section 512.060 are met.

Where a writ of possession has been issued pursuant to this subdivision, a copy of the summons and complaint, a copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof, and a notice which satisfies the requirements of subdivisions (c) and (d) of Section 512.040 and informs the defendant of his rights under this subdivision shall be served upon the defendant and any other person required by Section 514.020 to be served with a writ of possession.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 512.020.)¿ (a) Prior to the hearing required by subdivision (a) of Section 512.020, the defendant shall be served with all of the following:¿ (1) A copy of the summons and complaint.¿ (2) A Notice of Application and Hearing.¿ (3) A copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof.¿ (b) If the defendant has not appeared in the action, and a writ, notice, order, or other paper is required to be personally served on the defendant under this title, service shall be made in the same manner as a summons is served under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 413.10) of Title 5.¿ (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 512.030.)¿ (a) At the hearing, a writ of possession shall issue if both of the following are found:¿ (1) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the plaintiff's claim to possession of the property.¿ (2) The undertaking requirements of Section 515.010 are satisfied.¿ (b) No writ directing the levying officer to enter a private place to take possession of any property shall be issued unless the plaintiff has established that there is probable cause to believe that the property is located there.¿ (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 512.060.)¿ (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall not issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of possession until the plaintiff has filed an undertaking with the court. The undertaking shall provide that the sureties are bound to the defendant for the return of the property to the defendant, if return of the property is ordered, and for the payment to the defendant of any sum recovered against the plaintiff. The undertaking shall be in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount.

The value of the defendant's interest in the property is determined by the market value of the property less the amount due and owing on any conditional sales contract or security agreement and all liens and encumbrances on the property, and any other factors necessary to determine the defendant's interest in the property.¿ (b) If the court finds that the defendant has no interest in the property, the court shall waive the requirement of the plaintiff's undertaking and shall include in the order for issuance of the writ the amount of the defendant's undertaking sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 515.020. (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 515.010.)¿ B.

Discussion

Plaintiff moves the Court for a writ of possession of the Subject Vehicle (2021 TOYOTA RAV4 Vehicle Identification No. 2T3W1RFV8MW116823). Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply for a writ of possession. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 512.010(a).) The application shall include all of the following, which may be established by affidavit, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 512.101(b): 1. The basis of the plaintiff's claim that the plaintiff is entitled to possession; 2.

A showing that the property is wrongfully detained and of the manner in which defendant came into possession; 3. A particular description of the property and a statement of its value; 4. The property's location based on plaintiff's knowledge, information and belief; and 5. A statement that the property has not been seized by statute or execution against it. The writ will be issued if the plaintiff's claim is probably valid. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 512.040(b).) A writ to take possession of property at a private location requires the plaintiff to show probable cause that the property is located there. (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 512.060(b).)

Santander sets forth the elements required to obtain a writ of possession through the declaration of its employee Edward Vargas (the "Vargas Decl."). (1) The basis of Santander's claim is that it is the secured creditor and legal owner of the Subject Vehicle. (Vargas Decl., P. 2.) Santander holds a perfected security interest in the Subject Vehicle after having been assigned the Contract by which Patricia Reed ("Reed") financed the purchase of the Subject Vehicle from the originating dealer. (Id., P. 3, Exh.

A.) At all relevant times, Santander has been the legal owner of the Subject Vehicle (Id., P. 5.) (2) On or about September 29, 2025, Reed notified Santander that the Subject Vehicle had been involved in an accident and, on or about October 6, 2026 Reed notified Santander that the Subject Vehicle was in the possession of Xclusive (Id., P.P. 6-7.) Reed's notification has since been confirmed by Xclusive's responses to Santander's Requests for Admission. (Id., P. 12.) (3) Santander alleges Reed is in default of the Contract by exposing the Subject Vehicle to "misuse/seizure/confiscation, or involuntary transfer." (Id., P. 8.)

Upon default, Santander alleges that the Contract provides that it may retake or repossess the Subject Vehicle. (Id.) (4) Santander did not receive any notice of stored vehicle or notice of storage charges from Xclusive and did not receive any notice from the California Department of Justice that Xclusive was in custody of the Subject Vehicle in excess of 30 days. (Id., P.P. 9-10.) Santander has also not received any notice that Xclusive applied for authorization to conduct a lien sale with the Department of Motor Vehicles. (Id., P. 11.) (5) In response to Requests for Admission, Xclusive admits that it obtained possession of the Subject Vehicle on September 23, 2025 and it did not complete repairs to the Subject Vehicle but only performed teardown and inspection work in connection with evaluation of the Subject Vehicle. (Id., P.P. 12-13.) (6) Xclusive has not produced an application to conduct a lien sale for the Subject Vehicle, nor has it produced any notice of stored vehicle with notice sent pursuant to Vehicle Code Sec. 10652.5 (Id., P.P. 14-15.)

Xclusive's documents produced in response to Santander's discovery requests include only a repair/intake authorization, a tow bill, and email communications. (Id., P. 16, Exh. C.) (7) Santander's counsel sent a demand letter on December 2, 2025 demanding return of the Subject Vehicle. (Id., P. 18, Exh. D.) Xclusive did not respond or resolve the matter. (Id., P.P. 18, 20.) (8)

The approximate value of the Subject Vehicle was $20,325.00 at the commencement of this action. (Id., P. 19, Exh. E.) (9) Santander believes the Subject Vehicle is currently in Xclusive's possession and/or control at Xclusive's principal place of business located at 7614 Somerset Blvd., Paramount, CA 90723. (Id., P. 22.) (10) Santander does not have knowledge of any taking or assessment on account of tax, assessment or fine. (Id., P. 21.) Santander served Xclusive with the Summons and Complaint and the instant Notice of Application for Writ of Possession along with the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and affidavit in support. (See, generally, docket.) And Xclusive has appeared in this action. (See Answer, 1/13/2026.)

In its review of the evidence presented, the Cout finds that Santander has established the basis for its claim of possession, the manner in which Xclusive came into possession and Xclusive's detainment. The Subject Vehicle is described as a 2021 Toyota RAV4 with Vehicle Identification Number 2T3W1RFV8MW116823 and valued at approximately $20,325.00. The Subject Vehicle is believed to be at Xclusive's principal place of business located at 7614 Somerset Blvd., Paramount, CA 90723 and Santander attests that the Subject Vehicle has not been seized by statute or execution against it.

What is missing, however, is specification and/or clarification as to Reed's alleged default under the Contract, which default is the basis for Plaintiff's claim of right to possession of the Subject Vehicle. [1] Plaintiff contends that Reed is in default for violation of Section 2b of the Contract, which reads in its entirety as follows: Using the vehicle. You agree not to remove the vehicle from the U.S. or Canada, or to sell, rent, lease or transfer any interest in the vehicle or this contract without our written permission. You agree not to expose the vehicle to misuse, seizure, confiscation, or involuntary transfer. If we pay any repair bills, storage bills, taxes, fines, or charges on the vehicle, you agree to repay the amount when we ask for it. (Vargas Decl., Exh. A, p. 3, Section 2b (emphasis in original).)

First, the Court is unable to determine whether Xclusive has any interest in the Subject Vehicle (which, in turn, would apparently be a violation of Section 2b quoted above). On the one hand, Santander, through its employee Vargas, attests that Xclusive has produced no documents evidencing a properly asserted or perfected lien, and "has not shown compliance with the statutory requirements for maintaining or enforcing any lien against the [Subject] Vehicle." (Vargas Decl., P.P. 14-16.) On the other hand, Santander's Complaint alleges that Reed is in default of the Contract because she "caused the SUBJECT VEHICLE to be transferred to defendants [sic] Body Shop, causing a large lien to be owed on the SUBJECT VEHICLE." (Compl., P. 11 (emphasis in original).) [2] If indeed Reed's alleged default is premised upon a transfer of interest in the vehicle without Santander's written permission, further information is needed to clarify whether that actually occurred and whether any lien exists such that Reed is in default.

Second, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege Reed's default for any reason other than her transfer causing a large lien to be owed on the Subject Vehicle. Thus, Santander's contention that Reed defaulted because "she exposed the Vehicle to misuse/seizure/confiscation, or involuntary transfer . . . by transferring it to Defendant who has been withholding the Vehicle from Plaintiff." (see Vargas Decl., P. 8) appears to be an allegation of a default not set forth in Plaintiff's operative Complaint. The Court cannot evaluate the probable validity of Plaintiff's prevailing on a claim of default not made in the operative Complaint.

Next, the Court is unable to determine whether the transfer of the Subject Vehicle to Xclusive for repairs constitutes exposure to "misuse, seizure, confiscation, or involuntary transfer" such that Reed is in default pursuant to Section 2b of the Contract. Plaintiff has not explained how Reed's apparently voluntary transfer of the Subject Vehicle to Xclusive constitutes any of the above. There is no indication that the Subject Vehicle was misused, seized, confiscated, or involuntarily transferred.

On the contrary, Vargas' declaration indicates that Reed voluntarily transferred the Subject Vehicle to Xclusive for repairs after an accident. (See Vargas Decl., P.P. 6-7.) The only action taken that might be construed as falling within the prohibitions set forth in Section 2b is Xclusive's apparent refusal to return the Subject Vehicle to Santander upon Santander's demand, but Santander has not explained or set forth how that action constitutes a violation of Section 2b. The sole statement made in this regard is the conclusory assertion that "Patricia Reed is clearly in default under the terms of said Contract in that she exposed the Vehicle to misuse/seizure/confiscation, or involuntary transfer . . . by transferring it to Defendant who has been withholding the Vehicle from Plaintiff." (Vargas Decl., P. 8.)

Again, no explanation is made as to how a voluntary transfer to Xclusive for repairs constitutes exposure to misuse, seizure, confiscation or involuntary transfer. Perhaps a connection might be made to a possible lien sale to be conducted by Xclusive but, as is noted above, the existence of any lien is unclear and thus the Court cannot infer that Xclusive's possession of the Subject Vehicle constitutes exposure to seizure, confiscation or involuntary transfer in violation of Section 2b. In short, further information is needed.

Finally, as is noted above, the Court shall not issue a writ of possession until the plaintiff has filed an undertaking with the Court, except where the Court finds that the defendant has no interest in the property. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 515.010.) "If the court finds that the defendant has no interest in the property, the court shall waive the requirement of the plaintiff's undertaking and shall include in the order for issuance of the writ the amount of the defendant's undertaking sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 515.020." (Id., Sec. 515.010(b).)

Code of Civil Procedure 515.020(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he undertaking shall state that, if the plaintiff recovers judgment on the action, the defendant shall pay all costs awarded to the plaintiff and all damages that the plaintiff may sustain by reason of the loss of possession of the property." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 512.020(b).)

With conflicting information as to the existence of a lien, the Court is unable to determine whether an undertaking is required and, if so, by which party. In the absence of a properly asserted and perfected lien, Xclusive may have unpaid repair bills but nothing further. Accordingly, the Court might find no undertaking is necessary and waive Plaintiff's undertaking requirement. In contrast, should a lien exist, the Court would need the amount of any such lien in order to properly set Santander's undertaking. III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff's Application for Writ of Possession is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may re-file its Application addressing the issues noted above.

[1] See Vargas Decl., Exh. A, p. 3, Section 3d. ("If you default, we may take (repossess) the vehicle from you if we do so peacefully and the law allows it.") [2] See also Complaint P. 38, alleging that "Plaintiff contends that the registered owner(s) are required to make the payments called for in the subject contract and to keep the SUBJECT VEHICLE free and clear of any secondary liens (which they have failed to do." (Emphasis in original.) Case Number: 26TRCV00572 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT JAMES STARKMAN, an individual; and STARQUEST REALTY INVESTMENTS 1242 WEST 134TH CORPORATION, a California corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. ROUHEL FEINSTEIN, an individual; DAVID WEISELMAN, Trustee of the Weiselman Family Trust; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. |)))