Leslie Reyes, et al. v. Ford Motor Company

relationship, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that AVN performed any repairs inconsistent with industry standards, nor that any work AVN performed on the Vehicle caused damage. (Motion, p. 11:4-6.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' initial disclosure of document production includes a limited repair history, but identifies no repair records performed negligently by AVN, and that none of the documents provided reference negligent conduct, deviation from standards for repair, breach of a duty to exercise ordinary care and skill in the inspection, storage, preparation, and repair of the Vehicle, and Plaintiffs thus have failed to produce any evidence of breach of a duty or causation. (Motion, p. 11:6-15.)

Here, the Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden of establishing that no triable issue of material fact exists. Defendants first carry the burden of establishing with competent evidence that (1) AVN did not breach the duty owed and (2) any alleged breach was not the cause of damage suffered by Plaintiffs. Here, Defendants merely argue that Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of negligence, which is not sufficient on a motion for summary judgment under these circumstances.

Defendants bear the burden of providing evidence, including evidence that the repairs were done in conformity with industry standards, that the repairs were done in conformity with the internal procedures for AVN, that the repair efforts were not negligently performed, or any other factual, evidentiary basis on which no trier of fact could find negligence and that the cause of action will fail as a matter of law. In the absence of such evidence, there exists room for questions as to whether AVN did, in fact, comply with industry standards and appropriately perform inspection and repair on the Vehicle.

Plaintiffs and Defendants have produced evidence establishing that the same issue was present in the Vehicle shortly after the first repair attempt, which raises a question of negligence in AVN's first repair effort. In light of the significant differences between the repair efforts following the January 28, 2025 presentation of the Vehicle and the efforts following the February 10, 2025 presentation of the Vehicle, there is a question as to whether AVN was negligent in inspecting the Vehicle and failing to repair the Vehicle sooner.

With all inferences and evidence construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot find that there is no triable issue of material fact here. Therefore, Defendants' motion is DENIED as to the fourth cause of action. ----- V.

Conclusion

Defendants Nissan North America, Inc. and Antelope Valley Nissan, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants Nissan North America, Inc. and Antelope Valley Nissan, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in part as to the third cause of action. Defendants Nissan North America, Inc. and Antelope Valley Nissan, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED in part as to the first, second, and fourth causes of action. Case Number: 25AVCV00713 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: A14 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTH DISTRICT LESLIE REYES and OSCAR HERNANDEZ, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, et al., Defendant. | Case Number 25AVCV00713 [TENTATIVE] ORDER ON MOTION Date of Hearing: August 18, 2026 Dept. A-14 Judge William H. Forman

| I.

Background

This is a Song-Beverly action arising from Plaintiffs Leslie Reyes and Oscar Hernandez's (Plaintiffs) purchase of a new vehicle from Defendant Ford Motor Company (Defendant) and Defendant's alleged violation of its statutory obligations under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act). Plaintiffs move the Court for an order of attorney's fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement.

On January 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant, asserting three causes of action for (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act for breach of express warranty, (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Act for breach of implied warranty, and (3) negligent repair. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that on March 15, 2023, Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with Defendant regarding a 2023 Ford Maverick (Vehicle). (Compl., P. 16.) Plaintiffs claim that during the warranty period, the Vehicle contained or developed defects and nonconformities to warranty which impaired the use, value, or safety of the Vehicle. (Compl., P. 17.) Plaintiffs presented the Vehicle to Defendant, who failed to repair the Vehicle or offer restitution or replacement of the Vehicle. (Compl., P.P. 18-20.)

On February 11, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement of the entire case. On April 27, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the present motion for attorney's fees. At the OSC, the Court continued the OSC re dismissal to July 27, 2026. On August 5, 2026, Defendant filed its opposition. On August 11, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their reply. ----- II.

Legal Standard

Standard for Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses - Under¿Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), the prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entitled to fees that were reasonably incurred: "If the buyer prevails under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the Court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).)

The trial court has an obligation to award only those attorneys' fees that are reasonable. (See PLCM Group v. Drexler ¿(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-96; see also ¿ Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) A prevailing party includes the party with a net monetary recovery in settlement of the case. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

The lodestar method is the primary method for determining a reasonable attorney fee award under section 1794, subdivision (d). (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818-19.) "A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case." (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 [internal quotations omitted].)

"The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.] The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work." (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 (citations omitted).)

"The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." (Horsford v. Board of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.)

"The law is clear, however, that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records." (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.)

In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of "fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work." (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664; see also Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 ["[R]ate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate."].) ----- III.

Discussion

Application - Plaintiffs request an order for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses amounting to $22,815 pursuant to a signed settlement agreement (Settlement), the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), and calculated using the lodestar formula. (Notice of Motion, p. i:2-8.) This total is comprised of (1) $13,332.50 for attorney's fees, (2) $6,666.25 for an enhancement of attorney's fees by a multiplier of 1.5, and (3) $2,816.50 for costs and expenses. (Notice of Motion, p. i:9-13.)

a. Entitlement to Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party to this litigation or that they were entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred in litigation. The settlement offer establishes that Plaintiffs accepted the offer, which states, in relevant part, "As part of this Statutory Offer, Ford agrees that Plaintiffs shall retain the right to petition the Court for an award of reasonably and actually incurred attorney fees and costs against Ford recoverable pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1794(d).

In ruling on Plaintiffs' fee/cost motion(s), the attorney fees, expenses and costs amount shall be calculated as if Plaintiffs were found to have prevailed in this action under section 1794(d) of the California Code of Civil Procedure as of the date of this offer of judgment. Ford expressly reserves all defenses to Plaintiffs' fee/costs motion(s). Plaintiffs may recover for attorney fees and costs reasonably and actually incurred in bringing such a fee/cost motion(s). Ford will pay the attorney fees and cost amounts determined by the Court within 30 days' written notice of entry of the Court's ruling awarding those amounts." (Biemann Decl., Ex.

A, P. 2.)

In any event, it is undisputed that this settlement offer was accepted by Plaintiffs. Where an accepted settlement offer designates the Plaintiffs as the prevailing party and specifically delegated determination of fees to the Court, it thereby entitles the Plaintiffs to bring the subject motion. (Engle v. Copenbarger & Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 165, 168-69.)

b. Reasonableness of Attorney's Fees Amount

As discussed, the standard method for calculating reasonable attorney's fees is the lodestar method, which determines recoverable fees by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate of the attorneys by the reasonable number of hours billed for the work performed.

i. Reasonableness of Attorneys' Hourly Rates

The Declaration of Roger Kirnos, Plaintiffs' counsel, sets forth the autobiographies and hourly rates for six billing attorneys and one billing law clerk who worked on this case. The hourly rates and billing codes and are as follows: 1. Roger Kirnos (RK), Managing Partner of Knight Law Group, LLP (KLG) ($600/hr.) - admitted to the California Bar in 2012; 2. Armando Lopez (AL), Associate Attorney of KLG ($450/hr.) - admitted to the California Bar in 2018; 3. Brian Cohen (BC), Associate Attorney of KLG ($475/hr., later increased to $515/hr.) - admitted to the California Bar in 2017; 4.

Colby Meagle (CAM), Associate Attorney of KLG ($400/hr.) - admitted to the California Bar in 2019; 5. Debra Reed (DR), Associate Attorney II of KLG ($495/hr.) - admitted to the California Bar in an unspecified year; 6. Matias Leite (ML), Associate Attorney of KLG ($350/hr.) - admitted to the California Bar in 2024; 7. Marianne Collazo Robles (MCR), Lawyer at Castillo Law, with whom KLG contracts for attorneys and law clerk services, operated as a law clerk for this case under the supervision of California licensed attorneys ($295/hr.) - admitted to the Puerto Rico Bar in 2023. (Kirnos Decl., P. 28.)

Plaintiffs' counsel Kirnos provides the billing procedures, accolades, and notable published and unpublished case law for Knight, including the firm's appellate case work. (Kinos Decl., P.P. 17-22, 25.) Kirnos also provides a plethora of case law establishing other courts' acceptance of hourly rates of attorneys who have worked on similar Song-Beverly Actions for reference of the general community rates for similar work. (Kirnos Decl., P. 29, Exs. D - FF.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' counsel's rates are excessive and unsupported by evidence and should be reduced to $275/hr. for non-partners and $350/hr. for partners. Defendant provides numerous trial court cases holding such rates are reasonable, stating the Court should follow these cases instead of the cases cited by Plaintiff, along with a copy of the Real Rate Report, pointing to Consumer Goods and Insurance rates. (Opp., p. 8:10-21; Biemann Decl., Ex. B.) Defendant also argues Robles's time should be stricken entirely as she is not licensed to practice law in the state of California, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 119. (Opp., p. 10:20-11:6.)

To start, the Court declines to strike all of the time entries of Ms. Robles for what Defendant appears to argue is the unlawful practice of law. Plaintiffs' counsel has made clear that Ms. Robles was not working in any capacity as an attorney in this case, but as a law clerk, which does not require admission to the State Bar of California. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in response to the argument that 'nonlawyers cannot recover fees for practicing law,' clarified the extent of the Birbrower holding in Frye v.

Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 23, 48-49, stating "[i]n Birbrower, we concluded that an out-of-state law firm was not entitled to a judgment enforcing its client's obligations under a fee agreement for legal services rendered in California, because neither the firm nor its lawyers were authorized to practice law in California. Birbrower is inapposite. It concerned a law firm's action to recover contractual fees owed by its client. The question in the present case is whether Frye, the plaintiff tenant for whom THC won a favorable judgment, is entitled to statutory attorney fees that the court ordered the defendant landlords in the underlying action to pay." (Ibid.)

In any event, none of the time entries submitted by Ms. Robles lead the Court to the conclusion that she was unlawfully practicing law as an attorney in California, and actually establish that she was conducting typical and permitted preparatory, non-representative law clerk tasks like drafting discovery, all of which appears to have been reviewed by Mr. Leite, an attorney licensed to practice in California. From the billing statements Ms. Robles never made an appearance, spoke to the clients, or spoke to opposing counsel in any capacity. The Court is not aware of any law which prohibits an attorney from working in a lesser, non-attorney capacity in a state in which they are not licensed, prohibits recovery of attorney's fees for law clerks, or that prohibits recovery of attorney's fees for law clerks or paralegals who work on a contract basis.

However, the Court finds that Ms. Robles's rate is excessive for a law clerk in light of the scope of the work done, and therefore, reduces her hourly rate to $175/hr. Based on the Kirnos Declaration and the Court's experience, the Court finds the remainder of Plaintiffs' requested hourly rates are reasonable for practitioners with comparable experience in Song-Beverly matters. (See Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-474 [approving $575 per hour in Los Angeles lemon-law litigation].)

Given Mr. Kirnos' role as a managing partner, the Court is persuaded his higher rate is justified by his particular expertise. Because of Mr. Kirnos' unique situation as a founding partner, the approval of his rate would not in most cases serve as a benchmark for rates charged by other partners in other representations. Accordingly, the rates requested by Plaintiffs' counsel is accepted as requested.

ii. Reasonableness of Hours Billed

Plaintiffs' counsel contends that they reasonably spent 33.4 hours in prosecuting this action, including the actually-incurred fees in bringing the present fee motion and anticipated fees in reviewing the opposition, drafting a reply, and preparing for and attending the hearing, and has provided detailed billing records reflecting the work. (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A.) In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' request should be denied or significantly reduced, objecting specifically to the following and requesting all be stricken in full: 1.

All entries by Robles - 10.9 hours ($3,215.50) billed throughout the case 2. 05/20/2025 - 0.6 hours ($270) billed for "Review and make redlines changes to draft plaintiff discovery responses for both plaintiffs." 3. 10/01/25 - 0.1 hour ($35) billed for "Drafted the results summary memo for the 10/1/25 IDC." 4. 10/02/25 - 0.1 hour ($35) billed for "Component list and summary of phone conversation emailed to Opposing Counsel." 5. 10/16/25 - 0.3 hour ($105) billed for "Discovery and case strategy conference with attorney CM regarding Defendant's supplementation of discovery." 6. 10/16/25 - 0.1 hour ($35) billed for "Summary of phone conversation emailed to Opposing Counsel." 7. 03/27/26 - 0.3 hour ($154.50) billed for "Begin to review, analyze and audit billing entries for purposes of drafting Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees." 8. 04/13/26 - 0.4 hours ($140) billed for "Review of case file, court docket and draft declaration for OSC re Dismissal." 9. 04/16/26 - 0.4 hour ($206) billed for "Continue to review, analyze and audit billing entries for purposes of drafting Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees." 10. 04/16/26 - 0.7 hour ($360.50) billed for "Draft Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and the Declaration of attorney RK in support of Motion."

11. TBD - 3.0 hours anticipated for "Review and analyze Defendant's Opposition (Anticipated)," "Draft Reply to Opposition to Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses (Anticipated)," and "Prepare for and appear remotely at hearing on Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses (Anticipated)" at $515/hr.

Generally, Defendant objects to recovery of fees due to use of templates and excessive billing, including billing for internal communication, administrative tasks, and anticipated legal fees. On reply, Plaintiffs reiterate their moving arguments and argue that the fees are improperly characterized by Defendant.

The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees were "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount." (Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at 817.) The party seeking attorney fees "'is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him].'" (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) Therefore, if the "time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount." (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

The detailed billing records Plaintiffs have submitted to validate the billed hours for which Plaintiffs request reimbursement "are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous." (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.) On presentation of a detailed fee bill, accompanied by a sworn affidavit as to the accuracy of the fee bill, the bill is presumed credible, and the court must use these records as a starting point for its lodestar determination. (Id at 396-97.)

Here, the Court finds most of Plaintiffs' counsel's billing reasonable. From February 6, 2025 through April 16, 2026, KLG billed for work that appears reasonably necessary for the prosecution of Plaintiffs' case, including client communication, drafting documents and discovery, communication with Defense counsel, prepared for and attended depositions, reviewed document production, and prepared for mediation. (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A.) While reliance on templated drafts is common and can significantly reduce an attorney's work, counsel is still expected to review these templates and modify them accordingly, considering the specific legal issues raised, the facts of the case, and conducting further research where necessary. The same is true for review of discovery production.

The Court does not find it appropriate to reduce or strike billing entries for client communication. Attorneys have a legal and ethical obligation to promptly provide their clients with updates and advise them on the progress of their case, and the Court finds entries related to client communication reasonable, necessary, and appropriate. The Court also declines to strike time spent communicating with Defense counsel and fails to see how this is excessive or unreasonable.

Plaintiffs submit the Declaration of Brian Cohen, who declares that he spent 0.5 hours reviewing Defendant's opposition and supporting declaration, spent 1.4 hours drafting Plaintiffs' reply, and anticipates spending one hour preparing for and attending the hearing on this motion. (Cohen Decl., P. 6-8.) Plaintiffs' request a reduced amount for anticipated time from $1,545 in anticipated fees for 3.0 hours to $1,493.50 for 2.9 hours. The Court finds this amount reasonable and reduces the anticipated fees by 0.1 hour ($51.50.)

The Court also agrees that time spent auditing KLG's billing entries is not reasonable and strikes $154.50 for 0.3 hours of work. The Court finds that 10.9 hours spent drafting discovery responses between May 13 and 15, 2025 was excessive. The Court strikes 5.0 hours from these entries. The Court also finds that internal communication is not reasonably necessary and strikes 0.3 hours from October 16, 2025 ($105). Aside from the entries specifically identified above as being reduced or stricken entirely, the Court finds these billing entries reasonably and necessarily incurred in litigation absent evidence from Defendant to the contrary.

iii. Lodestar Calculation

Based on the foregoing, the Court calculates the amount of reasonable attorney's fees Plaintiffs are entitled to recover by multiplying the number of reasonably billed hours for work on this case by the reasonable hourly rate of the billing attorneys. 1,032.5 From Plaintiffs' $13,332.50 attorney's fee request for 33.4 hours, the Court strikes $2,493 for 5.7 hours stricken and a reduction of Robles's hourly rate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $10,839.50 in reasonably incurred attorney's fees.

c. Fee Multiplier

Plaintiffs request a fee multiplier of 1.5 to the lodestar amount, for a total of $6,666.25 for the delay in payment and the risk associated with contingency-based representation. (Notice of Motion, p. i:9-11; Motion, p. 13:1-12.) Once the Court has determined¿an appropriate lodestar¿figure, the court may then determine whether that figure should be adjusted with a positive or negative multiplier. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. ¿(2005) 34 Cal.4th 553, 582.)

Whether a multiplier or negative multiple is appropriate depends on several factors, including (1) the risks presented by the litigation; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal and factual issues involved; (3) the results obtained on behalf of the plaintiff; (4) the skill exhibited by counsel; (5) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (6) the contingent nature of the fee award based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award. (Consumer Privacy Cases ¿(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556; Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at 819.) "The 'results obtained' factor can properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where [1] an exceptional effort produced [2] an exceptional benefit."¿(Graham supra, 34 Cal.4th at 582.)¿

In opposition, Defendant argues that this case does not warrant a fee multiplier because there was nothing novel, difficult, or unique about the present case, as it is a standard Song-Bevely action in which the issues presented are virtually identical case to case, the case presented no unusual or complex issues, the work was limited to standard and generic filings and discovery, there is no evidence Plaintiffs' counsel was precluded from other employment as a result of this litigation, and there is little to no contingent risk in light of the mandatory statutory attorney's fees. (Opp., p. 6:7-14.)

The Court finds that a multiplier is not warranted in this case. While Plaintiffs received an favorable result in settlement, and while Plaintiffs' counsel took this case on contingency, this is a standard Song-Beverly action. While the Court acknowledges that there is inherent risk in taking a case on contingency, the Court finds the risk in this action to be minimal considering a prevailing buyer in a Song-Beverly action is legally entitled to recovery of all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1794, subdivision (d).

Based on the relatively sparse record, and the moving and opposition papers filed for the present motion, the Court does not find the novelty or difficulty of the legal and factual issues involved, nor the skill required of Plaintiffs' counsel in this case, rising to the level of warranting a multiplier. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request for a fee multiplier is DENIED.

d. Costs and Expenses

Plaintiffs request costs and expenses totaling $2,816.50. (Memorandum of Costs, p. 1.) The costs and expenses requested include filing and motion fees, jury fees, deposition costs, service of process costs, attorney services and messenger court filings and service, court appearance professionals, and minute orders. (Memorandum of Costs.)

"Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1032, subd. (b).) "Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).)

"If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary." (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774.) "On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs." (Ibid.)

"A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).) "Any notice of motion to strike or tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

In opposition to Plaintiffs' request, Defendant requests that the Court deny the costs entirely on the grounds that Plaintiffs have provided no explanation or evidence for the costs requested to substantiate the request. (Opp., p. 9:14:22-23, 15:5-16:1.)

To start, the Court must permit the prevailing buyer to recover such costs and expenses if reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of the action. (Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).) The party filing a memorandum of costs is not required to attach any supporting documents. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267.) "[A]¿verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety of the items listed on it, and the burden is on the party challenging these costs to¿demonstrate¿that they were not reasonable or necessary."¿(Bender v.

County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 989, internal citations omitted; see also Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131-132 ["trial court erred in requiring additional proof from" the party claiming costs when party opposing costs bore the burden of proving the cost unnecessary or unreasonable]; Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 116, 121 ["where a party shows a prima facie entitlement to costs, the burden is on an objector to prove the costs should be disallowed"].)

The burden is on the party opposing the memorandum to either (a) show that the request is facially improper or (b) produce some evidence to show that the request is improper. (Bender, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 989.) Here, the burden is on Defendant to show that the costs included on Plaintiffs' Memorandums of Costs are unreasonable. Defendant has provided no evidence that any of these fees or costs are unreasonable. While Plaintiffs' counsel provided an internal worksheet on reply to substantiate their request for costs, such an offer is appreciated, but unnecessary. Defendant is incorrect that further supporting documentation is needed, and Defendant fails to point to a single entry which is neither allowable nor reasonably necessary.

In reviewing Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs, none of the costs or expenses for which Plaintiffs seek reimbursement are facially improper. In the absence of evidence or argument to the contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' request of $2,816.50 in costs is reasonable and recoverable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred in prosecuting this litigation is GRANTED in the total amount of $13,656, consisting of $10,839.50 in attorney's fees and $2,816.50 in costs. ----- IV.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs Leslie Reyes and Oscar Hernandez 's Motion for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED in the amount of $13,656.00. Case Number: 26AVCV00222 Hearing Date: August 18, 2026 Dept: A14 Defendant Newrez, LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant ZBS Law, LLP's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint and Objection to Declaration of Nonmonetary Status.

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on July 24, 2026, before her Oppositions to the Demurrer and Motion to Strike were due. However, there has been no proof of service filed. A complaint may only be amended without leave of court as a matter of right after the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike the initial complaint if the amended complaint was filed and served before the opposition was due, or on stipulation of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 472(a).)

Before the time of the 08/18/2026 hearing on the demurrer and the motion to strike, Plaintiff is to file any proof of service of the First Amended Complaint. Furthermore, if Defendants have properly been served with the FAC, they are to submit a statement to the Court indicating the date and method of service. | Home -->)" -->