JEFRY REYES, ANA GUARDADO v. DANIEL MAURICE VILLALBA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

JEFRY REYES, ANA GUARDADO, Case No.: CIVSB2519702 Plaintiffs, [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET v. ASIDE DEFAULT

DANIEL MAURICE VILLALBA, Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

This litigation concerns title and rights to real property. On July 8, 2025, Plaintiffs Jefry

Reyes and Ana Guardado filed their Complaint against Defendant Daniel Maurice Villalba. The

Complaint pleads 7 causes of action: (1) promissory fraud, (2) quiet title, (3) constructive trust,

(4) declaratory relief, (5) accounting, (6) conversion, and (7) money had and received. Defendant

Villalba defaulted on August 29, 2025.

A. Complaint’s Allegations

The Complaint alleges that on September 20, 2020, Reyes and Guardado entered into a

contract with Villalba to purchase the property at 6995 Summit Valley Rd., Hesperia (Subject

Property). They would pay $250,000 in cash, and pay the monthly mortgage payment amount to

Villalba. In exchange, Villalba would quitclaim the Subject Property to Reyes and Guardado.

Despite Plaintiffs complying with their obligations, Defendant did not transfer the title in the

property to them or apply their monthly payments to the mortgage (¶¶ 6-8, 10).

B. Pending Motion

Defendant Villalba seeks to set aside his default, based upon equitable mistake. Plaintiffs

Reyes and Guardado oppose. After issuing a tentative ruling and holding a hearing on the

motion, the Court now issues its final ruling.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A motion to set aside is premised on Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivisions

(b) or (d), or 473.5, or on extrinsic grounds.

A court has broad discretion to vacate a default judgment, default, or order; however, said

discretion can only be exercised if the moving party establishes a proper ground for relief, by

proper procedure, and within the appropriate periods. (Cruz v. Fagor America Inc. (2007) 146

Cal.App.4th 488, 495.) The law strongly favors trials on the merits, so any doubts about setting

aside a default must be resolved in favor of the party seeking such relief. (Elston v. City of

Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) When the defaulting party moves promptly to seek relief,

and the opposing party has or will suffer little prejudice, very slight evidence is required to

justify setting aside a default. (Ibid.; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.)

Three essential requirements must be met to obtain equitable relief: (1) a meritorious

defense, (2) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action, and

(3) diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it was discovered. (Rappleyea v. Campbell

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982.) A party seeking relief under the Court’s equitable extrinsic powers

must make a stronger showing than would be necessary for relief under Code of Civil Procedure

section 473. (Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 314-15.) No time

limit exists for setting aside a default because of extrinsic mistake/fraud. (Manson, Iver & York v.

Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 47.)

The Court has the inherent equitable power to grant relief from a default when there is a

showing of extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 855; Olivera v.

Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575-76.) Extrinsic fraud results when a party is denied the

opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court, i.e., where he was kept in ignorance or

some other manner fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceedings. (In re

Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068.) Extrinsic mistake involves the

excusable neglect of a party when the neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair

adversary hearing, and the basis for equitable relief is present. (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.

981; Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 47.) Examples of extrinsic

mistakes are “[a] party becomes incompetent but no guardian ad litem is appointed [citations];

when one party relies on another to defend [citations]; when there is reliance on an attorney who

becomes incapacitated to act [citations]; when a mistake led a court to do what it never intended

[citations]; when a mistaken belief of one party prevented proper notice of the action [citations];

or when the complaining party was disabled at the time the judgment was entered [citations].

Relief has also been extended to cases involving negligence of a party’s attorney in not properly

filing an answer [citations]; and mistaken belief as to immunity from suit [citation].” (Kulcher v.

Kulcher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471-72 [Kulcher].)

III. WHY THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED

Defendant Villalba attests that he owns the Subject Property. Plaintiffs Reyes and

Guardado occupy it under a verbal arrangement, which included a potential right to purchase.

However, a dispute arose between themselves on their full performance and entitlement to title.

(Villalba Decl. at ¶¶ 2-4.) Villalba attests that Reyes and Guardado were frequently late with

their payments, fell behind during extended periods, and stopped making payments. (Villalba

Decl. at ¶ 5.) On July 24, 2025, the parties signed Addendum No. 1, which Villalba believed was

a settlement agreement where the Subject Property would be sold, and Plaintiffs would be paid

$240,000 from the sale proceeds. The parties would sell the property rather than continue

pursuing litigation. Villalba did not understand that Reyes and Guardado would pursue his

default judgment and acquire the Subject Property while in dispute over payment obligations,

sales terms, escrow issues, and the effect of the signing of the Addendum No. 1. (Villalba Decl.

at ¶¶ 8-11.) Villalba attests that he has meritorious defenses that include statute of frauds,

consideration, breach, unclean hands, waiver, and estoppel. (Villalba Decl. at ¶ 18.) He is ready

to file a demurrer to challenge the sufficiency of the Complaint. (Exh. K to Stelnick’s Decl.)

Finally, he notes he moved to set aside his default soon after he received a copy of Plaintiffs’

default packet on May 11, 2026. (Villalba Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15; Stelnick Decl. at ¶ 10, Exh. E.)

Plaintiffs note that Defendant Villalba has been on notice that he has been in default since

September 8, 2025, when counsel emailed him that he was in default. His default was reiterated

in an email sent on February 20, 2026. Defense counsel recognized the default existed when she

responded to the February 20 email on March 5, 2026. (Chemerinski Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 7-9, Exhs. A,

C, & E.)

Although Defendant submits facts suggesting that he may have a meritorious defense,

Defendant has not established that he has a satisfactory excuse for not responding to the lawsuit,

nor that he exercised diligence since learning that he was in default.

First, contrary to Defendant’s position, although he may have moved diligently after

service of the default packet to seek to set aside his default, he did not move diligently after

being made aware, as early as September 2025, that he was in default. Defense Counsel even

recognized the default existed in March 2026 but made no effort to set aside the default until

May 2026, and only after a default judgment packet was served. This does not demonstrate

diligence in seeking to set aside the default upon being expressly made aware of its entry in

September 2025, and again in February 2026.

Second, Villalba does not provide a satisfactory excuse for not responding to the

Summons and Complaint. Per the evidence, Villalba made an erroneous assumption that nothing

would occur in the litigation while the parties were actively disputing title issues. But the point

of the litigation was to resolve those disputed title issues. Villalba also states that he believed the

signing of Addendum No. 1 on July 24, 2025 constituted a settlement. Without determining

whether it was a settlement or not, no evidence is offered that Plaintiffs agreed, in association

with signing the Addendum, that they would dismiss this litigation. Furthermore, after this

purported settlement, Villalba was made aware that his default was entered in this litigation. The

entry of the default would raise doubt that Plaintiffs were foregoing the pursuit of their claims in

this litigation against Villalba.

The facts and evidence support that Villalba decided not to respond to the Summons and

Complaint and raise any challenges to Plaintiffs seeking to acquire title in the Subject Property.

This is not a case where he could not respond; was relying on his attorney or third party to

respond and they failed to do so; or was kept mistakenly ignorant of the lawsuit. Extrinsic

mistake is not proper “if a party has been given notice of an action and has not been prevented

from participating therein. He has had an opportunity to present his case to the court and to

protect himself from mistake or from any fraud attempted by his adversary.” (Kulcher, supra, 1

Cal.3d at p. 472.)

Finally, Defendant argues that statutory protections exist concerning quiet title cause of

action. While these protections apply, they do not warrant granting this motion; rather, they grant

Defendant the limited right to participate in open court despite his default. If a defaulted

defendant appears prior to judgment, the court must hear admissible evidence offered by that

party regarding its claims (Id. at p. 1504; Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 507, 532).

IV. CONCLUSION Defendant Villalba’s Motion to Set Aside is DENIED. Defendant fails to establish a

satisfactory extrinsic mistake and due diligence in seeking to set aside his default upon being

informed of its entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

CHRISTOPHER BLUNT, Case No.: CIVSB2534190 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL v. ARBITRATION FILED BY DEFENDANT ADAMS & BROOKS, ADAMS & BROOKS, INC., INC. Defendant.

V. INTRODUCTION

A. The Complaint and Allegations

This is a wage and hour class action. On November 20, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Blunt

filed his Complaint against Defendant Adams & Brooks, Inc. (Adams) alleging ten causes of

action for various Labor Code violations for minimum wages, reporting time, unpaid overtime,

meal and rest breaks, untimely wage payment, wage statements, failure to reimburse business

expenses, plus an unfair competition claim under Business & Professions Code section 17200, et

seq. Adams answered.