CASTRO, et al. vs BRANDSAFWAY SERVICES LLC

21CV000179: CASTRO, et al. vs BRANDSAFWAY SERVICES LLC 08/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Riley Power INC (Defendant) CRS# 774963970960 in Department 18

Tentative Ruling - 08/14/2026 Patrick McKinney

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Riley Power INC on 05/12/2026 is Granted.

If the following Tentative Ruling is timely contested, THE HEARING WILL BE CONDUCTED ON FRIDAY, 8/28/2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Dept.

18.

Defendant Riley Power Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) is GRANTED.

Defendant’s alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication (“MSA”) is DENIED as moot.

Plaintiffs allege that their decedent Raymond Castro (“Decedent”) was exposed to respirable asbestos from asbestos-containing thermal insulation and refractory materials incorporated into Defendant’s boilers at various San Francisco Bay Area oil refineries between approximately the early 1970s and 2000.

ANALYSIS OF MSJ

Defendant attempts to meet its initial burden of production on summary judgment pursuant to Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 106-107 (plaintiff’s “factually devoid” responses to defendant’s sufficiently comprehensive written and deposition discovery) regarding the issue of threshold exposure. However, the moving Separate Statement is defective in that it does not identify any specific written discovery requests and responses it claims constitute sufficiently comprehensive written discovery and Plaintiffs’ assertedly factually devoid responses thereto, instead citing to an entire set of Special Interrogatories (“SROG”) and an entire set of Responses thereto.

It is not the Court’s responsibility to search through an entire set of written discovery requests to determine whether any of them constitute sufficiently comprehensive written discovery on the issue of threshold exposure. Although the Court elects to consider this MSJ/MSA on the merits, the Court admonishes defense counsel that in the future it is likely to summarily deny any dispositive motion that does not contain a compliant Separate Statement.

Defendant’s SROG Nos. 1-10 appear to be addressed to threshold exposure, although none of these SROG properly request all facts regarding Plaintiffs’ threshold exposure claim. SROG Nos. 7 and 9 seek, respectively, identification of all witnesses and all documents supporting the threshold exposure claim. However, instead of responding to the specific SROG propounded, Plaintiffs’ Responses to SROG Nos. 2-7 and 9 incorporate Plaintiffs’ Responses to either SROG No. 1 or No.

10. Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG No. 10 appears to be an omnibus Response that addresses their threshold exposure claim, and the Court will therefore treat it as such. (Defendant’s Index of Exhibits (“DIOE”) Exh. E and F.) 21CV000179: CASTRO, et al. vs BRANDSAFWAY SERVICES LLC 08/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Riley Power INC (Defendant) CRS# 774963970960 in Department 18

Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG Nos. 1 and 10 state, as stated above, that Decedent was exposed to respirable asbestos from asbestos-containing thermal insulation and refractory materials incorporated into Defendant’s boilers at various San Francisco Bay Area oil refineries between approximately the early 1970s and 2000. However, the Response to SROG No. 10, incorporated by reference in the Responses to SROG Nos. 7 and 9, seeking identification of witnesses and documents, identifies no witnesses or any specific documents. Defendant also presents evidence that at deposition none of Plaintiffs or several previously deposed former co-workers of Decedent had any personal knowledge to support a threshold exposure claim.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Responses to SROG Nos. 1-10 and Defendant’s sufficiently comprehensive deposition discovery are factually devoid, and the burden of production to produce evidence to show triable issues of material fact regarding Plaintiffs’ threshold exposure claim shifts to Plaintiffs.

In Opposition, Plaintiffs primarily rely on the deposition testimony in this action of Paul Young (“Young”), a former co-worker with Decedent at Chevron’s Richmond, California oil refinery in the early 1980s. He testified that he met Decedent around 1980 at Chevron refinery’s asphalt plant, which was about the same time he began working as an insulator at the refinery. Young testified that around 1981, Decedent began working in “utilities,” where among other things Decedent worked in the number one boiler house.

He testified that at least some of the boilers in the number one boiler house were Riley boilers because the name was on the boilers. Young also testified that employees of Defendant worked on the Riley boilers during that period. However, his testimony contains no foundation regarding how he knew those workers were employees of Defendant. (Plaintiffs’ Index of Exhibits (“PIOE”) Exh. A.) Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Additional Material Fact (“PAMF”) No.

16.

Young testified that he and other contractors routinely disturbed insulation on the Riley boilers in Decedent’s presence. He testified that he had received training when he became an insulator in 1980 to identify insulation as asbestos-containing if it contained fibrous material. Given the timeframe, the Court credits this testimony and OVERRULES Defendant’s Objections thereto.

Young testified that he believed the insulation on the Riley boilers was original because it was “old.” He does not provide any estimate of how old the insulation was in the portions of his deposition presented in the record. Further, he initially testified on cross-examination by Defendant’s counsel that the boilers in number one boiler house were “at least” 70 or 80 years old in the early 1980s based on his belief that the building was built in the 1907 to 1914 timeframe. (PIOE Exh. A at pp. 45:45:4-19, 115:17-24.)

Young later testified, also on crossexamination by Defendant’s counsel, that a “specific” “Riley Stoker” boiler at the Chevron refinery was 40 or 50 years old in the early 1980s. (Id. at p. 140:6-9.) Plaintiffs present evidence that Defendant has admitted in verified discovery responses in a prior action that Defendant sold asbestos-containing boilers to Standard Oil (now Chevron) refinery in Richmond between 1930 and 1985. (PIOE Exh. B at pp. 7:10-9:17 and Exh. B thereto.) In Reply, Defendant presents

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

21CV000179: CASTRO, et al. vs BRANDSAFWAY SERVICES LLC 08/18/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Riley Power INC (Defendant) CRS# 774963970960 in Department 18 further evidence from Young’s deposition testimony in this action that Young later testified he had “no idea” whether Riley Stoker (Defendant’s predecessor in interest) supplied any of the insulation that was on the boiler when Young first saw the boiler in 1978. (Thompson Reply Dec. Exh. A at p. 147:19-22.)

Testimony provided by Defendant’s person most qualified in a prior action creates reasonable inferences that prior to 1973, Riley Stoker boilers incorporated asbestos-containing thermal insulation as OEM parts. (PIOE Exh. 3.)

Ultimately, the Court finds Mr. Young’s deposition testimony too speculative to create triable issues of material fact that asbestos-containing thermal insulation on Riley boilers that Young observed being disturbed in Decedent’s presence was OEM supplied by Defendant or that Defendant’s employees disturbed asbestos-containing thermal insulation in Decedent’s presence. Because the Court has found above that Plaintiffs bear the burden of production on this issue, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of production.

Wherefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MSJ.

The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ alternative MSJ as moot.

The Court OVERRULES all of Defendant’s Reply Objections except to the extent addressed above.

The Court has not considered Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Responses to the Moving Separate Statement. Such Separate Statements are not authorized by CCP § 437c. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 249, 252; CCP § 437c(b)(4).)

CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERS

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