Ana Alvarez v. California Mid-State Fair, et al.

Ana Alvarez v. California Mid-State Fair, et al., 23CVP-0194

Hearing: County of San Luis Obispo’s Motion for Summary Judgment or for Summary Adjudication

Date: August 18, 2026

On June 14, 2023, Ana Alvarez (Plaintiff) filed a personal injury lawsuit. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC), filed April 11, 2024, alleges two causes of action for premises liability (i.e. negligence, willful failure to warn, and dangerous condition of public property), and negligence, against various Defendants, including the County of San Luis Obispo (Defendant or County).

Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication of the first and second causes of action. Plaintiff has not filed opposition to the motion. The motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Defendant, as the moving party has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact and that they are entitled to adjudication as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) In particular, Defendant bears “the burden of persuasion that ‘one or more elements’ of the ‘cause of action’ in question ‘cannot be established’, or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto.” (Id., quoting current Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Defendant may present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the Plaintiff’s causes of action, or the burden can be satisfied by a showing through evidence that the Plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. supra, 25 Cal.4th 826, 855.) If Defendant makes a prima facie showing, then the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to produce admissible evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Plaintiff may rely on reasonable inferences arising from declarations or other evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Thus, review of a summary judgment motion involves a three-step process: (1) identifying the issues framed by the pleadings, (2) determining whether the moving party has made an adequate showing that negates the opponent’s claim, and (3) determining whether the opposing party has raised a triable issue of fact.” (Beroiz v. Wahl (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 485, 491.)

“The court’s sole function on a motion for summary adjudication is issue-finding, not

issue-determination; the judge must simply determine from the evidence submitted whether there is a ‘triable issue as to any material fact.’ ” [italics in original] (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 10:270, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The SAC alleges that on July 23, 2022, Plaintiff was in line at the Paso Robles Event Center to enter the Mid-Sate Fair in Paso Robles, California; that the line was formed along a narrow embankment; and that Plaintiff was injured when she lost her footing, slid down an embankment, and contacted a fence. (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [UMF] No. 2.)

There were three main entrance gates into the fairgrounds, including the entrance gate near the livestock gate which is located on 24th Street in the City of Paso Robles. (UMF No. 5.) Plaintiff’s incident occurred on July 23, 2022, while it was still light out at approximately 7:30 p.m. outside of the entrance gate located on 24th Street in the City of Paso Robles, near the livestock gate. (UMF No. 6.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Cause of Action: Premises Liability

The SAC alleges three premises liability theories: negligence, willful failure to warn, and dangerous condition of public property.

Defendant contends Plaintiff’s first cause of action for premises liability lacks merit because: (1) Plaintiff cannot establish the element of “ownership or control” against the County as required by Government Code section 835; (2) Plaintiff’s willful failure to warn theory is premised on Civil Code section 846, which Defendant contends does not apply to public entities; and (3) Government Code section 815, bars common law negligence liability against public entities absent a statutory basis for liability.

1. Ownership or Control

Defendant argues that in order to establish liability under Government Code section 835 proof that the governmental defendant owned or controlled the public property at issue is required. (See Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elect. Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170 [city not liable for dangerous condition of privately owned lamp post because there was no evidence that city controlled it]; Aaitui v. Grande Properties (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1369 (swimming pool of private apartment building not transformed into “public property” within meaning of Gov.

Code, section 830 subd. (c) merely because municipality inspected pool for safety violations]; Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792 [dangerous road condition located half mile from school grounds held not basis for school district liability to student struck by car because district had no ownership or control of road.].) (Mem. P. & A., pp. 11, ll. 21-26; 12, ll. 1-4.)

“Government Code section 835 provides the basis for liability in an action against a public entity for an injury caused by the dangerous condition of public property.” (Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2025) § 12.5.) Government Code section 835 is the sole statutory basis for a personal injury claim imposing liability upon a public entity for the condition of public property. (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 438.)

Under the Government Claims Act, a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition “of its property.” (Gov. Code, § 835.) Government Code section 830, subdivision (c), defines “property of a public entity” and “public property” as real or personal property “owned or controlled by the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 830, subd. (c).)

“A plaintiff’s failure to allege and prove actual ownership by the defendant entity of the defective property is not fatal if the plaintiff can allege and prove that the defendant had ‘control’ over the property. See Govt C § 830(c).” (Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2025) § 12.12.) “Control may be established by whether the defendant had ‘the power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition.’ Huffman v City of Poway (2000) 84 CA4th 975, 990” (Ibid., see Hoover v. City of Fresno (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 7, 13-14 [summary judgment for the city held improper when uncontradicted evidence showed absence of ownership but failed to negate control of defective sidewalk].)

Defendant submits the declaration of Wendy Marie C. Hall, Division Manager in the Public Works Department. (Hall Dec., ¶ 2.) Ms. Hall declares that Defendant “does not own, maintain, lease, rent, operate, control, repair, or supervise, or manage 24th Street, City of Paso Robles, California, the embankment about which Plaintiff complains, or the fence located at the bottom of the embankment at or near the location of Plaintiff’s slip and fall incident. Furthermore, the County did not design, construct, or alter these areas.” (Id., ¶ 5.)

Ms. Hall declares that the vicinity map attached to her declaration depicts the approximate location of the subject incident and confirms that the area at issue is not County property. (Id., ¶ 7, Ex. 4.) Ms. Hall additionally declares that Defendant “was not involved with any roadway construction or repair in the area of the subject incident, on or near the date of the accident.” (Id., ¶ 6.)

Defendant provides evidence that in 2022 the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Office was contracted with the Mid-State Fair to patrol the inside perimeter of the fairgrounds, but not the exterior perimeter. (See McKim Dec., ¶ 5; O’Farrell Dec., ¶ 11; Ex. 7., Snyder Dep., pp. 56, ll. 5-6; 57, ll. 8-9.) The City of Paso Robles Police Department and the California Highway Patrol were responsible for patrolling the exterior perimeter of the fairgrounds. (See O’Farrell Dec., ¶ 12.)

Defendant submits the Declaration of Terrence O’Farrell, employed with the San Luis Obispo County District Attorney’s Office, as Chief for the Bureau of Investigations. (O’Farrell Dec., ¶ 2.) In July 2022, O’Farrell took vacation time from his position with

the District Attorney’s Office to work as the Chief of the Event Staff Program for the California Mid-State Fair. (Id. ¶ 3.) O’Farrell’s work in that position “was performed as a State of California seasonal employee at the Mid-State Fair.” (Id. ¶ 4.)

Defendant has met its initial burden on summary judgment to negate the element of “ownership or control”, shifting the burden to Plaintiff to produce evidence establishing a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff filed no opposition disputing that the County does not own, maintain or control the subject area and has offered no evidence to meet that burden. Accordingly, no triable issue of material fact exists. The Court finds Plaintiff’s premises liability claim, based on a dangerous condition of public property, fails as a matter of law.

2. Willful Failure to Warn

The SAC alleges a premises liability “willful failure to warn” theory, asserting that “Defendants, and each of them, are liable for wilfull [sic] failure to guard or warn against the dangerous condition pursuant to Government Code Section 846, and for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property pursuant to Government Code Section 835.” (SAC, Prem.L-1, Prem.L-3.) Defendant relies on Delta Farms Reclamation District v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 704, to argue that Civil Code section 846 does not apply to public entities.

“Under the Government Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 810 et seq.), there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California; instead, such liability must be based on statute. (Gov.Code, § 815, subd. (a)” (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 897.) Here, the SAC identifies only Government Code section 835 and Civil Code section 846 as statutory bases for the willful failure to warn theory.

As Delta Farms explains, public entities are not protected by Civil Code section 846. (Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2025) §12.8, citing Delta Farms Reclamation District v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.3d 699, 707 [“public entities are not protected by CC §846, which limits the duty of care owed by property owners to persons using property for designated recreational purposes. Civil Code §846 does not provide protection because it is irreconcilable with provisions of the Government Claims Act that also address liability to recreational users of property”].)

Because Civil Code section 846 is inapplicable to Defendant, Plaintiff cannot rely on it to support the failure to warn theory. Moreover, because Plaintiff’s Government Code section 835 dangerous condition claim fails, there is no remaining statutory basis for liability on a willful failure to warn theory.

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s premises liability claim, based on willful failure to warn.

3. Negligence

“A public entity may be negligent—and hence liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition on its property—in one of two ways.” (Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 518.) “The public entity is negligent if it ‘created the dangerous condition.” (Ibid., citing Government Code section 815, Fackrell v. San Diego (1945) 26 Cal.2d 196 [“city is liable for defects with project it designed and built”].) “The public entity is also negligent if it did not take ‘measures to protect against [a] dangerous condition’ (that it did not create) if it had ‘actual or constructive notice of th[at] dangerous condition.’” (Id., at pp. 518-519, citing Government Code section 815, Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 715.)

Under Government Code section 815, public entities cannot be held liable on the theory of common law negligence. (Hill v. County of Solano (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 161, 170 [“liability of County could only be statutory and could not rest on a theory of common law negligence”]; Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183 [Governmental bodies cannot be held directly liable for common law torts]; see also County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1045 [“In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute (not including a charter provision, ordinance or regulation) is found declaring them to be liable” (internal quotation marks omitted)].)

Defendant notes that Plaintiff only identifies Government Code section 835 and Civil Code section 846 in the SAC. Defendant argues however that “these counts lack merit, as Plaintiff cannot establish the element of ownership or control as to the County as required by Government Code §835 to establish a cause of action for a dangerous condition of public property. (UMF Nos. 11-13.) Additionally, Civil Code §846 has been held to be inapplicable to public entities. (See Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Sup. Ct., supra, at 33 Cal.3d 709-710.)” (Mem. P. & A., pp. 14, l. 26; 15, 11. 1-4.) The Court agrees.

Accordingly, because Defendant is a public entity and no applicable statute supports Plaintiff’s negligence theory, Defendant is immune from Plaintiff’s common law negligence - premises liability theory. Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s premises liability claim, based on negligence.

The Court grants adjudication of Plaintiff’s first cause of action in the Defendant’s favor.

B. Second Cause of Action: Negligence

The SAC pleads a negligence claim as the second cause of action. Consistent with the premises liability negligence theory, the second cause of action alleges a dangerous condition on public property, and willful failure to warn, and cites Government Code section 835 and Civil Code section 846. 1 (SAC, p. 5.)

1 As noted by Defendant, Plaintiff erroneously cites “Government Code section 846.” The correct citation is Civil Code section 846.

For the same reasons stated with respect to the premises liability negligence theory, adjudication is granted in Defendant’s favor as to the second cause of action for negligence. (Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 508, 517 [the elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury].)

ORDER (PROPOSED)

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant shall serve notice.

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