CHRISTOPHER BLUNT v. ADAMS & BROOKS, INC.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

CHRISTOPHER BLUNT, Case No.: CIVSB2534190 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL v. ARBITRATION FILED BY DEFENDANT ADAMS & BROOKS, ADAMS & BROOKS, INC., INC. Defendant.

V. INTRODUCTION

A. The Complaint and Allegations

This is a wage and hour class action. On November 20, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Blunt

filed his Complaint against Defendant Adams & Brooks, Inc. (Adams) alleging ten causes of

action for various Labor Code violations for minimum wages, reporting time, unpaid overtime,

meal and rest breaks, untimely wage payment, wage statements, failure to reimburse business

expenses, plus an unfair competition claim under Business & Professions Code section 17200, et

seq. Adams answered.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately August 20151 to May 2023 as a cook

and forklift driver in Adams’ San Bernardino location. The Complaint states it is a class action to

recover damages on behalf of Plaintiff and all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt

employees who worked for Defendant at any time during the four-year period preceding the

filing of the action through final judgment.

B. Motion to Compel Arbitration

Now before the court is Adams’ motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposes and

Adams replies. After issuing a tentative ruling and holding a hearing on the motion, the Court

now issues its final ruling.

VI. EXPLANATION OF COURT’S RULING Adams contends that Plaintiff signed two separate arbitration agreements: one called the

2006 Agreement signed during Blunt’s hiring on 8/17/16 then a few months later a second

document called the 2016 Agreement which Blunt also purportedly signed. (Brooks Decl., ¶¶ 8,

9, 12-15, Exhs. A, B.)

Under both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and under California law, to compel

arbitration, a finding must be made that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.

(Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130; Trinity v. Life Ins.

Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal. App. 5th 1111, 1120 (Trinity).)

A. 2006 Agreement

For the 2006 Agreement, Brooks states that Blunt “was requested to sign the agreement.”

(Brooks Decl., ¶ 11.) Then she states she countersigned the agreement. (Ibid.) Earlier, when

1 Plaintiff’s opposing declaration here states his employment started August 17, 2016. (Blunt Decl., ¶ 4.)

authenticating the 2006 Agreement, Brooks stated it was signed by herself and Blunt. (Brooks

Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A.)

Defendant does not recite the 2006 Agreement verbatim in its memorandum; instead, it

attaches a copy as Exhibit A to the Brooks and Huang declarations. But, as Plaintiff observes in

opposition, the 2006 Agreement appears to be missing at least two pages. (Brooks Decl., Exh. A;

Huang Decl., Exh. A.) The 2006 Agreement supplied to the court skips from page 1 to page 3 to

page 5, and from paragraph 2 to paragraph 6 and from paragraph 8 to paragraph 13. (Ibid.) Thus,

multiple paragraphs and at least two pages of the 2006 Agreement appear to be missing.

Whether an agreement was formed is determined under ordinary principles of state

contract law. In resolving that question, “[t]he trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the

affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at

the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic

(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164 (Gamboa), rejected on other grounds by Ramirez v. Golden

Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821 (Ramirez), quoting Engalla v. Permanente

Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “The burden of

persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with

the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at

p. 164.)

Because the 2006 Agreement is incomplete, Defendant has not met its threshold burden

to attach a copy of the 2006 Agreement purporting to bear the opposing party’s signature or set

forth the agreement’s provisions verbatim in the motion. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p.

165; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) Therefore, Defendant did not show that the purported

2006 Agreement discloses an agreement to arbitrate between Adams and Plaintiff. (Trinity,

supra, 78 Cal. App. 5th at p. 1120.) In their reply, Defendant did not cure this defect regarding

the 2006 Agreement.

B. 2016 Agreement

In December 2016, Adams updated its arbitration agreement, held an employee meeting

to explain its adoption, then in subsequent days called each employee into Human Resources to

have them sign the 2016 Agreement. (Brooks Decl., ¶¶ 12-14.) Then, Brooks states that Blunt

signed the 2016 Agreement on 12/8/16 and a copy was placed in his personnel file. (Brooks

Decl., ¶ 15, Exh. B.)

The 2016 Agreement appears to be complete, spanning pages 1 to 8 and paragraphs 1-19

with the signature page at the end; page 1 references Blunt as the employee and appears to

include his handwritten signature on page 8. (Brooks Decl., Exh. B; Huang Decl., Exh. B.)

Moreover, the 2016 Agreement appears to cover the disputed claims at issue here, because it

expressly states that employer and employee agree to arbitrate any and all claims and disputes

“including but not limited to wage and hour laws that Employee may assert against Employer.”

(Brooks Decl., Exh. B, p. 2, ¶ 1.) Therefore, Defendant satisfied its initial burden to attach a copy

of the 2016 Agreement purporting to bear the opposing party’s signature which evidences an

agreement to arbitrate. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; Cal. Rules of Court, rule

3.1330.)

1. 2016 Agreement: Authenticity of Signature: Applicable Law

With the burden shifted to him, in opposition, Plaintiff disputes that he signed the 2016

agreement because he does not recall seeing or signing any arbitration agreement in 2016 and

does not recall a December “all hands” meeting to explain the new arbitration agreement. (Blunt

Decl., ¶ 9.)

A party’s contention that he does not recall signing an arbitration agreement is a

challenge to its signature; in the face of such evidence, the burden shifts back to the party

compelling arbitration to prove by a preponderance of evidence that a signature was authentic

under Evidence Code section 1401, meaning the signature is what the employer proponent

claimed it was: “the act of” the employee who purportedly signed it (referencing Civil Code

section 1633.9, subdivision (a), regarding attribution of electronic signatures). (Ruiz v. Moss

Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846 (Ruiz); accord Gamboa, supra, 72

Cal.App.5th at pp. 167-68.) The disputed signature in Ruiz was an electronic one. (Ruiz, supra,

232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.) Here, the signature on the 2016 Agreement is handwritten. (Brooks

Decl., Exh. B, p. 8.)

If a party disputes the authenticity of his signature, he must offer admissible evidence

creating a factual dispute as to the authenticity of it; the opponent does not need to prove that his

purported signature is not authentic, but must submit “sufficient evidence to create a factual

dispute” and shift the burden back to the arbitration proponent. (Ramirez v. Golden Queen

Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 832-33 (Ramirez).)

The Ramirez court explains there is a split of authority among appellate courts as to what

constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten

signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 825.)

The Ramirez court identified specifically Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747

(Iyere) and Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 158 as the split authority. (Ibid.)

In Gamboa, a trial court denied a motion compelling arbitration because the employee’s

opposing declaration stated she reviewed the agreement in the employer’s moving papers, did

not remember the documents, no one told her about an arbitration agreement or explained it, and

had she been aware of its existence, she would not have signed it. (Ramirez, supra, 102

Cal.App.5th at p. 833, citing Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 163, 167.) In affirming the

trial court’s denial, the Gamboa court stated it did not need to decide if the employee challenged

the authenticity of her purported signature on the agreement because it was enough that she

challenged the authenticity of the agreement by saying under penalty of perjury that she did not

remember it. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 168; Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p.

833.)

In contrast, in Iyere, the trial court denied a motion to compel because the employer

failed to prove the authenticity of plaintiffs’ signatures on an arbitration agreement. (Iyere,

supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 754.) In reversing the denial, the Iyere court evaluated the plaintiffs’

opposition declarations where they stated on the first day of work they were given a stack of

documents, told to quickly sign them so they could get to work, and signed the stack of

documents immediately and returned them. (Id., at p. 756.) The declarations also stated the

employees did not recall reading or signing any document about arbitration and did not know

how their signatures were placed on the document. (Ibid.)

The First District found the declarations did not create a factual dispute as to whether

plaintiffs signed the agreements because they explicitly acknowledge the employees signed a

stack of documents and do not deny the stack included the arbitration agreement. (Iyere, supra,

87 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) While the employees did not recall signing the agreement, the court

found no conflict between having signed a document on which their handwritten signature

appears and, two years later, being unable to recall doing so; in the absence of any evidence that

their purported signatures were not their own, there was no evidence that plaintiffs did not in fact

sign the agreement. (Ibid.)

Thus, in Gamboa, not recalling a signature was enough to challenge its authenticity and

shift the burden back to the employer, whereas under the facts in Iyere, where employees

acknowledged signing a stack of documents containing an arbitration agreement, lack of recall

was insufficient because there was no evidence the employees did not in fact sign the agreement

because they did not deny the signatures were theirs.

The Iyere court reasoned that an individual is capable of recognizing his own signature; if

he does not deny that the handwritten signature is his own, then his failure to remember signing

is of little or no significance. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) In distinguishing cases

involving electronic signatures, the Iyere court explained that an individual cannot confirm or

deny an electronic signature’s authenticity by viewing a computer printout of a printed named

followed by the words “electronic signature.” (Id., at p. 757.) In that factual situation, a person’s

inability to recall signing electronically may be regarded reasonably as evidence a person did not

do so. (Ibid.)

2. 2016 Agreement & Existence of Agreement Here, the purported employee signature on the 2016 Agreement is handwritten, not

electronic. (Brooks Decl., Exh. B, p. 8.) In Blunt’s opposing declaration, paragraphs 4-8 relate

facts about his onboarding on the first day of work, August 17, 2016, which do not address the

2016 Agreement. (Blunt Decl., ¶¶ 4-8.) Then, Blunt shifts to discussing the 2016 Agreement

stating the following: he does not recall a December 2016 all hands meeting explaining the new

arbitration agreement; he does not recall seeing or signing any agreement in 2016; sometimes

Human Resources would unexpectedly call him away to sign documents “randomly” and when

that occurred, he was rushed, in the middle of his shift, and was not given time to review or

understand the documents nor did he have an opportunity to ask questions. (Blunt Decl., ¶¶ 9-

11.)

Similar to the employee in Gamboa, Blunt attests that he reviewed the arbitration

agreements included in Defendant’s motion papers and does not recall signing the 2016

Agreement; with respect to the 2006 Agreement, Defendant did not explain to him that he was

signing an arbitration agreement requiring him to waive his right to a jury trial or pursue a class

action. (Blunt Decl., ¶¶ 6, 9, 12; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.)

Unlike the employees in Iyere, where their declarations explicitly acknowledged signing

a “stack of documents” that undeniably included an arbitration agreement, Blunt does not

acknowledge signing the 2016 Agreement. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) In that

regard, the facts of this case are distinguishable from Iyere and the Court cannot so simply turn

away Blunt’s challenge to the 2016 Agreement based on lack of recall. With Iyere

distinguishable, that would leave the rationale and guidance of the Gamboa decision and the Ruiz

decision.

In Gamboa, the employee’s opposing declaration stating she did not recall the agreement

and would not have signed it had she been aware of it was sufficient to satisfy her burden to

challenge the purported agreement’s authenticity. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) In

Ruiz, while the opposing party did not deny an electronic signature was his, he claimed he did

not recall signing the agreement and would not have signed it had it been presented to him; the

Fourth District, Division 2 found that this failure to recall signing the agreement shifted the

burden back to the arbitration proponent to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the

signature was authentic. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.)

There is one more reason that justifies shifting the burden back to Defendant Adams to

establish authenticity, and it involves Blunt’s signature itself. The Court observes that the

signatures on the 2006 and 2016 Agreements appear extremely similar. (Brooks Decl., Exhs. A,

B.) However, even a cursory visual inspection shows these signatures do not match Blunt’s

signature on his 8/3/26 declaration supplied in opposition to the motion. This discrepancy

contributes to uncertainty about the authenticity of the signature on the 2016 Agreement.

Coupled with Blunt’s lack of recall about signing it and the fact he does not acknowledge signing

the 2016 Agreement, that is sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute and shift the burden

back to Adams to prove by a preponderance of evidence that Blunt’s signature on the 2016

Agreement is authentic. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 832-33.)

With their reply, Adams does not submit any declaration or supporting documents. In the

reply memorandum, Adams argues that Plaintiff undisputedly signed both arbitration

agreements. This is not true, however, based on the analysis above, because Blunt does not

expressly acknowledge or admit signing the 2016 Agreement and he disputes authenticity by

claiming lack of recall.

With no other arguments and no evidence submitted with their reply, Adams did not

establish by a preponderance of evidence that Blunt’s signature on the 2016 Agreement is

authentic. Therefore, Adams did not establish its threshold burden to prove the existence of a

valid agreement to arbitrate Plaintiff’s claims. Because the motion warrants denial, it is not

necessary to address Plaintiff’s unconscionability arguments.

VII. CONCLUSION Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED because it did not establish the

existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

SYNCHRONY BANK, Case No.: CIVSB2607793 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO v. COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS, FILED BY CREAM CABAHUG, DEFENDANT CREAM CABAHUG Defendant.

VIII. INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 2026, Plaintiff Synchrony Bank filed a complaint against Defendant Cream

Cabahug alleging a single cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges Cabahug

entered into a contract for a credit card but has failed to pay the principle sum of $8,707.80 due

and owing on the card.

Now before the Court is Cabahug’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the

proceedings arguing that Plaintiff’s claim is subject to an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff opposes

arguing that Cabahug has waived her right to arbitration and that arbitration would be too costly.