RESPONSE INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA VS AMTRUST NORTH AMERICA

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice Exhibits 1 and 2 GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice Exhibits 1-10 GRANTED.

Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections 1, 2, 9 and 10 OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections 3-8 SUSTAINED.

Defendants’ Motion to Modify Interlocutory Judgment is DENIED.

Status Conference re Removal Plan is set for 12.03.26. Parties are to file a joint status report no later than 5 court days prior to the status conference.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Order filed 7.30.26 detailing the implementation of the Removal Plan shall be signed by the court.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME NIETO VS CREATING A MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS CVPS2404518 LEGACY, INC., A COUNSEL FOR JESSE GARCIA CALIFORNIA Tentative Ruling: Hearing vacated.

Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Jesse Garcia GRANTED.

Attorneys John Haubrich Jr. and Kandice Canchan are relieved as attorneys for Defendant Jesse Garcia upon filing the proof of service of the signed court order upon the Defendant.

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME RESPONSE INDEMNITY COMPANY OF DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT OF CALIFORNIA, A RESPONSE INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CVPS2602348 CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION VS CORPORATION AMTRUST NORTH AMERICA Tentative Ruling: To withstand a demurrer the complaint must contain “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (C.C.P. § 425.10.) “[T]he complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged. (C.A. v.

William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) Generally a plaintiff need only plead facts necessary “to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his claims.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-550.) On demurrer the court must assume the truth of all facts properly pled, facts that may be implied or reasonably inferred from the facts expressly alleged, and evidentiary facts that are in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.)

The court’s task is to treat well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of affidavits, declarations, depositions, and other such material which was filed on behalf of the adverse party and which purports to contradict the allegations and contentions of the plaintiff.” (Del E.

Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605; Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374- 375.) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) In ruling on a demurrer, the court may take into account only the challenged pleading and matters subject to judicial notice under E.C. §§451, 452. (C.C.P. §§430.30(a0, 430.70; Gould v.

Maryland Sound Indus., Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144.) The sole issue raised by a demurrer is whether the facts pleaded state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. Thus, no matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true for the purposes of the demurrer. (Requa v. Regents of University of California (2012) 213 Cal.App.4th 213, 223 (citing Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Material Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604).) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v.

Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

The Complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows: Plaintiff and Wesco had a mutual insured Santiago Sun Canyon Estates, L.P. Defendant WESCO issued commercial general liability policies to Santiago under Policy No. WPP1087415-00, in effect from April 30, 2015, to April 30, 2016, and renewed annually until April 30, 2019 (“WESCO Policies”). Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each WESCO Policy provides primary general liability coverage to Santiago on an occurrence-basis for claims arising out of its ownership and operation of the Park, specifically including claims alleging “property damage” or “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence” during the applicable policy period at the Park, subject to all terms, conditions, limitations, exclusions, exceptions, and a $1,000,000 per-occurrence limit.

Plaintiff issued commercial general liability policies to Santiago under Policy No. RMP 1000017-00, effective from April 30, 2019, to April 30, 2020, and renewed annually through April 30, 2023 (“RESPONSE Policies”). Each RESPONSE Policy provides primary general liability coverage to Santiago on an occurrence-basis for claims arising out of its ownership and operation of the Park, specifically including claims alleging “property damage” or “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence” during the applicable policy period at the Park, subject to all terms, conditions, limitations, exclusions, exceptions, and a $1,000,000 per-occurrence limit.

Santiago was named as a defendant in a civil lawsuit entitled Andrade, et al. v. Santiago Sun Canyon Estates, et al., Riverside County Superior Court, Case No. CVPS2303219 (the “Underlying Action”). RESPONSE is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the Underlying Action arises from Santiago’s ownership and operation of a mobilehome park located in Palm Springs, California.

The Underlying Action settled on or about October 24, 2025, for $2,475,000, with RESPONSE funding $2,175,000 and WESCO contributing $300,000. RESPONSE is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the settlement was funded, the settlement agreement was executed, and the Underlying Action was dismissed with prejudice on or about January 30, 2026. Upon being served with the Underlying Action, Santiago tendered its defense to four of its commercial general liability insurers: CAPITAL, RESPONSE, WESCO and Western World Insurance Company (“Western World”).

RESPONSE accepted the tender and agreed to defend and indemnify Santiago under a full reservation of rights, RESPONSE is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant WESCO accepted the tender and agreed to defend and indemnify Santiago under a full reservation of rights, while Defendant CAPITAL denied coverage. Western World denied coverage for the Underlying Action based on the anti-concurrent cause provisions of its policy’s habitability exclusion. Santiago’s defense expenses for the Underlying Action through October 31, 2026, total $405,477.50, of which RESPONSE has paid 50% ($202,738.75).

Around November 2023, AMTRUST assumed primary responsibility for claims handling on behalf of WESCO in connection with the Underlying Action. Thereafter, RESPONSE and AMTRUST agreed to allocate Santiago’s defense expenses on a pro-rata basis, with RESPONSE and WESCO each paying 50%. Specifically, on November 13, 2023, RESPONSE issued an email to AMTRUST that stated: “Agree to share defense costs and expenses with the Cooksey firm.” The following day, on November 14, 2023, AMTRUST sent a follow up email to RESPONSE confirming AMTRUST’s agreement “to split in defense costs” with RESPONSE and stating: “Once discovery is developed down the road, we can determine our time on risk for indemnity purposes.”

In accordance with its November 2023 agreement with AMTRUST to “split” defense costs, RESPONSE paid 50% of all defense costs incurred. AMTRUST paid 50% of all defense costs incurred through October 31, 2026. In March 2024 Santiago’s defense counsel proposed making a 998 offer to some, but not all, of the plaintiffs in the Underlying Action. After multiple discussions regarding the structure and funding of the 998 Offers, on May 16, 2024, AMTRUST issued an email to RESPONSE stating: After reviewing my file, I believe that AmTrust has a time on risk coverage of April 30, 2015 – April 30, 2019, and Response Indemnity has a time on risk coverage of April 30, 2019 – April 30, 2023.

It is my understanding that the carrier prior to these periods and the carrier after these periods have both disclaimed coverage, and as a result the insured has an uninsured risk/exposure as it pertains to this loss. I think it would be prudent of the insured to contribute something to these 998 offers that we are proposing. It looks like we both have about the same time on this risk, so it may be effective if we split the 998 offer, with credit for the insured’s contribution, down the middle.

Please let me know your thoughts. On May 22, 2024, RESPONSE issued an email to AMTRUST stating: “Yes agree to spilt TOR [Time on Risk] & 998’s at 50% with contribution from insured. Defense proposed 998’s per space is $631,000 which allocates to $315,500 – 50% spilt.” On July 16, 2024, defense counsel requested settlement authority from RESPONSE and AMTRUST in the amount of $552,000 to fund 998 Offers to 59 of the 67 plaintiffs, inclusive of their attorneys’ fees. By email to RESPONSE dated July 29, 2024, AMTRUST reaffirmed and ratified its acceptance of and adherence to the 50/50 indemnity allocation the two insurers previously negotiated in the May 2024 allocation agreement, stating: “AmTrust agrees to contribute 50% of the proposed 998 offers, and our share will be $276,250.00.”

The following date, RESPONSE issued an email to AMTRUST dated July 30, 2024, reaffirming and ratifying its acceptance of and adherence to the 50/50 allocation agreement stating: “Response Indemnity agrees to contribute 50% of the proposed 998’s for $276,250.00| inclusive of [the plaintiff’s] attorney fees.” After the issuance of the 998 Offers by defense counsel, several of those offers were accepted. Pursuant to the May 2024 allocation agreement, RESPONSE contributed fifty percent (50%) toward the funding of the accepted 998 Offers.

Under the May 2024 allocation agreement, AMTRUST reaffirmed and ratified the agreement through its conduct by likewise contributing fifty percent (50%) toward the funding of the accepted 998 Offers. On September 25, 2024, a newly assigned AMTRUST claims adjuster abruptly asserted that, despite the plain language of the WESCO Policies and AMTRUST’s own prior performance in accordance with the May 2024 allocation agreement, AMTRUST no longer intended to pay its agreed-upon pro-rata share of Santiago’s indemnity expenses.

AMTRUST instead unilaterally imposed a 90% (RESPONSE) / 10% (WESCO) allocation formula of its own making. Specifically, on September 25, 2024, AMTRUST issued an email to RESPONSE stating, in relevant part Wesco Insurance Company/AmTrust will continue to participate on the defense of the case. However, we do not agree to a 50% TOR (time on risk) split and will not contribute towards settlement at 50% as coverage for indemnity is questionable based on the lawsuit’s allegations that the damages occurred in the “past 4 years” which would put the damage claims back to July 5, 2019, after the expiration of the Wesco policies.

Between September 2024 and October 2025, multiple efforts were made to negotiate a settlement of the Underlying Action, but those efforts were thwarted by AMTRUST’s insistence that RESPONSE accept the newly imposed 90/10 allocation formula. AMTRUST’s conduct delayed the global settlement of the Underlying Action by more than a year, thereby increasing both the defense expenses incurred and the ultimate settlement value of the lawsuit. On or about October 2025 defense counsel requested settlement authority up to $2,805,000 (based on $85,000 per space) from RESPONSE and AMTRUST with which to negotiate a global resolution of the Underlying Action.

Based on AMTRUST’s continuing refusal to move off its 10% contribution, RESPONSE proposed an alternative funding strategy that adopted the 50/50 allocation for the first $552,000 based on AMTRUST’s funding agreement relative to the 998 Offers, plus 90% of the remainder in order to protect Santiago’s interests. In response to RESPONSE’s hybrid funding proposal, on October 15, 2025, AMTRUST abruptly and unilaterally withdrew the 90/10 allocation formula it had previously imposed and, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, substituted a $300,000 cap on its contribution, stating: Wesco will agree to contribute $300K.

Period. No 10%, no 50% of the 998 number from over a year ago. $300K flat, Wesco walks. Hopefully this makes the math easy and provides clarity to all involved. WESCO unlawfully prioritized and advanced its own financial interests at the expense of the Insured and in further breach of the May 2024 allocation agreement. Through its use of the phrase “Wesco walks,” AMTRUST was signaling that the $300,000 figure was intended to be inclusive of both its contribution toward the settlement and its 50% allocated share of all unpaid and future defense expenses.

As a result, RESPONSE had no choice but to agree to fund WESCO’s allocated share of any settlement under a full reservation of rights.

An actual and present controversy exists between Plaintiff and WESCO as WESCO is generally obliged to contribute not only to the defense, but also the indemnity and settlement up to their full policy limits, even for damages occurring outside of its own policy period, since the damage is part of the same continuous loss. Defendants dispute this obligation. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate so that the parties may ascertain their rights and obligations with respect to indemnity for the Underlying Action.

As a result of Defendants’ refusals and underpayments, Plaintiff conferred a direct and substantial benefit on Defendants by paying defense costs that Defendants were legally obligated to bear. Plaintiff’s payments reduced or eliminated Defendants’ own financial exposure and allowed them to retain funds they otherwise would have been required to expend. The allegations and known facts in the Underlying Action triggered Wesco’s duties to defend and indemnify Santiago. However, as a result of Defendants’ coverage refusals and underpayments, Plaintiff was compelled to assume and pay amounts on behalf of their mutual insured that, in equity and good conscience, should have been paid by Defendants.

Plaintiff’s payments reduced or eliminated Defendants’ own financial exposure and allowed them to avoid indemnity obligations they were legally required to bear.

Defendant Amtrust North America, Inc.: The Complaint alleges that Amtrust acted as Wesco’s claims adjuster and acted on behalf of Wesco, but fails to establish any basis for independent liability for the 2nd, 3rd, 5th or 6th causes of action which reference contracts and obligations of Wesco, not Amtrust.

Defendant Wesco Insurance Company:

2nd Cause of Action Declaratory Relief/Duty to Indemnify: Declaratory relief is authorized pursuant to C.C.P. §1060-1062.5. The purpose of declaratory relief is to eliminate uncertainties and controversies that may result in future litigation. (Marina Development Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 435, 443.) An action for declaratory relief is authorized only when an actual controversy exists. (C.C.P. §1060.) Declaratory relief has two elements a party must satisfy: “ (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [the party’s] rights or obligations.” (Jolley v.

Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal App. 4th 872, 909.) “[T]he remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights rather than execute them.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal App. 4th 872, 909.) “It is the general rule that, if a complaint shows the existence of a present controversy between the parties of the nature contemplated by section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is improper to sustain a general demurrer on a theory that assumes any declaration would necessarily be unfavorable to plaintiff.” (Safeway Stores, Inc. v.

Royal Indem. Co. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 44, 47.) However, “[w]hile section 1060's language 'appears to allow for an extremely broad scope of an action for declaratory relief'...In the context of a demurrer, the court will evaluate 'whether the factual allegations of the complaint for declaratory relief reveal that an actual controversy exists between the parties....Section 1060 must be read together with section 1061.” (Cummins Corporation v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (2016) 246 Cal.

App. 4th 484, 489.) CCP §1061 provides that “[t]he court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” Here, the Complaint sufficiently states a declaratory relief cause of action against Wesco on the issue of duty to indemnify.

3rd Cause of Action Unjust Enrichment: California recognizes a cause of action for “unjust enrichment.” “Whether termed unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, or quantum meruit, the equitable remedy of restitution when unjust enrichment has occurred ‘Is an obligation (not a true contract []) created by the law without regard to the intention of the parties, and is designed to restore the aggrieved party to his or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money.” (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 346.)

California recognizes a cause of action for “unjust enrichment.”

‘[A]n individual may be required to make restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. [Citation.] A person is enriched if he receives a benefit at another's expense. [Citation.] The term ‘benefit’ ‘denotes any form of advantage.’ [Citation.] Thus, a benefit is conferred not only when one adds to the property of another, but also when one saves the other from expense or loss. Even when a person has received a benefit from another, he is required to make restitution ‘only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it.’ [Citation.]

Thus, a party who does not know about another's mistake, and has no reason to suspect it, may not be required to give up the benefit if he also relied on it to his detriment.... In other circumstances, however, the party benefiting from a mistake of fact may be not entitled to retain what amounts to a mere windfall.’ (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1996) 14 Cal.4th 39, 51–52, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 924 P.2d 996, italics added.)

(Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 346-347.)

However, unjust enrichment is a restitution theory and “[a]s a matter of law, an unjust enrichment claim does not lie where the parties have an enforceable express contract.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370 (citing California Medical Ass’n. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172).) “When parties have an actual contract covering a subject, a court cannot—not even under the guise of equity jurisprudence—substitute the court's own concepts of fairness regarding that subject in place of the parties' own contract.” (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.) Here, the 3rd cause of action is an alternative theory to the breach of contract action, which is permissible.

5th Cause of Action Equitable Indemnity: The elements of a cause of action for equitable indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is equitably responsible. C.W. Howe Partners, Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 700. The Complaint sufficiently alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for equitable indemnity as to Defendant Wesco.

6th Cause of Action Breach of Contract: The elements for a breach of contract claim are: (1) contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance; (3) breach; and (4) damages. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. N. Y. Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) The Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for breach of contract against Defendant Wesco.

As to Defendant AmTrust for the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Causes of Action, Demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend. Plaintiff to file amended complaint within 15 days.

As to Defendant Wesco Insurance for the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Causes of Action, Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Case Management Conference continued to 11.24.26.

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME JAMES VS DESERT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND CVPS2603656 MOBILE HOMES LLC AMENDED COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: No opposition filed.

Motion for Leave to File 2nd Amended Complaint GRANTED.

The Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Motion shall be deemed filed as of the date of this order.

Hearing on Anti-SLAPP motion as to the 1st Amended Complaint is confirmed for 9.23.26. It should be noted that Plaintiff filed his motion for leave to file an amended complaint on 7.14.26. The hearing for that motion was calendared for 8.18.26. On 8.10.26, Defendant filed a special motion to strike pursuant to CCP 425.16, with the hearing date for 9.23.26.

Thus, Plaintiff’s motion was not filed prior to the Anti-SLAPP motion and not subject to the restrictions of attempting to plead around a special motion. (JKC3H8 v. Colton, 221 Cal.App.4th 468, 477-478 (2013)).

5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR WRONGFUL EVICTION AS TO FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION BY CVPS2604324 WELDON VS FIFE MICHAEL E. FIFE, AS TRUSTEE OF THE FIFE FAMILY TRUST, DATED MAY 13, 2008 Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling.