Lauren Lockwood v. Strivr Labs, Inc.

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

DATE: August 18, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

Line 3 23CV417347 Jia Liang v. Kuan William Plaintiff Jia Liang’s motion enter judgment. Notice is not proper Wu (there is no proof of service), but defendant Kuan William Wu filed a timely opposition. The matter settled at a mandatory settlement conference. A stipulation re settlement attached to plaintiff’s motion indicates defendant agreed to pay plaintiff $45,000 in installments. Under the terms of the stipulated settlement, defense “Attorney Sara Linder will prepare and file the judgment.”

That never occurred. Plaintiff contends defendant is in breach of the settlement because instead of a $2,000 payment to plaintiff, defendant paid plaintiff $1,100 and paid the remaining $900 to a mediator to pay for plaintiff’s share of mediation fees. Plaintiff disputes that the mediator is owed those fees. The court finds no material breach of the settlement on this record. Any dispute about the mediation fees must be resolved outside of court between plaintiff and the mediator. The court grants plaintiff’s motion to the extent it merely seeks to enter judgment.

Because defense counsel never lodged a proposed judgment, plaintiff is ordered to lodge a proposed judgment for the court’s review. That judgment must restate the terms of the stipulation re settlement, without adding any other information. The matter is set for a hearing on dismissal after settlement on January 21, 2027, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 10. The proposed judgment must be lodged for the court’s review before the next hearing. The court will prepare the order. Line 4 24CV441910 Lauren Lockwood v.

Click LINE 4 or scroll down for ruling. Strivr Labs, Inc.

Calendar Line 4 Case Name: Lauren Lockwood v. Strivr Labs, Inc. Case No.: 24CV441910

This is a wrongful termination and employment discrimination action brought by plaintiff Lauren Lockwood (Plaintiff) against defendant Strivr Labs, Inc. (Defendant).

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC) alleges 14 causes of action: (1) pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); (2) gender discrimination in violation of FEHA; (3) interference in violation of the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDL); (4) retaliation in violation of the PDL; (5) interference in violation of California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (6) retaliation in violation of CFRA; (7) sex and gender-based harassment; (8) failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, and/or retaliation in violation of FEHA; (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (10) race discrimination in violation of FEHA; (11) unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (12) breach of contract; (13) breach of contract; and (14) promissory estoppel.

According to the FAC, Plaintiff accepted an employment offer with Defendant in May 2022 for the position of Director of People Operations. (FAC, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff and Defendant had an at-will employment relationship. (Id. at ¶ 140.) Plaintiff’s employment benefits included up to 18 weeks of paid leave in the event of birth or adoption, and continued payments to her health insurance policy. (Id. at ¶¶ 134, 136.) To be eligible for paid leave, Plaintiff had to be the primary caregiver and had to have been employed by Defendant for at least six consecutive months. (Id. at ¶ 135.)

Plaintiff fully complied with the conditions required under the agreement, including timely notifying Defendant of Plaintiff’s intent to take parental leave. (Id. at ¶ 136.) The FAC does not attach the paid leave policy itself. The FAC cites a Bates-stamped document apparently produced by Defendant in discovery. (Id. at ¶ 135.)

Plaintiff went on maternity leave on April 29, 2024. (FAC, ¶ 138.) On May 3, 2024, Defendant’s chief executive officer Derek Belch emailed Plaintiff on May 3, 2024, stating, “[y]ou are still an employee in good standing at Strivr and we look forward to your return from maternity leave on October 1, 2024.” (Id. at ¶ 139.) Plaintiff then received a notice of immediate termination on May 31, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 20.) The FAC alleges Defendant deprived Plaintiff of four months of paid leave and health insurance coverage. (Id. at ¶ 142.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiff was deprived of a “reasonable employment duration of at least 3 months starting from October 1, 2024, as she was not expecting to return to work only to get fired immediately upon return.” (Ibid.)

At issue is Defendant’s demurrer to the 12th, 13th, and 14th causes of action. Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR DEMURRERS

In ruling on a demurrer, the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations but does not accept as true contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. 12

(Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 253 (Valero).) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 states that “[a] demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” The California Rules of Court also require that the demurrer itself (distinct from a supporting memorandum) specify the target of any objection and the grounds. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1103(c), 3.1112(a), 3.1320(a) [“Each ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.”])

The court cannot consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a demurrer. This includes declarations. The court has considered the declaration from defense counsel filed in support of the demurrer only to the extent it discusses the meet and confer efforts required by statute.

DISCUSSION

Defendant challenges the 12th cause of action for breach of contract, 13th cause of action for breach of contract, and 14th cause of action for promissory estoppel on the grounds that each cause of action fails to allege sufficient facts and is uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, pp. 1-2, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e)-(f).) Defendant also demurs to the 13th cause of action on the ground that the FAC fails to allege whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. (Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer, p. 2:2-5, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (g).)

Twelfth Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

Defendant contends the 12th cause of action fails to state sufficient facts because (1) the FAC expressly alleges an at-will relationship that bars any promise for continued employment (Demurrer, p. 8:11-13); and (2) neither the leave policy nor the May 3, 2024, email create a contract for continued employment. (Id. at p. 10:13-15.) Defendant also demurs to the 12th cause of action on the ground of uncertainty, arguing the FAC does not attach the contract or plead its material terms.

“To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must plead and prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Maxwell v. Dolezal (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93, 97-98.) “In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 199 (Construction Protective Services).)

An employment relationship is fundamentally contractual, and Labor Code section 2922 establishes the presumption that an employer may terminate its employees at will. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 350 (Guz).) That said, an employer’s official policies and practices may also give rise to implied employment contract terms such as promises for non-monetary employment benefits. (Id. at p. 344.)

The 12th cause of action alleges, “As part of Plaintiff’s employment benefits, there was a specific promise to provide Plaintiff with up to 18 weeks of paid leave in the event of birth or adoption.” (FAC, ¶ 123.) To be entitled to the leave, the employee had to be the primary 13

caregiver, and had to have been employed for at least six months. (FAC, ¶ 124.) It alleges “Plaintiff was also entitled to continue to receive payments from Defendant towards her health insurance policy.” (FAC, ¶ 125.) And it alleges Defendant breached “the agreement” by terminating Plaintiff while she was on parental leave. (FAC, ¶ 129.)

The court understands the 12th cause of action as alleging a breach of Defendant’s parental leave policy. As currently alleged, the 12th cause of action does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The 12th cause of action alleges that Defendant’s parental leave policy allowed for up to 18 weeks of paid leave for employees who met the conditions described in the FAC. But the 12th cause of action does not allege that the full period of paid leave was guaranteed even to individuals who were terminated. Upon termination, Plaintiff was no longer an “employee” to which the policy applied. The 12th cause of action does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

A plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment would cure any defect identified on demurrer. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) Plaintiff requests leave to amend to allege additional details on the policy’s operative terms. The court will grant leave to amend because this is the first pleading challenge and there is a reasonable possibility of amendment. (City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.)

The demurrer to the 12th cause of action for failure to state sufficient facts is sustained with leave to amend. The court does not reach Defendant’s alternate grounds for demurrer to this cause of action.

Thirteenth Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

Defendant demurs to the 13th cause of action on the grounds that it: (1) fails to allege sufficient facts; (2) fails to allege the nature of the contract; and (3) is uncertain.

The 13th cause of action also alleges breach of an agreement. It repeats the allegations from the 12th cause of action about the parental leave policy. It also adds alleges that Plaintiff was assured by the May 3, 2024, email from Derek Belch informing her that she was “still an employee in good standing at Striver and we look forward to your return from maternity leave on October 1, 2024.” (FAC, ¶ 139.)

Plaintiff confirms in her opposition that the 13th cause of action alleges “the same enforceable [promise for] paid-leave benefit” as the 12th cause of action. (Opposition, p. 7:18- 19.) It likewise fails to state sufficient facts.

The demurrer to the 13th cause of action based on the failure to state sufficient facts is sustained with leave to amend. The court does not reach Defendant’s alternate grounds for demurrer to this cause of action.

Fourteenth Cause of Action – Promissory Estoppel

Defendant contends that the 14th cause of action does not allege a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable reliance, or detrimental reliance. Defendant also contends that the 14th cause of action is uncertain.

The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reliance that is both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) harm to the party asserting the estoppel from such reliance. (Aceves v. U.S. Bank N.A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 218, 225 (Aceves).) An enforceable promise must be definite enough for a court to determine the scope of the duty, and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis to assess damages. (Id. at p. 226, citing Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044.)

The 14th cause of action alleges that on May 3, 2024, Belch called Plaintiff and sent an email stating, “[y]ou are still an employee in good standing at Strivr and we look forward to your return from maternity leave on October 1, 2024.” (FAC, ¶ 139.) Plaintiff alleges that email created a clear and unambiguous expectation of continued employment through that date. (Id. at ¶ 146.)

Belch’s email describes an expectation of a return date, rather than a binding promise that termination could not occur beforehand. (Demurrer, p. 17:11-13.) The email does not supply the court with facts to determine the scope of duty or any limits on performance. (Aceves, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 226.) And the allegation that the email “created a clear and unambiguous expectation of continued employment through that date,” without more, is a legal conclusion that the court does not accept as true for purposes of demurrer. (Valero, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 253.)

The demurrer to the 14th cause of action for failure to state sufficient facts is sustained with leave to amend. The court does not reach Defendant’s alternate grounds for demurrer to this cause of action.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s demurrer to the 12th through 14th causes of action for failure to state sufficient facts is sustained with leave to amend. The court does not grant leave to add any new parties or causes of action. (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.)

Any amended pleading must be filed and served no later than September 18, 2026.

The court will prepare the order.

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