DecisionDepot
California legal research
All cases
25CV1050·eldorado·Civil·Professional Malpractice
Hearing 3 months agoGRANTED

STEPHENS v. LAUB LAW PLCC, ET AL.

Defendant Rusin's Motion to Set Aside Default; Defendants Joe Laub's and Law Firm of Laub & Laub's Motion to Set Aside Default

Hearing date
May 15, 2026
Department
Department Four
Judge
Prevailing
Moving Party
Appearance
Not required

Motion type

Browse all Other rulings statewide →

Causes of action

Parties

PlaintiffStephens
DefendantJill Rusin
DefendantJoe Laub
DefendantLaw Firm of Laub & Laub

Attorneys

Ciu Ciu Tannerfor Defendant

Ruling

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 15, 2026

6. STEPHENS v. LAUB LAW PLCC, ET AL., 25CV1050

(A) Defendant Rusin’s Motion to Set Aside Default

(B) Defendants Joe Laub’s and Law Firm of Laub & Laub’s Motion to Set Aside Default

Defendant Rusin’s Motion to Set Aside Default Default was entered against defendant Jill Rusin (“defendant”) on

December 16, 2025. On March 3, 2026, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473,

defendant filed a motion to set aside default and default judgment. On March 04, 2026,

defendant submitted a declaration in support of her motion. On March 11, 2026, plaintiff submitted a timely opposition.

On April 09, 2026, defendant submitted a declaration of Ciu Ciu Tanner in support of

her motion. Defendant submitted no reply brief.

1.

Background

Proof of service filed November 10, 2025, shows plaintiff electronically served his

third amended complaint (“TAC”) on defendant on November 4, 2025, at the following

email addresses: Jillyrusin@gmail.com and Jill@lawlaub.com. Although the summons

and complaint must generally be personally served or served via substitute service

(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 415.10, 415.20), the court notes that, on July 21, 2025, defendant

electronically filed a motion to quash in this case and concurrently provided her email

address (jill@lawlaub.com), thereby consenting to electronic service. (Cal. Rules of Ct.,

rule 2.251, subd. (b)(1)(B).) Accordingly, the deadline for defendant to file a responsive

pleading to plaintiff’s TAC was December 8, 2025 (30 calendar days, extended by two

court days for electronic service). (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412.20, subd. (a)(3), 1013,

subd. (e).)

Defendant admits receiving a copy of the TAC via email on November 6, 2025: “On

November 6, 2025, I received a copy of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. This was

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 15, 2026

sent to Laub & Laub and to Joe Laub. Not to me. But I did receive an emailed copy of the

copies directed to Mr. Laub and The Firm.” (Rusin Decl., ¶ 20.)

Defendant declares that, on December 4, 2025, she sent an email to plaintiff

explaining that Laub & Laub had received two copies of the TAC, one for defendant Joey

Laub and one for defendant Laub & Laub. (Rusin Decl., ¶ 21.) “Tired of dealing with

service issues, [defendant] asked Plaintiff at that time to let [defendant] know if his

intention was to also serve [defendant], and that [defendant] would respond to his

Complaint.” (Rusin Decl., ¶ 21.) Defendant did not submit a copy of her email correspondence in support of the instant motion. However, plaintiff did submit a copy

of an email from defendant (using the email address jill@lawlaub.com) to plaintiff

(defendant also sent a copy of the email to herself at jillyrusin@gmail.com) dated

December 4, 2025, which states: “Hello Mr. Stephens: This shall serve as an effort to

meet and confer regarding demur [sic] to your amended complaint. Can you please

provide a few dates/times convenient to your schedule? Sincerely, Jill Marchione

Rusin.” (Stephens Decl., Ex. B.)

Defendant provides no explanation of why she did not file a responsive pleading

before the December 8, 2025, deadline.

On December 9, 2025, the law firm’s receptionist added a document to their case

file with the heading, “30 day extension to answer.” (Rusin Decl., ¶ 22.) Later, defendant

realized that the extension did not apply to her but was for another defendant in this action. (Rusin Decl., ¶ 22.)

Defendant was away from the office on holiday vacation and was unaware of

plaintiff’s December 29, 2025, email, which attached plaintiff’s request for default.

(Rusin Decl., ¶ 23.) Defendant planned to return to the office on January 6, 2026. (Rusin

Decl., ¶ 25.) Days later, her brother was hospitalized, which significantly limited

defendant’s ability to work and communicate with her employer. (Rusin Decl., ¶¶ 25– 26.)

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 15, 2026

When defendant discovered plaintiff’s request for default in her email spam folder,

she completed her answer to the complaint and contacted a trusted friend to file the

document on her behalf as a favor. (Rusin Decl., ¶ 27.) Defendant requested the filing

receipt from her friend but, uncharacteristically, did not hear back from the friend.

(Rusin Decl., ¶ 29.) When defendant finally returned to work (defendant does not

specify the date), she noticed a default prove-up hearing set for February 27, 2026.

(Rusin Decl., ¶ 30.) Defendant attempted to reach her friend to obtain e-filing

confirmation of the answer she filed. (Rusin Decl., ¶ 30.) After several days without a return call, defendant contacted another colleague, who informed defendant that the

friend had abruptly left the county due to a death in her family. (Rusin Decl., ¶ 30.)

Sometime between February 26 and February 27, 2026, defendant contacted the court

and was informed that her answer had not been filed. (Rusin Decl., ¶ 31.)

2.

Discussion

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides: “The court may, upon

any terms as may be just, relieve a party ... from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other

proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)

Here, the court declines to grant defendant relief under the mistake provision of

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), because defendant provides no

explanation of why she did not file a responsive pleading before the December 8, 2025, deadline. Defendant’s claim of mistakes only occurred after the December 8, 2025,

deadline. Plaintiff’s evidence shows defendant sent plaintiff a meet and confer email on

December 4, 2025, regarding defendant’s intended demurrer.

Still, Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “The court

may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, ...enlarge the time

for answer or demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) The court will grant defendant relief under this section because plaintiff’s claims of negligence and breach of

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 15, 2026

fiduciary duty, as alleged against defendant Rusin in the TAC, both likely fail as a matter

of law. The TAC alleges defendant is a paralegal for defendant Law Firm of Laub & Laub.

Therefore, it would appear that defendant owed no legal duty of care to plaintiff and

owed no fiduciary duty to plaintiff. The court finds it to be in the interest of justice that

defendant’s answer attached to her motion be deemed filed in this matter as of the

date of notice of entry of order.

Defendants Joe Laub’s and Law Firm of Laub & Laub’s Motion to Set Aside Default

Default was entered against defendants Joe Laub and Law Firm of Laub & Laub

(collectively, “defendants”) on December 16, 2025. On March 4, 2026, pursuant to Code

of Civil Procedure section 473, defendants filed a motion to set aside default, as well as

a supporting declaration of defendant Joe Laub. Defendants also rely on defendant Jill

Rusin’s declaration, submitted March 4, 2026, in support of their motion.

On March 11, 2026, plaintiff filed a timely opposition. Defendants filed no reply.

1.

Background

Proofs of service filed November 10, 2025, show that both defendants were

personally served with plaintiff’s third amended complaint (“TAC”) on

November 4, 2025. Therefore, defendants’ deadline to file a responsive pleading was

December 4, 2025.8 (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).)

On or about December 4, 2025, defendant Joe Laub’s office informed him of a 30-

day extension to respond to the TAC, causing Mr. Laub to believe the new deadline for a

responsive pleading was January 6, 2026. (Laub. Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5.) He later learned from

his paralegal that this extension actually applied to a different defendant. (Laub. Decl.,

¶ 4.)

8 Defendant Joe Laub’s declaration in support of the instant motion states his office was

served plaintiff’s TAC by substitute service on November 4, 2025. (Laub Decl., ¶ 1.) Even assuming, arguendo, that defendants were served via substitute service, meaning the deadline to file a responsive pleading was December 15, 2025, neither defendant filed a responsive pleading before default was entered on December 16, 2025.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 15, 2026

Mr. Laub was due to return to his office after a holiday vacation on January 6, 2026.

(Laub Decl., ¶ 6.) On January 7, 2026, he was hospitalized after a serious ski accident.

(Laub Decl., ¶ 7.) Mr. Laub’s paralegal had a family emergency and his legal assistant

was unable to return from her holiday vacation due to an emergency in her family.

(Laub Decl., ¶ 9.) At some point in January 2026, Mr. Laub’s paralegal informed him that

the answers to plaintiffs’ TAC had been filed. (Laub Decl., ¶ 10.) However, this turned

out to be incorrect. (Laub Decl., ¶ 10.) Mr. Laub recently learned the answers had not

been filed “due to yet another person’s family emergency.” (Laub Decl., ¶ 11.)

2.

Discussion

Code of Civil Procedure section 473 provides, in pertinent part: “The court may,

upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party ... from a judgment, dismissal, order, or

other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Additionally, “the

court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after

entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn

affidavit attesting to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate

any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against the attorney’s client, and which will

result in entry of a default judgment ... unless the court finds that the default or

dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

neglect.” (Ibid.) Here, defendant Joe Laub, a licensed California attorney, submitted a declaration

indicating he mistakenly believed plaintiff had granted both defendants a 30-day

extension to January 6, 2026. Then, due to a serious ski injury and a series of family

emergencies sustained by members of his law firm’s staff, Mr. Laub mistakenly believed

that an answer to complaint had been filed, when in fact, that was incorrect.

Based on Mr. Laub’s declaration, the court grants the motion to set aside default as to both defendants and deems the answer to the complaint attached to the motion as

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 15, 2026

being filed on the date of notice of entry of order. Mr. Laub is representing himself in

pro per; thus, the court grants him permissive relief under Code of Civil Procedure

section 473, subdivision (b). Defendant Law Firm of Laub & Laub is represented by

Mr. Laub in his professional capacity; therefore, the court grants the law firm mandatory

relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).

TENTATIVE RULING # 6:

JILL RUSIN’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT: PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE SECTION 473, SUBDIVISION (A)(1), THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

AGAINST DEFENDANT JILL RUSIN IS GRANTED. THE ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

ATTACHED TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION IS DEEMED FILED AS OF THE DATE OF NOTICE

OF ENTRY OF ORDER.

JOE LAUB’S AND LAW FIRM OF LAUB & LAUB’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT:

PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473, SUBDIVISION (B), THE

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT IS GRANTED AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS, JOE LAUB

AND LAW FIRM OF LAUB & LAUB. THE ANSWER TO COMPLAINT ATTACHED TO

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IS DEEMED FILED AS OF THE DATE OF NOTICE OF ENTRY OF

ORDER.

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19

CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR

ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT’S

WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE

DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO

APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID

NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

Cited authorities

Extracting citations from the ruling text…
Verify against the source PDF — LLM extraction may miss or mis-normalize citations.

Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities

Ask about this ruling

Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”

Answers reference only this ruling's text. Not legal advice — always verify against the source PDF.

Find similar rulings

Source

Share