Advoque Safeguard, LLC et al. v. Sanctuary Systems, LLC et al

AMBF received cash deposits to manufacture materials that would be used in Plaintiffs’ N95 respirators but have not returned the money materials to Plaintiffs despite knowing they belonged to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ repeated requests. (Ibid.) AMBF had a duty to maintain the monies and materials in a non-negligent manner, but through a transaction with co-defendant Sanctuary Systems, LLC (“Sanctuary”), intended to strip Plaintiffs of the property they were entitled to. (Id. at ¶ 54.)

On May 19, 2026, AMBF filed the instant motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. On May 28, 2026, this court granted AMBG’s ex parte application to advance the hearing from January 15, 2027 to August 14, 2026. Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition, and AMBF filed a timely reply.

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Legal Standard

Any party may move for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) The object of the summary judgment procedure is “to cut through the parties’ pleadings” to determine whether trial is necessary to resolve the dispute. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

Similarly, “[a] party may seek summary adjudication on whether a cause of action, affirmative defense, or punitive damages claim has merit or whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff. [Citation.] ‘A motion for summary adjudication...shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary

1 The court, on its own motion, takes judicial notice of the record in this action. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

judgment.’ [Citation.]” (California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 630 (California Bank).)

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action...The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; internal citations omitted.) A triable issue of material fact exists “if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) If the party opposing summary judgment presents evidence demonstrating the existence of a disputed material fact, the motion must be denied. (Id. at p. 856.)

A motion for adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of an entire cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an “issue of duty.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); McClasky v. California State Auto. Ass’n (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 975 [“If a cause of action is not shown to be barred in its entirety, no order for summary judgment—or adjudication—can be entered.”].)

Request for Judicial Notice

AMBF’s request for judicial notice of the FAC and AMBF’s answer to the FAC is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Evidentiary Objections

AMBF submitted evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Jason Azevedo, the deposition transcript of Sanctuary’s PMQ, and an email exchange between Stephen Sharpe, Bryan Sigler, Buddy Barnes, and Harry Barnes. The court need not rule on the objections, which are preserved, because they are not material to the disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Discussion

In moving for summary judgment, AMBF asserts the following: (1) Plaintiffs’ negligence, negligent interference with prospective economic relations, and conversion claims are barred by the economic loss rule; (2) Plaintiffs’ conversion claim fails because Plaintiffs were not entitled to immediate possession of a sum certain; (3) Plaintiffs’ intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations claims fail because Plaintiffs cannot establish knowledge, causation, or independently wrongful conduct; (4) Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim fails because Plaintiffs have no evidence to support the claim; and (5) Plaintiffs’ Unfair Business Practices claim fails because Plaintiffs have no evidence to support the claim. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:15-26.)

The Economic Loss Rule

The economic loss rule provides no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted “economic losses.” (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 400.) The economic loss

rule arises in various contexts, such as barring “claims in negligence for pure economic losses in deference to a contract between litigating parties.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922.) However, “[w]here a special relationship exists between parties, a plaintiff may recover for loss of expected economic advantage through the negligent performance of a contract although the parties were not in contractual privity.” (J’aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 804.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs do not allege any physical injury or property damage, only economic losses. (AMBF’s Undisputed Material Facts [“UMF”], No. 16.) It is also undisputed that AMBF entered into contracts only with co-defendant Sanctuary—i.e., Plaintiffs and AMBF did not have a contractual relationship. (UMF, No. 5.)

AMBF’s assertion that the economic loss rule bars the conversion claim is unpersuasive as it solely relies on Fine v. Kansas City Life Insurance Company (C.D. Cal. 2022) 627 F.Supp.3d 1153, 1161 (Fine) which observed, “Whether the economic loss rule bars a conversion claim turns on ‘whether the ownership interest that formed the basis for the conversion claim preexisted the contract or arises from the contract. Where the interest preexisted the contract, a conversion claim will lie.’” Fine is distinguishable because the parties there were in contractual privity with each other. (Id. at p. 1157.)

Here, Plaintiffs and AMBF indisputably lack contractual privity; Plaintiffs’ conversion claim does not arise from contract a between Plaintiffs and AMBF. AMBF provides no authority supporting the assertion that the economic loss rule bars a conversion claim arising from any contract— including one that AMBF is a stranger to. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; see also Baggett v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 2009 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 95241, at *4 [economic loss rule barring conversion claim by purchaser against seller because claim arose “solely out of their contract and commercial transaction”].)

AMBF’s argument that the economic loss rule bars the negligence and negligent interference of prospective economic relations claims, on the other hand, is well taken. The parties are not in contractual privity, and the FAC does not allege a special relationship that would permit Plaintiffs to recover economic losses for AMBF’s negligence performance of its contract with Sanctuary. Plaintiffs appear to concede this argument as they do not address this point in the opposition and thus fail to raise any triable issue of material fact. (See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc./Obayashi Corp. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 (Sehulster) [failure to address point is equivalent to a concession].)

Because the economic loss rule serves as a bar, the court GRANTS AMBF’s motion for summary adjudication of the negligence and negligent interference with prospective economic relations claims.

Conversion

AMBF moves for summary adjudication of the conversion claim on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs cannot establish entitlement to immediate possession; and (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege or prove a sum certain.

The tort of conversion is comprised of three elements: (1) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) defendant’s disposition of the property in a manner inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) damages. (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1150 (Voris).) A party must also allege it is entitled to immediate possession at the time of conversion. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 452.) A contractual right of payment alone is insufficient. (Ibid.) Actions for the conversion of money require a specific, identifiable sum. (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 396 (PCO).)

AMBF argues that Plaintiff cannot establish entitlement to immediate possession of the money because Plaintiffs’ voluntarily (and indirectly) paid for AMBF’s materials. AMBF characterizes Plaintiff’s payment as a buyer-seller transaction, for which the appropriate remedy would be based in contract. AMBF cites Voris in support. Voris concerned an employee who sought to hold his employer personally liable for unpaid wages under a theory of conversion. (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1144.) The Court first noted that “the simple failure to pay money owed” does not support a claim for conversion, because to hold otherwise would “swallow the significant category of contract claims” based on nonpayment. (Id. at p. 1151.)

The Court observed, “cases recognizing claims for the conversion of money ‘typically involve those who have misappropriated, commingled, or misapplied specific funds held for the benefit of others.’ ” (Id. at p. 1152 [quoting PCO, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 396].) Thus, the employee’s claim did not allege the employer’s “wrongfully exercised dominion over a specifically identifiable pot of money that already belongs to the employee” (i.e., a conversion claim), but merely “that the employer failed to reach into its own funds to satisfy its debt.” (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1152-1153.)

The Court concluded, “a claim for unpaid wages simply seeks the satisfaction of a monetary claim against the employer, without regard to the provenance of the monies at issue.” (Id. at p. 1156.) Given the rationale of Voris, AMBF disclaims any obligation to reach into its own funds to satisfy Plaintiffs’ claimed debt. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs voluntarily deposited the money with Sanctuary and that those funds were intended for AMBF. (UMF, No. 30.) Plaintiffs have not established that AMBF— not Sanctuary—now holds “a specifically identifiable pot of money” that belongs to Plaintiffs.

In opposition, Plaintiffs produce no evidence demonstrating that AMBF failed to return money that was “earmarked for a specific person before being misappropriated.” (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1156.) Instead, Plaintiffs cite cases such as Aljabban v. Fontana Indoor Swap Meet, Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 482 (Aljabban) for the proposition that the failure to return a refundable cash deposit supports a conversion cause of action. But, these cases are unhelpful. For example, in Alijabban, the court entered judgment in favor of hair salon owners against an indoor swap meet for failing to return $680 of the security deposit because the agreement did not permit the swap meet to use the deposit to repair damages to the premises. (Id. at p. 506.)

Plaintiffs’ citation to Aljabban, is unhelpful. As noted above, it is undisputed that the money was deposited with Sanctuary, not AMBF. Sanctuary alone had the obligation to hold the money for the benefit of Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Plaintiffs stated in discovery that Plaintiffs and Sanctuary agreed that the money Plaintiffs deposited with Sanctuary would go to AMBF, and that Sanctuary represented the money had gone to AMBF. (AMBF’s Index of Exhibits, Ex. 16, p. 5:1-5.) Plaintiffs provide no authority or evidence supporting their proposition that AMBF is liable for a purportedly refundable deposit that was given to Sanctuary. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.)

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact on their conversion claim.

Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact on their entitlement to immediate possession of the money at issue, the court GRANTS AMBF’s motion for summary adjudication of the conversion cause of action. The court declines to reach AMBF’s remaining argument that Plaintiffs have not pled and cannot prove a sum certain.

Intentional Interference with Contractual and Prospective Economic Relations

AMBF moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective economic relations causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate knowledge, causation, or independently wrongful conduct.

To state a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead and prove a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party, and the defendant’s knowledge of the contract. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126.) Similarly, an intentional interference with prospective economic relations cause of action requires the plaintiff to plead and prove an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party “with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff”, and defendant’s knowledge of that relationship. (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1152, fn. 6.)

Here, AMBF contends that Plaintiffs have no evidence of its knowledge of Plaintiffs’ contractual or economic relationships with the State of California, GiveMasks/Fine Group, JDM, Bradley Group, ProPlas, the Titus Group, Inc., or Paper 360, Inc. In support, AMBG offers the declaration of its chief executive officer, Frederick Geyer. Geyer plainly attests, “AMBF also had no knowledge of any of the contracts Plaintiffs had with the State of California, GiveMasks/Fine, JDM, Bradley Group, ProPlas, Paper 360, Inc[.], or Titus Group, Inc.” (UMF, No. 35.) Geyer further testified at deposition that AMBF did not know who Sanctuary’s customer was, or who Plaintiffs were. (UMF, No. 39.)

AMBF also offers Plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses. On January 26, 2023, Plaintiffs responded to AMBF’s special interrogatories, which required Plaintiffs to state all facts in support of Plaintiffs’ contention that AMBF knew of contracts between Plaintiffs and third parties. (UMF, No. 36.) Plaintiffs solely responded, “On information and belief, [AMBF] had business relationship(s) with the other Defendants in this matter and pursuant to said relationship(s), [AMBF] obtained knowledge of [Plaintiffs] and the contracts it intended to fulfill...” (UMF, No. 37.)

The record does not reflect that Plaintiffs have since supplemented their discovery responses to provide factual bases beyond their statements made “on information and belief.” Accordingly, the court may infer that Plaintiffs cannot provide more evidence on AMBF’s knowledge of the contracts or economic relationships. (Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 114, 134 [“to grant summary judgment, the court must be able to infer from the record that the plaintiff could produce no other evidence on the disputed point.”])

AMBF’s evidence is sufficient to meet its initial burden, and Plaintiffs waive this point by failing to provide argument or evidence in opposition. (See Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [“‘This court is not required to discuss or consider points which are not argued or which are not supported by citation to authorities or the record.”])

Because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact on AMBF’s knowledge of the contractual or economic relationships, the court GRANTS AMBF’s motion for summary adjudication of the intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective economic relations causes of action. The court declines to reach the AMBF’s remaining arguments concerning causation or independently wrongful conduct.

Conspiracy

AMBF also moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ conspiracy cause of action on the ground that Plaintiffs have no evidence of AMBF’s participation in a conspiracy.

The essential elements of a conspiracy claim are: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) damages arising from wrongful conduct. (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022.)

AMBF again submits Plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses in support. On January 26, 2023, Plaintiffs responded to AMBF’s special interrogatories requiring Plaintiffs to state all facts and identify all documents supporting the allegation that AMBF conspired to engage in conversion. Plaintiffs relied on the allegations of the FAC and stated “on information and belief” that agreements existed between the defendants. (UMF, Nos. 54-55.) On April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs later amended their discovery responses to state that all documents have been produced. (UMF, No. 56.)

Plaintiffs cannot rely on the allegations within their FAC to oppose a motion for summary judgment. A plaintiff may not rely on the allegations of its own pleadings to oppose a motion for summary judgment. (Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1054.) And the record does not reflect that Plaintiffs have supplemented their discovery responses or otherwise produced evidence demonstrating an agreement to conspire. Plaintiffs again waive any argument by failing to address this point in their opposition. (Sehulster, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345, fn. 16.)

Because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact on AMBF’s participation in a conspiracy, the court GRANTS AMBF’s motion for summary adjudication of the conspiracy cause of action.

Unfair Business Practices (UCL)

In moving for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ UCL cause of action, AMBF argues that because the claim is premised on fraud and misrepresentation, and Plaintiffs do not allege these underlying claims against AMBF, summary adjudication is proper. The argument is well taken.

“The UCL covers a wide range of conduct. It embraces [] anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law. [] [Citations.]” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143.) The UCL “prohibits ‘unfair competition,’ which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [Section 17500].” (Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 714, 722 (Hansen) [quoting Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200].)

The FAC alleges, “Defendants...engaged in conduct likely to deceive general members of the public in how Defendants tested, distributed, manufactured, and sold respirator mask materials. This deception came about through Defendants...misrepresenting and/or making fraudulent statements and promises to [Plaintiffs].” (FAC, ¶ 167.) Thus, the viability of Plaintiffs’ UCL cause of action is predicated on the existence of a fraud claim. As AMBF points out, no such claim is alleged against AMBF here.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that because the conversion cause of action survives, so too, does Plaintiffs’ UCL cause of action. The court disagrees. A party may not oppose a summary judgment based on a claim, theory, or defense that is not alleged in the pleadings. (California Bank, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 637, fn. 3.)

Given the foregoing, the court GRANTS AMBF’s motion for summary adjudication of the UCL claim.

Disposition

Defendant AMBF’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

The court will prepare the order.

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Calendar Line 2 Calendar line 2 Case Name: Advoque Safeguard, LLC et al. v. Sanctuary Systems, LLC et al Case No.: 21CV392455

Defendants Sanctuary Systems, LLC, Bryan Sigler, and 305 Consulting’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

Background2

Plaintiffs Advoque Safeguard (“ASG”) and Ciasom LLC (“Ciasom”; collectively, “Plaintiffs”) manufactured N95 respirators during the COVID-19 pandemic and sued various entities and individuals that were involved in supplying Plaintiffs with mask filtration materials. These entities and individuals include, among others, defendants Sanctuary Systems, LLC, Bryan Sigler, and 305 Consulting (collectively, “Sanctuary Defendants”).

The first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following causes of action against Sanctuary Defendants: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of vendor indemnity agreement; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) negligence; (5) products liability; (6) express warranty; (7) implied warranty of merchantability; (8) implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; (9) intentional misrepresentation; (10) concealment; (11) false promise; (12) negligent misrepresentation; (13) conversion; (14) intentional interference with contractual relations; (15) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (16) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; (17) conspiracy; and (18) implied contractual indemnity; and (19) unfair business practices.

On April 14, 2026, the court granted Sanctuary Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the following causes of action: (1) breach of vendor indemnity agreement (2) negligence; (3) products liability; (4) intentional misrepresentation; (5) concealment; (6) false promise; (7) negligent mis representation; (8) conversion; and (9) unfair business practices. (April 14, 2026 Order, pp. 43:8-12.)

On July 21, 2026, this court granted Sanctuary Defendants’ ex parte application to advance the hearing on its motion for judgment on the pleadings to August 14, 2026. Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition, and Sanctuary Defendants filed a timely reply.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(2).) “The grounds for motion provided in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any mater of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) The motion is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer made after the time to demur has expired and more than 30 days before trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438; see also Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999; Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110

2 The court takes judicial notice of the record in this action on its own motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Calendar Line 3 Case Name: Advoque Safeguard, LLC et al. v. Sanctuary Systems, LLC et al Case No.: 21CV392455

Defendants Bentham Pourdeyhimi and Leaders in Innovation and Nonwovens Commercialization’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Background4

Plaintiffs Advoque Safeguard (“ASG”) and Ciasom LLC (“Ciasom”; collectively, “Plaintiffs”) manufactured N95 respirators during the COVID-19 pandemic and sued various entities and individuals that were involved in supplying Plaintiffs with mask filtration materials. These entities and individuals include, among others, defendants Benham Pourdeyhimi (“Pourdeyhimi”) and Leaders in Innovation and Nonwovens Commercialization (“LINC”; collectively, “LINC Defendants”).

The first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following causes of action against LINC Defendants: (1) negligence; (2) products liability; (3) express warranty; (4) implied warranty of merchantability; (5) implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; (6) intentional misrepresentation; (7) concealment; (8) false promise; (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) conversion; (10) intentional interference with contractual relations; (11) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (12) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; (13) conspiracy; and (14) unfair business practices.

On April 14, 2026, the court granted LINC Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the following causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) products liability; (3) conversion; (4) intentional interference with contractual relations; (5) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; (6) conspiracy. (April 14, 2026 Order, pp. 43:21-44:3.) The court also granted LINC Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the following causes of action and granted 20 days’ leave to amend: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) concealment; (3) false promise; and (4) negligent misrepresentation. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs did not file a second amended complaint.

On June 29, 2026, Pourdeyhimi filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings. That same day, LINC filed a notice of joinder in Pourdeyhimi’s motion. The request for joinder is granted. On July 23, 2026, this court granted Pourdeyhimi’s ex parte application to advance the hearing from February 19, 2027 to August 14, 2026. Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition, and Pourdeyhimi filed a timely reply.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(2).) “The grounds for motion provided in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any mater of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) The motion is the functional equivalent of a

44 The court takes judicial notice of the record in this action on its own motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Calendar Line 10 Case Name: Advoque Safeguard, LLC et al. v. Sanctuary Systems, LLC et al Case No.: 21CV392455

Defendant Robert Sigler’s request for joinder and motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Background

Facts

Plaintiffs Advoque Safeguard (“ASG”) and Ciasom LLC (“Ciasom”; collectively, “Plaintiffs”) manufactured N95 respirators during the COVID-19 pandemic and sued various entities and individuals that were involved in supplying Plaintiffs with mask filtration materials. These entities and individuals include, among others, defendant Robert Sigler.

The first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following causes of action against Robert Sigler: (1) negligence; (2) intentional misrepresentation; (3) concealment; (4) false promise; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) intentional interference with contractual relations; (7) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (8) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; (9) conspiracy; and (10) unfair business practices.

On April 14, 2026, the court granted Robert Sigler’s motion for summary adjudication of the following causes of action: (1) concealment; (2) false promise; (3) negligent misrepresentation; and (4) unfair business practices.

On August 5, 2026, Robert Sigler filed a combined notice of joinder and motion for judgment on the pleadings.7 On August 10, 2026, the court granted Robert Sigler’s unopposed ex parte application to advance the hearing from January 8, 2027 to August 14, 2026. Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition, and Robert Sigler filed a late reply. The court will exercise its discretion in considering the late-filed paper. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.)

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(2).) “The grounds for motion provided in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any mater of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) The motion is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer made after the time to demur has expired and more than 30 days before trial.

1 Robert Sigler originally attempted to file the combined motion on July 22, 2026. The motion was denied by the clerk’s office for having an incorrect hearing date.