ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC

This Agreement is intended to be both retrospective and prospective, and Covered Claims is intended to include past, present and future claims, including claims that may have originated or accrued prior to the signing of this Agreement. Covered Claims include, but are not limited to, claims arising out of applicable wage laws or other compensation due; disclosure of trade secrets; claims for breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied); tort claims; claims for harassment or discrimination (including, but not limited to, race, religion, national origin, age, marital status, medical condition, handicap, disability or other protected characteristic under applicable discrimination law); claims for benefits other than those brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ('ERISA'); and claims for violation of any federal, state or other governmental law, statute, regulation, ordinance or common law.

This includes, but is not limited to, claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code and all comparable laws.

Non-Arbitrable Claims

This Agreement does not preclude Employee from filing a claim or charge with a governmental administrative agency, such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Department of Labor or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This Agreement does not preclude either Employee or the Covered Parties from seeking injunctive relief in a court of law in accordance with applicable law. However, after the Court has issued a ruling concerning the injunctive relief, Employee and the Covered Parties are required to submit the dispute to arbitration pursuant to this Agreement.

Covered Claims does not include claims for workers' compensation or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

unemployment compensation benefits, claims under ERISA benefit plans, charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board, claims for sexual assault or sexual harassment (unless parties mutually agree to arbitrate such claims), and any claims that cannot be arbitrated as a matter of law ('Non-Arbitrable Claims').

Employee acknowledges that he or she is not barred from reporting any good faith allegations of unlawful employment practices or criminal conduct to appropriate federal, state or local agencies, or from making other truthful statements or disclosures as may be required by law, regulation, or legal process. Employee further acknowledges that he or she can participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws.

If any of the Covered Parties pursues Covered Claims and Non-Arbitrable Claims, then Covered Claims must be arbitrated and Non-Arbitrable Claims must be litigated in court. In no event will Covered Claims be joined with Non- Arbitrable Claims and litigated in court unless Employee and the Covered Parties agree.

Waiver of Class and Collective Claims

The Covered Parties and Employee agree that each may only bring claims against the other only in their individual capacity, and may not file claims as a plaintiff and/or participate as a class member in any pending or future class and/or collective action against the other.

Waiver of Representative Claims

Unless prohibited by applicable law, the Covered Parties and Employee agree that each may only bring claims against the other only in their individual capacity, and may not file claims as a plaintiff and/or participate or be included in any pending or future representative action against the other.

...

Arbitration Procedures

If there is a JAMS office in the state where Employee works (or worked) for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Rivian, then Covered Claims shall be resolved through binding arbitration to be administered by JAMS in accordance with its Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures ('JAMS Rules') then in effect, except as otherwise modified herein. The current version of the JAMS Rules can be found at https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/english or can be requested from the People team. To the extent that there is any conflict between this program and the JAMS Rules, the provisions of this Agreement shall govern except as provided by applicable law.

If there is no JAMS office located in the state where Employee works (or worked) for Rivian, then Covered Claims shall be resolved through binding arbitration to be administered by AAA in accordance with its Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures ('AAA Rules') then in effect, except as otherwise modified herein. The current version of the AAA Rules can be found at https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/EmploymentRules Web 2.pdf or can be requested from the People team. To the extent that there is any conflict between this program and the AAA Rules, the provisions of this Agreement shall govern except as provided by applicable law.

...

Validity of Agreement

If any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable, in whole or in part, the remaining provisions shall continue to be valid and any unenforceable or conflicting provision shall be automatically severed. However, if either the Waiver of Class and Collective Claims or the Waiver of Representative Claims is found to be unenforceable, then any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and such court shall be the exclusive forum for such claims.

Rivian is engaged in interstate commerce; thus, interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. Petitions to compel arbitration or to modify, confirm or vacate any award may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, under either the Federal Arbitration Act or under applicable state law. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement between the parties hereto and fully supersedes any and all prior agreements and understandings, written or oral, between the parties hereto pertaining to the subject matter hereof. . . . (Farnham Decl., Exh.

B (“Agreement”).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Legal Standard

Both federal and state law favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97; accord, Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 889.) Under California law, a written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable consistent with standard contract principles. There is a strong public policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Code Civ. Proc., §1281; Madden v.

Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 706.) On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Federal law is fully consistent with these principles. As the United States Supreme Court explained more than twenty years ago, “Because the Federal Arbitration Act is ‘at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,’ we look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute—not to broader policy considerations—in determining the scope of the agreement.” (Fleming v. Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19 [citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 294].) “For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (Id. [citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582].)

As such, “under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Ibid.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at p.1518.) “A party seeking to compel arbitration of a dispute ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability. [Citation.]” (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [citation omitted].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Discussion

Through this motion, Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff to submit his individual claims to binding arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement, dismiss the class claims, and stay this action pending resolution of arbitration. (Ntc. Mot.)

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that he signed the Arbitration Agreement. Rather, in opposition, Plaintiff points the following language contained in the Arbitration Agreement which Plaintiff characterizes as the “poison pill”:

However, if either the Waiver of Class and Collective Claims or the Waiver of Representative Claims is found to be unenforceable, then any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and such court shall be the exclusive forum for such claims. (Agreement, p. 4.)

Based on this language, Plaintiff argues that (1) the class action waiver is unenforceable, and (2) the representative action waiver is unenforceable. For these reasons, Plaintiff contends that the under the express terms of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court is the “Exclusive Forum” for Plaintiff’s Class and PAGA claims, and the motion to compel arbitration should be denied. Alternatively, Plaintiff maintains that that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.

Transportation Worker Exemption

Under Title 9, United States Code, section 1, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) does not apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” To determine whether this “transportation worker” exemption applies, courts must first define the relevant class of workers to which the plaintiff belongs. Next, courts must then determine whether that class of workers is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” (Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450, 455 (Southwest Airlines).) The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving the transportation worker exemption applies. (See Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line (2008) 547 F.3d 1148, 1151; see also Rogers v. Lyft, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2020) 452 F.Supp.3d 904, 913.)

The Supreme Court in Southwest Airlines explained that, to be part of a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” a worker need not transport goods across state lines. A class of workers is engaged in interstate commerce – or as the court wrote, “directly involved” in interstate commerce – if they are “directly involved in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

transporting goods across state or international borders.” (Southwest Airlines, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 457.) “[A]ny class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders falls within § 1’s exemption . . . Put another way, transportation workers must be actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce . . . Cargo loaders exhibit this central feature of a transportation worker. As stated above, one who loads cargo on a plane bound for interstate transit is intimately involved with the commerce (e.g., transportation) of that cargo.” (Id. at pp. 457-458.)

In Ortiz, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding that a California warehouse employee belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce. (Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2024) 95 F.4th 1152, 1157 (Ortiz).) Ortiz worked in a warehouse where products would arrive from various locations and be stored until they were shipped to end-use consumers and retailers in various states. (Ibid.) Ortiz’s duties consisted exclusively of warehouse work, including transporting packages to and from storage racks, helping other employees obtain packages so they could be shipped, and assisting other employees in preparing packages for shipment. (Id. at p. 1161.)

Notably, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that similar to plaintiff in Southwest, “Ortiz handled Adidas products near the very heart of their supply chain. In each case, the relevant goods were still moving in interstate commerce when the employee interacted with them, and each employee played a necessary part in facilitating their continued movement.” (Id. at p. 1162.) “Both Ortiz and Saxon fulfilled an admittedly small but nevertheless ‘direct and necessary’ role in the interstate commerce of goods: Saxon ensured that baggage would reach its final destination by taking it on and off planes, while Ortiz ensured that goods would reach their final destination by processing and storing them while they awaited further interstate transport.” (Ibid.) “Both were also ‘actively engaged’ and ‘intimately involved with’ transportation: Saxon handled goods as they journeyed from terminal to plane, plane to plane, or plane to terminal, while Ortiz handled them as they went through the process of entering, temporarily occupying, and subsequently leaving the warehouse—a necessary step in their ongoing interstate journey to their final destination. [Citation.]

Both were actively engaged in the interstate commerce of goods. If Saxon is an exempt transportation worker, Ortiz is, too. (Ibid. [citation omitted].)

Here, Plaintiff contends that the FAA does not apply based on the transportation worker exemption. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his role was “direct and necessary” to ensure that Rivian could transport goods throughout the country and the world. (Opp’n, p. 6:23-28 [citing Lawrence Decl., ¶¶ 12-19].) In his supporting declaration, Plaintiff attests that a “significant portion” of his daily work involved “unloading and loading freight trucks” – approximately 4-6 freight trucks daily. (Lawrence Decl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff states that the inventory that was loaded and unloaded from freight trucks would then

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

be sorted and stored in appropriate places throughout the warehouse; the items included vehicle parts, such as batteries, windows, mirrors, screws, wheel parts, bolts, nuts, and headlights. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff further states that these products would come from “other facilities or vendors from different locations throughout the state, out of state from places like Texas, Michigan, and Georgia, and even from out of the country.” (Ibid.) According to Plaintiff “[t]he majority of the vehicle parts and products I handled on a daily basis were coming into the warehouse from outside of California and being shipped from the warehouse to a different state.” (Id. at ¶ 19.)

However, Plaintiff does not proffer evidence to support that he was “near the very heart” of the supply chain. Plaintiff does not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the relevant goods were still moving in interstate commerce when he interacted with them, and further that he played a necessary part in facilitating their continued movement.

Furthermore, Defendant has proffered evidence in reply suggesting the contrary – Defendant’s Warehouse Supervisor Jordy Sanchez states: “[a]t the time of Plaintiff's employment, the Sacramento warehouse was newly constructed and not yet set up for operation. Accordingly, the majority of Plaintiff's job duties included setting up the interior of the warehouse. This included laying adhesive lines on the warehouse floor to indicate where certain items would be stored, placing signage in the appropriate areas, and installing storage.” (Sanchez Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Sanchez further states: “[d]uring the entirety of Plaintiff's employment, the Sacramento warehouse operated solely with an inbound receiving area used to stock the facility. It did not have an outbound shipping department at any point during Plaintiff's tenure.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that he is an exempt transportation worker, and the Court determines that the FAA applies. In light of this, the Court need not address the Parties’ arguments based upon the inapplicability of the FAA (e.g., that the class action waiver is unenforceable under Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443.)

Waiver of Representative Claims

Pointing to the section “Waiver of Representative Claims,” Plaintiff contends that the provision is unenforceable “as a matter of law.” (Opp’n, p. 8:112-17 [citing Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104].)

As stated above, the “Waiver of Representative Claims,” provides in its entirety: “Unless prohibited by applicable law, the Covered Parties and Employee agree that each may only bring claims against the other only in their individual capacity, and may not file

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

claims as a plaintiff and/or participate or be included in any pending or future representative action against the other.” (Arbitration, p. 2.)

The applicable law prohibits wholesale PAGA waivers, but, where the FAA governs, permits the division of PAGA claims into their individual and non-individual components. (Viking River, (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 662; Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1119.) Therefore, even if the Court were to find that the Arbitration Agreement imposed a wholesale PAGA waiver on Plaintiff, under Viking River the Court is required to sever the wholesale waiver and enforce the agreement insofar as it mandates arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim and because the Arbitration Agreement contains a severability provision (Agreement, p. 4).

In sum, the Court does not find that the Waiver of Representative Claims section is unenforceable, and thus, the Court does not find that the “poison pill” provision in the Arbitration Agreement necessitates denial of Defendant’s motion.

Unconscionability

The Court may refuse to enforce any contract or provision of a contract deemed to be unconscionable. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5.) Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a contract provision to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) “But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards to the regularity of the procedural process of contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’ In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)

Plaintiff has the burden to prove unconscionability. (Jenks, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 8.)

Procedural Unconscionability

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because the contract is one of adhesion.

In the employment context, the inequality of bargaining power between an employee and an employer is sufficient on its own to demonstrate procedural unconscionability in an employment contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (See Stirlen v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533-34.) “[I]n the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure exerted by the employer on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration agreement.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 115.)

Here, it appears that the Arbitration Agreement is adhesive. (See Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 103.) In any event, “cases uniformly agree that a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (2015) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127; see Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 179.) Moreover, “where the arbitration provisions presented in a contract of adhesion are highlighted for the employee, any procedural unconscionability is ‘limited.’” (Serafin, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 179.)

The Court finds a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability. As such, the Court must next turn to whether Plaintiff has established a high degree of substantive unconscionability.

Substantive Unconscionability

Substantive unconscionability “focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” (Kinney, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at 1330 [internal quotations omitted].)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because: (1) it lacks mutuality; (2) it is not subject to expiration after a reasonable amount of time; and (3) the Non-Disclosure and Confidentiality Terms in the Confidentiality and Work Product Assignment (“CWPA”).[1]

a. Mutuality

Primarily relying Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal. App.5th 312, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it lacks mutuality. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff is required to arbitrate claims against Defendant and “myriad other purportedly related individuals and entities”: “Rivian and the Employee agree that any employment-related legal claims or controversies (‘Covered Claims’) between Employee and Rivian, any parent, subsidiary, affiliated or successor company and/or any of its or their supervisors, employees,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

agents, members, directors, officers, partners, shareholders (collectively, ‘Covered Parties’) must be resolved by arbitration instead of the courts . . .” (Agreement, p. 1.)

In reply, Defendant argues that the agreement in Cook was deemed substantively unconscionable because it required the employee to arbitrate claims against a broad set of “related entities,” but did not compel those same entities to arbitrate claims against the employee. (Reply, p. 9:4-11 [citing Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 326].) Here, according to Defendant, the Arbitration Agreement is distinguishable as it expressly requires both Parties to arbitrate claims against each other as it applies to “any employment-related legal claims or controversies (‘Covered Claims’) between Employee and Rivian.” (Id. at p. 12-13 [citing Agreement] [emphasis added].)

The Court finds Defendant’s argument persuasive and determines that this language in the Arbitration Agreement is mutual. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not established any degree of substantive unconscionability on this basis.

b. Duration/Expiration

Plaintiff takes issue with the language in the Arbitration Agreement which states that it: “shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment with Rivian,” without “specifying a manner in which it can be revoked or modified.” (Opp’n, p. 12:13-16 [citing Agreement, p. 4].) Again, relying on Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 325-326, Plaintiff argues that this language would prevent the Arbitration Agreement from terminating or expiring after a reasonable amount of time, and thus, increase the substantive unconscionability present. In reply, Defendant argues to the contrary.

The Ayala-Ventura the court reviewed similar language and arguments:

This more limited potential claims bears on Ayala-Ventura’s claim the Agreement is unconscionable because it is infinite in duration. The Agreement states it “shall survive the termination of [Ayala-Ventura’s] employment. It can only be revoked or modified by a writing signed by [Ayala-Ventura] and the Human Resources Representative of the Company that specifically states an intent to revoke or modify this Arbitration Agreement.” Ayala-Ventura argues this language is substantially the same as the language the Cook court found unconscionable because the agreement survived indefinitely following the plaintiff employee’s termination. Specifically, the agreement in Cook provided it “‘shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment, and may only be revoked or modified in a written document that expressly refers to the “Agreement to Arbitrate Claims”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

and is signed by the President of the University.’” (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Though the Agreement’s language is substantially like that in Cook, we reiterate the importance of context in determining unconscionability. The various potential claims that could arise against USC together with the agreement’s infinite duration made it unconscionable. Ayala-Ventura claims if she were injured in an automobile accident caused by one of CCS’s company vehicles 10 years after her employment, she would be compelled to arbitrate a claim.

But without facts about the number of company vehicles generally in use by CCS, we are unable to assess the probability of this occurrence, which appears speculative at best. Nothing in the record indicates CCS’s operations have anything like the well-known, broad capacity of USC’s reach. Cook could be subject to the arbitration agreement forever in any manner of ways including not just a botched surgery but an injury while attending a USC football game in 15 years. (Ayala-Ventura, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 257-258 [emphasis added].)

The Court finds Ayala-Ventura persuasive. Namely, nothing properly before the Court indicates Defendant’s operations have anything like the well-known, broad capacity of USC’s reach, or that Plaintiff could be subject to the arbitration agreement forever in any manner of ways.

Furthermore, the plain language of the Agreement expressly limits its scope to employment-related claims. Specifically, it provides: “Rivian and the Employee agree that any employment-related legal claims or controversies (‘Covered Claims’) between Employee and Rivian, any parent, subsidiary, affiliated or successor company and/or any of its or their supervisors, employees, agents, members, directors, officers, partners, shareholders (collectively, ‘Covered Parties’) must be resolved by arbitration instead of the courts . . .” (Agreement, p. 1.) Accordingly, the concern identified in Cook, that an employee could be compelled to arbitrate future non-employment-related claims against USC-affiliated entities, such as medical malpractice claims, is not present here because the Agreement is expressly limited to employment-related disputes.

The Court concludes Plaintiff has not established any degree of substantive unconscionability on this ground.

c. Confidentiality and Work Product Assignment

Plaintiff proffers that as part of the onboarding process, he was sent several onboarding documents which included the Arbitration Agreement as well as the Confidentiality and Work Product Assignment (“CWPA”). (Lawrence Decl., ¶ 3; Gold Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

argues that the Arbitration Agreement and the CWPA should be construed together pursuant to Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482 and Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 327. (Opp’n, p. 13:10-23.) With this, pointing to the language in the CWPA, Plaintiff argues that the CWPA prohibits employees from “mak[ing] any independent use of, or disclos[ing] to any other Person” any “Confidential Information,” (Opp’n, p. 13;24-27 [citing Gold Decl., Exh. A (“CWPA”), pp. 1-2 [RIVIAN0000013- RIVIAN000014]].)

Plaintiff argues that the CWPA prohibits the employee from disclosing any information about their own employment to anyone, including in connection with any pending arbitration. (Id. at pp. 13:24-14:4.) For this reason, Plaintiff maintains that the “one-sided” confidentiality provision would impede the employee’s ability to bring a claim in arbitration, and thus, increases the level of substantive unconscionability.

On reply, Defendant does not dispute that the Agreements were signed as part of a single transaction such that they should be construed together. Rather, Defendant contends that any confidential information can still be utilized in arbitration/litigation via a protective order, and further, the confidentiality Agreement includes a section, “Required Disclosure of Confidential Information” which lists circumstances where confidential information can be disclosed such as when the “Individual or any Individual Representative becomes required to do so by an applicable law, regulation or rules, by a court of competent jurisdiction or by any government body.” (Reply, p. 10:19-24 [citing CWPA at p. “RIVIAN000014”].)

The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has established any substantive unconscionability on this ground.

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff has not established any degree of substantive unconscionability.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against Defendant on an individual basis.

Dismissal of Class Claims

Under the FAA, class action waivers are enforceable. (Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 525.) Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims based on the Arbitration Agreement’s class action waiver. (Agreement, p. 2.) For reasons

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV022023: ULYSSES LAWRENCE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES vs RIVIAN, LLC 07/10/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 8A

further discussed above, Plaintiff’s class claims are DISMISSED pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement’s class action waiver.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiff must arbitrate all claims in this Action against Defendant on an individual basis. Plaintiff’s class claims are DISMISSED pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement’s Class Action Waiver. This action is STAYED pending the completion of the arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. All other scheduled hearings in this department are VACATED.

The Parties are to contact the Court and request a Case Management Conference within 15 days of receiving notice of a final decision in the arbitration proceeding.

To request oral argument on this matter, you must call Department 8A at (916) 874- 5754 by 4:00 p.m., the court day before this hearing and notification of oral argument must be made to the opposing party/counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. (Local Rule 1.06.)

If oral argument is requested, the parties may appear by Zoom with the links below:

To join by Zoom link – https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16108301121 To join by phone dial (833) 568-8864 / ID: 16108301121

Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to notice all parties of this order.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order or further notice is necessary.

[1] Plaintiff also argues that the waiver of class claims increases the level of substantive

unconscionability. For reasons further explained above, the Court does not find this persuasive.