Cruz v. Fitts, et al.

2033.280, subd. (b).) To establish this ground, a movant must show: (1) Proper service (CCP Sec.Sec. 2030.080, subd. (a) [interrogatories], 2031.040 [demand to produce]); Sec. 2033.070 [requests for admission]) (2) Expiration of the deadline for the initial response 30 days after service or on date agreed to by parties (CCP Sec.Sec. 2030.260, subds. (a), (b) [interrogatories], 2031.260, subds. (a), (b) [demand to produce] 2033.250, subds. (a), (b) [requests for admission]); and (3) No timely response. (CCP Sec.Sec. 2030.290 [interrogatories], 2031.300 [demand to produce] Sec. 2033.280, subd. (b) [requests for admission]) A court must deny a motion to compel initial discovery where the discovery sought is outside the scope of discovery. (CBS, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19; CCP Sec. 2017.010 [scope of discovery].) The requests for admission were served via mail on March 30, 2026. (Kozinski Decl., Ex. 1.) The deadline to respond was 30 days after service, plus five days for service via mail. (CCP Sec. 1013 subd. (a).) Thus, responses were due on May 4, 2026. As of the date of the hearing on this motion, there is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff has responded to the discovery requests. Thus, the motion is GRANTED.

Request for Sanctions The Court must impose monetary sanctions against anyone--party, nonparty, or attorney--who unsuccessfully makes or opposes the motion, unless it finds that the person to be sanctioned acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make the imposition of the sanctions unjust. (CCP Sec.Sec. 2030.290, subd. (c) [interrogatories], 2031.300, subd. (c) [demand to produce]; Sinaiko, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 404 [interrogatories and demand to produce].) The Court must award sanctions when a party's response to request for admissions is untimely, and the discovering party makes a motion to deem the requests admitted. (CCP, Sec. 2033.280, subd. (c); Appleton, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 635-636 [sanctions are mandatory].) "The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed." (Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)

Even after a party provides discovery responses, a party can keep its motion on calendar and the court has authority to grant sanctions, even if it denies the motion to compel responses "as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part." (Sinaiko, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 409.) The burden is on the party subject to sanctions to show substantial justification or injustice. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990, 2nd Dist.) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436. Defendant requests sanctions in the amount of $900.

The amount requested is reasonable. Accordingly, the request for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $900. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS CCP section 2023.030 permits California courts to impose monetary, issue, evidence, and terminating sanctions for discovery misuses, which are defined by CCP section 2023.010. Discovery sanctions "should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery." (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793.)

Moreover, "[d]iscovery sanctions must be tailored in order to remedy the offending party's discovery abuse, should not give the aggrieved party more than what it is entitled to, and should not be used to punish the offending party." (Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1217.) Terminating sanctions are drastic sanctions that should be imposed sparingly and only when it is clear that the party to be sanctioned has left no viable alternatives. (See Dept. of Forestry & Fire. Prot. v.

Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191 [disapproved on other grounds].) The court should consider the totality of the circumstances before ordering terminating sanctions, including (1) whether the conduct of the party was willful, (2) the detriment to the party propounding discovery, and (3) the

number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery. (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.) The Court is not required to find that a party acted in bad faith before imposing terminating sanctions. (See Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 703.) Defendant moves for an order finding Plaintiff in contempt, and for evidentiary or terminating sanctions for failure to comply with this Court's February 27, 2026 and April 10, 2026 orders that Plaintiff respond to Defendant's discovery requests and remit sanctions. (2/27/2026 Minute Order; 4/10/2026 Minute Order.)

Defendant asserts that despite this Court's rulings, Plaintiff has failed to respond to the discovery requests or remit the Court ordered sanctions. (Semos Decl., P. 8.) The motion is unopposed, and thus there is no explanation for Plaintiff's failure to produce the discovery or comply with the sanctions previously ordered, nor has Plaintiff presented any argument against imposition of the requested sanctions. The Court finds that Plaintiff's failure to respond to the discovery requests and failure to comply with the Court's orders requiring responses constitutes a misuse of the discovery process.

Thus, the Court finds that monetary sanctions are warranted. Terminating sanctions are not appropriate here because there is no evidence before the Court that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules. Terminating sanctions are an extreme remedy. The Court is not inclined to grant the ultimate sanction at this juncture. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff's initial failure to respond to the discovery requests, followed by Plaintiff's subsequent failure to comply with the Court's orders, marks the beginning of a pattern of misuse of the discovery process.

Continued violations are likely to establish a "history of abuse" justifying the imposition of more severe sanctions, including terminating sanctions. (See Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280.)¿¿ Defendant requests sanctions in the amount of $1,530. The amount requested is slightly high given that the hearings on the motions are scheduled concurrently, require minimal preparation and can be attended remotely. The sanctions are adjusted accordingly. Sanctions are awarded as follows: The Court reduces attorney hours to 5 hours at $210 per hour with total attorneys fees of $1,050.

RULING: Defendant's Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted is GRANTED. The admissions are deemed ADMITTED as true. Monetary sanctions sought by the moving party: Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $900.00 (4.0 hours @ $210.00/hour) [4.0 hours requested] plus $60.00 in filing fees [Amount Requested $900.00], which sum is to be awarded in favor of Defendant Nicholas Robert Fitts and against Plaintiff Heennssy Cruz payable within 15 days. (CCP, Sec. 2033.280, subd. (c); CRC Rule 3.1348(a).)

Defendant's Motion for Contempt of Order, and Evidentiary or Termination Sanctions is GRANTED, in part. The request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. The requests to hold Plaintiff in contempt and for terminating sanctions are DENIED. Monetary sanctions sought by the moving party: Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,050.00 (5 hours @ $210.00/hour) [7.0 hours requested] plus $60.00 in filing fees [Amount Requested $1,530.00], which sum is to be awarded in favor of Defendant Nicholas Robert Fitts and against Plaintiff Heennssy Cruz payable within 15 days. (CCP, Sec. 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Counsel for moving party is ordered to prepare an order for sanctions and submit it on eCourt by noon today in accordance with this ruling. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES If you wish to appear remotely on LACourtConnect, you may register by visiting www.lacourt.ca.gov to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department

D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Case Number: 25NNCV01179 Hearing Date: August 14, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 3 Date: August 14, 2026 Case No: 25NNCV01179 Trial Date: January 11, 2027 Case Name: Ventura v. Toyota Motor Sales, et al. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES [CCP Sec. 1794 subd. (d)] Moving Party: Plaintiff, Jhonatan Ventura Responding Party: Defendant, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc RELIEF REQUESTED: Order awarding attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $46,386.52, comprised of attorneys' fees of $44,862.50 and costs of $1,524.02.

CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended Complaint 1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Sec. 1793.2(d) 2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Sec. 1793.2(b) 3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act - Breach of Express Warranty 4) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act - Breach of Implied Warranty SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Jhonatan Venture ("Plaintiff") alleges that in February of 2024, Plaintiff leased a new Toyota Tundra 4wd from Toyota of Pasadena.

The complaint alleges that defendant Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. ("Defendant") issued to Plaintiff express warranties, in which Defendant promised against defects in materials and workmanship and undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. Plaintiff alleges that subsequent to Plaintiff's purchase, the vehicle exhibited numerous defects and nonconformities covered by the warranties which substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the vehicle.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant or its authorized repair facilities have failed to begin repairs in a reasonable time and complete repairs on the vehicle within thirty days so as to conform the vehicle to the applicable warranties, and defendant has been unable to conform the vehicle to warranty after multiple failed repair attempts and failed inspections. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has failed to repair or replace the vehicle or provide restitution. ANALYSIS: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (CCP, Sec. 1032 subd. (b).)

Attorney fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute or law. (CCP, Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. Civil Code section 1794 states: "If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action." (Civil Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).)

Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees The parties here do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party pursuant to a January 22, 2026, Settlement Agreement which provides for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses to be determined by noticed motion. (David Decl., P. 4, Ex. 1.) Thus, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees.