Motion to tax costs
Court is precluded from granting the relief requested on this ground alone. Even if Plaintiff were to demonstrate adequate proof of service, the motion would be denied on substantive grounds.
Substantive "The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." (CCP, Sec. 473, subd. (b).) The application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, "in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceedings was taken." (CCP, Sec. 473, subd. (b).)
As a preliminary matter, although titled as a "Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment," substantively, this is a motion for a new trial, or otherwise a motion for reconsideration of the prior orders denying Plaintiff's motions for new trial. Plaintiff refers to CCP section 657, which prescribes the grounds for new trial. (Mot., p. 2; CCP, Sec. 657, subds. (1)-(7)). In addition, the motion "is based on procedural irregularities and issues that affected [Plaintiff's] ability to properly participate in the case and present [his] defense." (Mot., p. 2.) This argument is directed to the grounds for a new trial under CCP section 657, not to a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect that would support relief from the judgment under CCP section 473.
Moreover, the Notice of Entry of Judgment was served on May 20, 2025. Plaintiff did not file the instant motion until April 28, 2026, well beyond the six-month statutory deadline for seeking relief under CCP section 473.
More importantly, the Court repeatedly has considered and denied the arguments Plaintiff asserts in this motion. On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which the Court denied on August 29, 2025. (8/29/2025 Minute Order.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration on September 8, 2025, which the Court denied on October 10, 2025. (10/10/2025 Minute Order.) Plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration on October 16, 2025, which the Court denied with prejudice on November 26, 2025. (11/26/2025 Minute Order.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed two additional motions for a new trial. Both motions were taken off calendar because they had been improperly filed before judges who did not preside over the trial. (1/27/2026 Minute Order; 2/26/2026 Minute Order.) Plaintiff then filed yet another motion for new trial, which the Court properly construed as a motion for reconsideration, and denied for the same reasons as articulated in the prior orders. (4/2/2026 Minute Order.)
Plaintiff has already received multiple rulings setting forth the procedural and substantive reasons the requested relief cannot be granted. The instant motion presents no new facts, law, or arguments that would justify revisiting those determinations or reaching a different result. The motion is DENIED.
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RULING: Plaintiff Gonzalo Pina Reynaga's Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment is DENIED.
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Case Number: 23GDCV02547 Hearing Date: August 14, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 13 Date: August 14, 2026 Case No: 23GDCV02547 Trial Date: n/a Case Name: Valdes v. KIA America, Inc., et al. MOTION TO TAX COSTS [CRC, rule 3.1700(b)] Moving Party: Defendant, Kia America, Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff, Mirla Valdes
RELIEF REQUESTED: Tax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs seeking $15,865.27 by $10,080.67, for a total reduced cost award of $5,784.60.
CAUSES OF ACTION: from Complaint 1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Express Warranty 2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty 3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2
SUMMARY OF FACTS: Mirla Valdes ("Plaintiff") alleges that on October 20, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Kia Sorento for which Kia America, Inc. ("Defendant") issued express warranties. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was delivered with defects and nonconformities to warranties and that other defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the express warranty period. The Complaint alleges that notwithstanding Plaintiff's entitlement, Defendant has failed to either promptly replace the new motor vehicle or to promptly make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.
ANALYSIS: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (CCP, Sec. 1032, subd. (b).) A non-prevailing party may dispute any or all of the items in the prevailing party's costs memorandum by a motion to strike or tax costs. (CRC, rule 3.1700(b).) CCP section 1033.5 subdivision (a) sets forth the items allowable as costs and Section 1033.5 subdivision (b) details the items that are not allowable as costs.
"If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion." (Acosta v. SI Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.) Costs must be both "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation" (CCP, Sec. 1033.5 subd. (c)(1)) and reasonable in amount. (CCP, Sec. 1033.5 subd. (c)(2).)
If the items on a verified memorandum of costs appear to be permitted by statute, the "'verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety' of the items listed on it, and the burden is on the party challenging these costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary." (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486.) To meet the burden, the losing party must present evidence and prove that the costs are not recoverable. (See Litt v. Eisenhower Medical Center¿(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224.)¿¿
Song-Beverly allows a successful plaintiff to recover both "costs" and "expenses." (Civil Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).) Courts have held that "it is clear the Legislature intended the word 'expenses' to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of 'costs."' (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.) The court in Jensen held that "[t]he legislative history indicates the Legislature exercised its power to permit the recovery of expert witness fees by prevailing buyers under the Act ...," noting that the legislature included "expenses" in the lemon law act because '"[t]he addition of awards of "costs and expenses" by the court to the consumer to cover such out-of-pocket expenses as filing fees, expert witness fees, marshall's fees, etc., should open the litigation process to everyone.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs request a total of $15,865.27in litigation costs and expenses. (Haroutunian Decl., Ex. A [Memo of Costs].) Defendant seeks to tax certain of Plaintiff's requested costs on grounds that the amounts claimed are not reasonable.
Deposition Costs Defendant objects to $4,167.05 in deposition costs on grounds that certain transcription costs and additional charges were not necessary and are thus not recoverable under CCP section 1033.5. (Mot., p. 3:1-12.) Specifically, Defendant objects to "Plaintiff's deposition transcript of $1,591.30, Darell Blasjo's deposition transcript of $1,810.55, the Exhibit fees of $477.40 associated with the deposition transcript for KA's Expert Jeffrey Richards, and the $200.00 emergency add-on, $43.55 exhibit fees, and $35.00 processing and handling associated with the deposition transcript of KA's Person Most Knowledgeable." (Reply., p. 3:20-23.) Defendant argues that the expedited, convenience, summary, electronic, logistics, litigation-package, and similar add-on charges were merely convenient for counsel, as opposed to reasonably necessary to the litigation. (Reply., p. 4:9-10.)
Costs incurred in taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions are expressly allowable under CCP section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3). The Court does not find that the transcription costs or the corresponding exhibit or processing and handling fees are unreasonable. However, the $200 emergency add-on fee was not reasonably necessary to the litigation. Thus, the Court will strike the deposition costs in the amount of $200.
Service of Process Defendant objects to $282.25 in service of process fees for subpoenas directed to the dealership although no witness from the dealership was ever deposed. (Mot., p. 3:26-28.) Defendant also objects to the subpoena fees on the basis that Plaintiff served two identical subpoenas and that the charges are duplicative. (Mot., p. 4:3-11.) A party's entitlement to recover service of process fees does not depend on using the subpoenaed documents or calling the witness at trial. (CCP, Sec. 1033.5 subd. (a)(4); Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 694.) In addition, upon review of the invoices, the charges are for separate items and are not duplicative. Thus, the Court declines to strike the service of process costs.
Expert Fees Defendant next objects to $3,257.66 for expert witness costs on grounds that expert fees not ordered by the court are not allowable as costs under CCP section 1033.5 subdivision (b)(1). (Mot., p. 4:15-22.) This argument is not persuasive. Under Civil Code section 1794, expert witness fees are recoverable. (See also Jensen, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 138.) Defendant also argues that the Court should strike these fees because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the time and hourly rates charged by the expert are reasonable. (Mot., p. 4:16-17.) Plaintiff submits invoices substantiating the witness fees. (Decl., pp. 53-58.) Thus, the Court declines to strike the expert witness costs.
Interpreter Fees Defendant next objects to $2,070.00 in interpreter fees because under CCP section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(12), court interpreter fees are only recoverable if they are authorized by the court for an indigent person represented by a qualified legal services project, or a pro bono attorney, which is not the case here. (Mot., pp. 4:24-27.) The Court finds that interpreter fees fairly fall under the more expansive costs and expenses allowed under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d).
In the reply, Defendant argues that the interpreter fees sought exceed the amounts allowed by the Payment Policies for Independent Contractor Interpreters, published by the Judicial Council. (Reply, p. 5:9-26.) The rates set forth in the Judicial Council's Payment Policies for Independent Contractor Interpreters apply to interpreters retained and paid by California courts using state budget funds from the Trial Court Trust Fund. This scenario does not apply here. Thus, the Court declines to strike the interpreter costs.
Other Costs Defendant objects to $275.05 for CAP and courtesy copies for a Case Management Statement, Notice of Settlement of the Entire Case, and Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant's Designation of Records as Confidential. (Mot., p. 5:10-12.) Defendant also objects to $28.66 for travel expenses. (Mot., p. 5:17-22.) This Court requires courtesy copies for ex parte applications and motions. However, the costs incurred to deliver courtesy copies for other filings, such as the Case Management Statement and Notice of Settlement, were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that the local travel costs were necessary to conduct the litigation, as opposed to being merely convenient. Thus, the Court will strike the "Other" costs in the amount of $163.41.
In total, the Court strikes the claimed costs by $363.41, and awards costs in the reduced amount of $15,501.86. Thus, the motion to tax costs is GRANTED, IN PART.
RULING: Defendant Kia America, Inc.'s Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED, IN PART. The Court finds that reasonable costs and expenses are $15,501.86 [$15,865.27 sought]. Total costs of $15,501.86 are to be awarded to Plaintiff Mirla Valdes against Defendant Kia America, Inc. and added to the judgment. Counsel for moving party is ordered to prepare an order and submit it on eCourt by noon today in accordance with this order.
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Case Number: 24NNCV00085 Hearing Date: August 14, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 7 Date: August 14, 2026 Case No: 24NNCV00085 Trial Date: n/a Case Name: National Commercial Recovery, Inc. v. The Hub Food Management Company, et al. MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT [CCP Sec. 664.6] Moving Party: Plaintiff, National Commercial Recovery, Inc. ("Plaintiff") Responding Party: Defendants, The Hub Management Company, et al.
RELIEF REQUESTED: An order entering judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $598,466.55.
CAUSES OF ACTION: from Complaint 1) Open Book Account 2) Common Counts 3) Account Stated
SUMMARY OF FACTS: The Complaint alleges that beginning on April 12, 2023, and continuing through on or about December 22, 2023, Defendants ordered wholesale bakery products from Plaintiff's Assignor, which Plaintiff's Assignor delivered to Defendants at Defendants' request on an open book account, whereby defendants became indebted to Plaintiff's Assignor in the net principal amount of $585,595.00.
ANALYSIS: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement." (CCP, Sec. 664.6, subd. (a).)
Strict compliance with the statutory requirements is necessary before a court can enforce a settlement agreement under this statute. (Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v. Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37.) The party seeking to enforce a settlement "must first establish the agreement at issue was set forth 'in a writing signed by the parties' (Sec. 664.6) or was made orally before the court." (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 304.)
In support of the motion, Plaintiff attaches a copy of the Stipulation for Conditional Settlement (the "Settlement"), executed by the parties on March 19, 2026. (Besnyl Decl., Ex. A.) The pertinent terms are as follows: