Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Entry of Default and Default Judgment and Quash Service
received by that date. (Brown Decl. P. 12.) On June 17, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff reached out to counsel for Mehta in an attempt to resolve the matter. Mehta's counsel responded, and Plaintiff agreed to a 1-week extension to facilitate Mehta providing verified, substantive responses to the RFA. (Brown Decl. P.P. 13-15.) As of July 15, 2026, when Plaintiff's counsel signed the declaration in support of the motion, no such responses had been received. (Brown Decl. P. 19.) However, as explained in the attorney Declaration of Daniel A.
Fonda filed on August 13, 2026 in connection with Mehta's ex parte application for relief from default, Fonda was engaged only for a limited scope representation of Mehta, that did not include general discovery practice. (See Fonda Decl. P. 2 and Ex. A thereto; see also Notice of Limited Scope Representation filed May 15, 2025 [requiring all service be effectuated on both Fonda and Mehta directly at the address provided].) As such, service of the RFA on Fonda did not effectuate service on Mehta.
Moreover, the Court finds that the Motion was not served on Mehta. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion as procedurally defective. II. Sanctions Plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Mehta in the amount of $3,960, representing six and a half (6.5) hours of time incurred preparing the instant motion at an hourly rate of $600, plus the $60 filing fee for the motion. (Brown Decl. P. 22.) However, because the Court denies Plaintiff's request to deem the matters admitted, due to lack of proper service, the Court similarly denies Plaintiff's request for sanctions.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER Because neither the RFA nor the Motion was not properly served on Mehta, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion in its entirety. Plaintiff shall provide notice of this ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: August 17, 2026 _________/s/__________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court
DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE August 17, 2026 CASE NUMBER 25SMCV04654 MOTION Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Entry of Default and Default Judgment and Quash Service
MOVING PARTIES Defendants Slower, LLC and Rikin Shah OPPOSING PARTY Plaintiff KinectHQ, LLC MOTION This case arises from a dispute concerning employment placement services. On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff KinectHQ, LLC ("Plaintiff") filed suit against Defendants Slower, LLC ("Slower") and Rikin Shah ("Shah") ("Defendants"), alleging four causes of action for (1) breach of oral contract; (2) breach of implied in fact contract; (3) quantum meruit; and (4) fraud. Defendants were served with a copy of the summons and complaint by substitute service on October 21, 2025, and Defaults were entered on December 5, 2025.
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On April 14, 2026, the Court entered judgment against Defendants. Defendants now move to set aside/vacate the default judgment and entries of default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) as a void judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction and to quash the service of summons Code of Civil Procedure pursuant to section 418.10. Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants reply. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendants request judicial notice of the following: Exhibit 1: Proof of Service of Summons on Rikin Shah and Declaration of Diligence, filed by plaintiff KinectHQ, LLC in this action on December 1, 2025 Exhibit 2: Proof of Service of Summons on Slower, LLC and Declaration of Diligence, filed by plaintiff KinectHQ, LLC in this action on December 3, 2025 Judicial notice may be taken of records of any court in this state. (Evid.
Code, Sec. 452, subd. (d)(1).) Because the proofs of service are part of the Court's record for this case, the Court may take judicial notice of them. (Ibid.) However, "while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof." (Lockley v.
Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882 [cleaned up].) Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence, filing, and legal consequences of the proofs of service filed in this matter as court records, but not the truth of the
allegations contained therein. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The Court does not rule on the parties' evidentiary objections, as it has not relied on any of the evidence objected to. ANALYSIS "The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (d).)
In determining whether an order is void for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), courts distinguish between orders that are void on the face of the record and orders that appear valid on the face of the record but are shown to be invalid through consideration of extrinsic evidence. This distinction may be important in a particular case because it impacts the procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment [or order], when the judgment [or order] may be attacked, and how the party challenging the judgment [or order] proves that the judgment [or order] is void.
An order is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence. There is no time limit to attack a judgment void on its face. If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order is not void on its face. Such an order must be challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity. (Pittman v.
Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020-1021 [cleaned up] (hereafter Pittman).) Defendants argue that the judgment is void because the summons was served on a WeWork receptionist in an office space Defendants shared, who informed the process server that the receptionist was not authorized to accept service of process on behalf of Defendants. Indeed, this information appears on the face of both the proofs of service, indicating that service was effectuated on "Jane Doe-Receptionist with WeWork" and the Declarations of Diligence "Per employee with WeWork, not authorized to accept service[.]" (RJN Ex. 1-2.)
Further, the Shah Declaration indicates: 2. Slower rents office space from WeWork in the 12-story building located at 2211 Michelson Drive, Irvine, CA 92612.
3. Slower occupies a single suite in WeWork's 71,076 square-feet office space, along with many other tenants.
4. WeWork has no involvement in Slower's
business.
5. WeWork's receptionists are not Slower's employees and are not authorized to accept service on behalf of Slower or me personally. Slower and WeWork do not share any employees.
6. I did not receive the summons and complaint in this action from anyone at WeWork.
7. The summons and complaint in this action were not served on me at my residence. (Shah Decl. P.P. 2-7.) Notwithstanding, it is not apparent, either from the face of the proofs of service or the Shah declaration that such service was defective or otherwise improper. In lieu of personal delivery of the summons and complaint, service may be effectuated "by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in the person's office [...] with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where the copy of the summons and complaint were left." (Code Civ.
Proc., Sec. 415.20, subd. (a).) Although WeWork is undeniably a separate company from Slower, WeWork apparently rents office spaces to various businesses, which Shah's declaration confirms. (Shah Decl. P.P. 2-3.) Thus, the WeWork receptionist staffing the offices is "the person who is apparently in charge thereof[.]" It does not matter that the receptionist indicated they are not authorized to accept service on behalf of Slower. The Proof of Service did not purport to effectuate personal service on an authorized agent of Slower.
It evidences substitute service on the person apparently in charge of the office where Slower is located and where Shah works. Thus, like Lee v. Yan (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 975, cited by Plaintiff, Defendants have not overcome the presumption of proper service. This is not a situation like Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1048 where the summons was left with a random bus washer employed by another entity that operated out of the same location, who was obviously not "apparently in charge" of the entity being served.
The summons here was not left with a lower-level employee of one of the other companies operating out of the building; it was validly left with the WeWork receptionist for the offices, identifying herself as such. That person is "apparently in charge" if not actually in charge of the offices. CONCLUSION Therefore, finding Defendants have failed to rebut the presumption of proper service, the Court denies Defendants' motion in its entirety.
The Clerk of the Court shall provide notice of the Court's ruling. DATED: August 17, 2026 _______/s/____________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 26SMCV02765 Hearing Date: August 17, 2026 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT | 207 | HEARING DATE | August 17, 2026 | CASE NUMBER | 26SMCV02765 | MOTION | Preserve Evidence | MOVING PARTY | Plaintiff Alanna Zabel | OPPOSING PARTY | none | MOTION This case arises from allegations that Plaintiff was injured when she was unknowingly a cup of scalding hot water.
On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff Alanna Zabel ("Plaintiff") filed suit against Defendant Co-opportunity Market "Co-opportunity Consumers Cooperative, Inc." ("Defendant") alleging four causes of action for (1) negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff personally served Defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint on June 5, 2026, and Default was entered on July 16, 2026.