Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint
alleged facts in the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently state facts constituting Song-Beverly causes of action based on a lack of standing. Although Plaintiffs appear to generally allege that they collectively leased the Vehicle, the Court notes that Plaintiffs also specifically allege that the Vehicle "was leased in the name of ACE." (FAC P. 9.) In addition, though Plaintiffs generally allege that the Lease qualifies for protection under the Act as "a small business vehicle," Plaintiffs inconsistently and specifically allege that the Vehicle was leased for "personal, family, and/or household purposes" by them and "that it was used at all times mentioned herein primarily for personal, family, or household purposes by the individual Plaintiffs." (Ibid.) "Where a pleading includes a general allegation, such as an allegation of an ultimate fact, as well as specific allegations that add details or explanatory facts, it is possible that a conflict or inconsistency will exist between the general allegation and the specific allegations.
To handle these contradictions, California courts have adopted the principle that specific allegations in a complaint control over an inconsistent general allegation." (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235-1236.) Thus, as the general allegations regarding Plaintiffs collectively leasing the Vehicle and their characterization of it as a small business vehicle must give way to the specific allegations that the Vehicle's lease was executed in the name of ACE for "personal, family, and/or household purposes" and that the Vehicle was used "at all times mentioned herein primarily for personal, family, or household purposes" by Esmaeili and Nazarian, (FAC P. 9), the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently stated facts in the FAC establishing their standing to bring express and implied warranty claims as "lessees" with equivalent rights to "buyers" under the Act. (Perez, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236 ["Under this principle, it is possible that specific allegations will render a complaint defective when the general allegations, standing alone, might have been sufficient."].)
Therefore, as there exists no reasonable possibility of stating a good cause of action without creating a sham pleading, the demurrer to the FAC is sustained without leave to amend. RULING Defendant's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
August 14, 2026 Case Name: Ella Mirimanova vs. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, a New Jersey Corporation, et al. Case No.: 26NNCV03140 Motion: Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint Moving Party: Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, and Galpin Land Rover
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Responding Party: None Tentative Ruling: Overrule BACKGROUND On April 22, 2026, Plaintiff Ella Mirimanova ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Galpin Motors, Inc. dba Galpin Land Rover, and Does 1 through 20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Express Warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; and (4) negligent repair.
Defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, and Galpin Motors, Inc dba Galpin Land Rover ("Defendants") now demur to the fourth cause of action. No opposition was filed. MOVING PARTY POSITION Defendants argue that Plaintiff's negligent repair claim fails as matter of law because the complaint lacks specific details regarding the alleged negligence and because the claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. OPPOSITION No opposition was filed. REPLY No reply was filed. ANALYSIS I.
Legal Standard
A. Demurrer A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. Sec.Sec. 422.10, 589; see, also, Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)
The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) "All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action." (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)¿ In a demurrer, the court "may also look to exhibits attached to the complaint for operative facts. [Citation.]
And
because the 'allegations that we accept as true necessarily include the contents of any exhibits attached to the complaint, ... in the event of a conflict between the pleading and an exhibit, the facts contained in the exhibit take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary allegations in the pleading.' [Citation.]" (Nealy v. County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 596-97.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, "[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend." (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.) II. Meet and Confer Based on the declaration of Defendants' counsel Bryan Roth, it does not appear that counsel for the parties met and conferred in person, via telephone, or by video conference. (See Roth Decl.
P. 2.) Nevertheless, "[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) III.
Discussion
A claim for negligence requires the following elements: (1) a legal duty of care owed to a plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) the damages to plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.) "Ordinarily, negligence may be pleaded in general terms and the plaintiff need not specify the precise act or omission alleged to constitute the breach of duty." (Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.) Although there are limits to the generality with which a plaintiff is permitted to plead this cause of action, "negligence may be alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how the injury occurred." (Berkley v.
Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.) However, a plaintiff must allege "the plaintiff must indicate the acts or omissions which are said to have been negligently performed." (Ibid.) In liberally construing the alleged facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a cause of action for negligent repair based on the alleged negligent attempts by Galpin Land Rover to repair her vehicle. (Compl. P.P. 11-15, 64-68.) Although Defendants argue that the negligence allegations are not sufficiently pleaded due to a lack of specific details, Plaintiff alleges that she delivered the vehicle to Galpin Land Rover for repairs on numerous occasions since September of 2023 and that Galpin Land Rover failed to properly repair the malfunctioning components of the vehicle in accordance with
industry standards, resulting in damages to Plaintiff. (Ibid.) While the far from a model pleading, the Court finds that the complaint sufficiently states all the elements of a negligent repair cause of action under the applicable standards. Nor does the economic loss rule bar this claim, as a negligent failure to perform services under a contract may give rise to tort liability, including the negligent repair of a vehicle that is subject to a warranty. "A contract to perform services gives rise to a duty of care which requires that such services be performed in a competent and reasonable manner.
A negligent failure to do so may be both a breach of contract and a tort. [Citation.] In such a hybrid circumstance, the plaintiff is entitled to pursue both legal theories until an occasion for an election of remedies arises." (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1056 [quoting North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764].) Accordingly, it is not apparent on the face of the pleadings that Plaintiff's negligent repair claim is barred by the economic loss rule.
Therefore, the demurrer is overruled. RULING Defendants' Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint is OVERRULED. Defendants to file their answers to the complaint within 20 days. | Home -->)" -->