Anahit Arakelyan, individually, et al. vs. Raymond Shirvanyan, et al.

It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)

"All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action." (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)

"A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures." (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822 [quoting Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616].)

Demurrers "for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond." (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3, internal quotations omitted; accord Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

"A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge." (Chen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 822.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)

The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.)

However, "[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend." (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.)

II. Meet and Confer

Based on the declaration of Defendant's counsel S. Calvin Myung, it does not appear that counsel for the parties met and conferred in person, via telephone, or by video conference. (See Myung Decl., at p. 1.)

Nevertheless, "[a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 430.41, subd. (a)(4).)

III.

Discussion

A. Statute of Limitations

Code of Civil Procedure section 338(g) provides that "[a]n action for slander of title to real property" must be commenced within three years.

The discovery rule applies to this limitations period for slander of title causes of action. (Arthur v. Davis (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 684, 692.)

"A cause of action for slander of title accrues, and the statute begins to run, when plaintiff could reasonably be expected to discover the existence of the claim." (Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1230.)

"In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 [quoting McMahon v. Republic Van & Storage Co., Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 871, 874].)

Although the statute of limitations is generally raised as an affirmative defense by a defendant, "when a plaintiff relies on the discovery rule or allegations of fraudulent concealment, as excuses for an apparently belated filing of a complaint, the burden of pleading and proving belated discovery of a cause of action falls on the plaintiff." (Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 174, internal quotes omitted [quoting Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533].)

"More specifically, to overcome an apparent limitations bar, the plaintiff claiming delayed discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action has the burden of setting forth pleaded facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (Czajkowski, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 175, internal quotes omitted [quoting E-Fab, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1324].)

"When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a case [sic] of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in this case, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable conclusion." (Broberg v. The Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 912, 921.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is the widow of decedent Andranik Ayvazyan and that, prior to his death, she and the decedent held title to real property located at 1551 Cleveland Road, Glendale, CA 91202, identified as APN:5629-007-009 (the "Property"). (Compl. P.P. 2, 10.)

They allegedly acquired title to the Property on February 10, 2010, as reflected by the Grant Deed that was recorded on March 11, 2010. (Id. P. 12, Exh. C.)

Following their acquisition of title, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fraudulently arranged for the sale of the Property without their knowledge or consent, resulting in the transfer of title to the Property to Shirvanyan on August 1, 2013, as well as the subsequent transfer of this title from Shirvanyan to AR Cleveland LLC on May 27, 2016. (Id. P.P. 13-25.)

The corresponding grant deeds for each of these transfers were recorded on September 12, 2013, and June 1, 2026, respectively. (See id. P. 14, Exh. C; id. P. 16, Exh. E.)

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Shirvanyan executed a Deed of Trust on September 6, 2013, for a loan in the amount of $800,000.00 that was secured against the Property. (Id. P. 15.)

This deed of trust was recorded on September 12, 2013, the same day as the grant deed. (See id. P. 15, Exh. D.)

Although the discovery rule may toll the running of the limitations period for Plaintiff's slander of title cause of action, as this cause of action otherwise clearly and affirmatively appears to be barred by the three year limitations period based on the dates of each recorded instrument, Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts establishing the time and manner of her discovery of this cause of action, as well as the her inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (Czajkowski, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.)

Despite asserting that she only recently discovered the sale of the Property in 2025 due to her residence in Armenia between 2012 and 2024 and her reliance on Defendant to manage several properties throughout this period, Plaintiff failed to set forth any such factual allegations in her complaint. (See generally Compl.)

Given the lack of sufficient facts establishing delayed discovery, the demurrer to the slander of title cause of action is sustained.

Likewise, as "[a]n action against a notary public on the notary public's bond or in the notary public's official capacity except that a cause of action based on malfeasance or misfeasance is not deemed to have accrued until discovery, by the aggrieved party or the aggrieved party's agent, of the facts constituting the cause of action," (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 338, subd. (f)(1)), and as Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts establishing delayed discovery based on Defendant's malfeasance, the demurrer to the action on a notary bond is sustained.

Thus, as these defects appear to be curable, and as a reasonable possibility of stating a good cause of action for slander of title exists, the demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action is sustained with leave to amend.

RULING

Defendant Arsine Mkrtchyan 's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Case Number: 26NNCV02321 Hearing Date: August 14, 2026 Dept: T

Melonia Esmaeili, et al. vs. BMW of North America, LLC, et al. Demurrer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint Moving Party: Defendant BMW of North America, LLC Responding Party: Plaintiffs Melonia Esmaeili, Arbel Nazarian, and ACE Nail Lounge Tentative Ruling: Sustain

BACKGROUND

On March 30, 2026, Plaintiffs Melonia Esmaeili ("Esmaeili"), Arbel Nazarian ("Nazarian"), and ACE Nail Lounge ("ACE") ("Plaintiffs") filed a complaint against Defendants BMW of North America, LLC ("Defendant"), BMW/MINI of Monrovia, Does 1 through 50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act (the "Act"); and (2) breach of implied warranty obligations under the Act.

On May 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint ("FAC"), alleging the same causes of action against these defendants.

This action arises from lease of a 2024 BMW X5, bearing vehicle identification number ("VIN") 5UX13EU01R9W04408 (the "Vehicle"), on April 18, 2024 (the "Lease").

Defendant now demurs to the FAC based on Plaintiffs' lack of standing.