Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Stanislaus County - Civil - https://www.stanislaus.courts.ca.gov/online-services/tentative-rulings/civil-tentati ve-rulings Civil Tentative Rulings August 13, 2026 The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:
CV-25-003433 - TORRES, CANDIDO RODRIGUEZ vs STANISLAUS COUNTY - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - GRANTED. Based on both the parties' arguments and the Court-raised issue that the notice of rejection was sent after legal rejection was made, the case was filed untimely and the six-month statute of limitations applies. As such, County's motion is granted. Further the risk management firm had no legal authority even if agreed to by the County to do anything unilaterally other than reject because the 45-day statutory deadline had passed.
All objections are OVERRULED. The Court does not consider any legal conclusions reached by the declarants and bases any conclusions on the documents themselves and not on declarants' interpretations of them. The Request for Judicial Notice is denied as moot, as I believe it is unnecessary in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile (1902) 186 U.S. 212, 217.)
In this case, Plaintiff Rodriguez Torres crashed on April 11, 2023, allegedly due to a defect in the road, and he and his wife Plaintiff Rodriguez presented a claim to the County on October 6, 2023. Notices of rejection were mailed by County contractor George Hills on April 3, 2024. Plaintiff filed suit on April 11, 2025. Government Code section 945.6 provides for a six-month statute of limitations after receiving a denial, but a two-year statute from the date of the event if no denial is sent.
Government Code section 912.4 holds that the claim was deemed to have been rejected 45 days after its submission when no action was taken. While the county was well past the 45-day limit for their rejection, Katelaris v. County of Orange (2001) 92 Cal.App.4 th 1211 shortens the time to six months from the time of rejection even under these circumstances. Tardy notice of rejection only delays the start of the six-month clock.
Plaintiffs argue that because the board or an authorized employee did not send the rejection letter, it is of no import. But in fact the rejection letter complies with statutory notice; even though the outside contractor apparently believed it was rejecting the claim at that point, the claim had already been rejected by operation of law. The contractor's notice is likely sufficient in any event. Even assuming the County did no investigation and did nothing, the notice requirement is designed to provide Plaintiffs with the specific information on when the time for filing the suit would expire.
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This notice did so, and the contractor had both apparent and actual authority to send the letter. Plaintiffs were on notice of the requirements to sue within six months of the rejection, and did not do so. Such a failure is jurisdictional and the motion must be granted. The Court does not reach the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the County to show compliance with (apparent) statutory requirements that it be the County, not a contractor, who considers whether to accept or reject claims.
If it did, it would conclude that the evidence submitted by the County is sufficient to overcome any presumption that it did not.
CV-25-005600 - MILLS, MICHAEL vs CITY OF MODESTO - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - DENIED.
Evidentiary objections: Plaintiff's objections: OVERRULED. Goes to weight, not admissibility. OVERRULED. The Court does not appear to have these pages of the deposition. SUSTAINED. SECOND 3. SUSTAINED. Even if overruled, the Court would consider the apparent overbreadth of the sworn claims. OVERRULED. OVERRULED. OVERRULED.
Defendant's objections: To Walsh declaration: OVERRULED. "One or more," is not necessarily "multiple." 2.-7. OVERRULED. Dr. Walsh's declaration contains much boilerplate language, but appears to reference the specific defects at the location.
8. OVERRULED.
9. OVERRULED.
10. OVERRULED.
11. OVERRULED.
12. OVERRULED. To Robyn Mills declaration: 13. OVERRULED.
14. OVERRULED.
15. OVERRULED.
16. SUSTAINED on foundational grounds. To Michael Mills declaration: 17. OVERRULED.
18. OVERRULED.
19. SUSTAINED as to "trip and fall hazard," only.
Procedural notes: The Court granted Plaintiff's request for additional time for discovery and to address defects in its initial filings. No additional information was provided and the defects in the Wong declaration were repaired.
Factual Summary: Plaintiff fell on an area of the sidewalk which had cracks, and raised asphalt. The cracks appear to be safely less than an inch high. The height of the raised asphalt is not entirely clear to me. I have reviewed the photographs and evidence. Plaintiff testified that he stumbled on a crack and then hit the slightly raised asphalt and fell. Defendant asserts two grounds for its motion. The first is triviality, which at this stage the Court rejects for the reasons outlined below. The second is lack of notice, which is partially based on sworn statements which are inconsistent with other sworn statements by the same people and is not well-taken.
Triviality Government Code Sec.830.2 defines "excluded conditions" as those that a trier of fact determines are of "such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances" that, when the property is foreseeably used with due care, the risk of injury created would not be substantial." Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5 th 102 is instructive. In Stack, the Court reviewed the lengthy history of sidewalk defect cases and expressly endorsed a holistic view, where the size of a defect was one factor to consider. (Even considering the disputes over the sizes of the defects in the sidewalk here, the primary defect in Stack was larger.)
Here, the declaration of Bong Walsh asserts - with some degree of boilerplate - that the specific defects here combined to make for a hazard. Further, I lack full measurements of all defects and it is unclear whether this defect is trivial. In some cases, triviality of the risk cannot be established as a matter of law because under the particular facts reasonable minds may differ about whether the risk was trivial. (Stathoulis v City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 569 (triable issue of fact if competing and conflicting evidence regarding size, nature, and quality of defect to surface presented danger to pedestrians exercising ordinary care).)
In this case, it is not entirely clear what the net change between the crack defect and the raised asphalt creates. Plaintiff's familiarity with the area is a factor to consider, although the Stack court entirely disregarded it under the theory that the issue was the danger to the general public. In this case, there had likely been thousands of safe traversals of the area by Plaintiff. The Court adopts the Stack court's views on Plaintiff's familiarity with the area for the purposes of this motion only.
Walsh's expert opinion on the dangerousness of the condition is not so unsupported from the facts that it is insufficient to find a reasonable basis for the conclusion. Defendant observes accurately that this Court can disregard expert declarations where they are unsupported, but here there are references to the subject defects and a rationale for the dangerousness of that defect.
Notice Richard Mendoza declared under penalty of perjury "A review of the City of Modesto's records reveals that the City had received no complaints about an offset or trip hazard on the sidewalk in front of [the address] at any time prior to August 9, 2024. Based on this review, I can confidently state that the City of Modesto had no notice of an obviously dangerous condition invoving the sidewalk where Plaintiff claims to have tripped and fallen prior to August 9, 2024." At his deposition, his confidence had abated.
He acknowledged that prior repairs had apparently been done by the City, and that was likely in response to a citizen call and a review of the sidewalk status. Whether the City had other notice or not is sufficiently disputed by the Robyn Mills declaration. Further, the Court must consider the countervailing declaration in the context of what appear to be inaccurate assertions Government Code section 835(b) provides that liability exists when the public entity "had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition ... a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition."
Further, a public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition if Plaintiff proves that the condition has existed "for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character." Whether the defect had existed for an adequate length of time and whether the defect was sufficiently conspicuous that the entity should fairly be charged with notice both of its existence and of its dangerous character are ordinarily questions of fact to be resolved from all relevant circumstances. (Carson v Facilities Dev.
Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830). Both actual and constructive notice are sufficiently raised by Plaintiff to bring about a triable issue.
CV-26-001061 - MCKINLEY CONGER JOLLEY & GALARNEAU LLP vs LEMOS, ANNETTE RENE - Petitioner's Amended Petition to Confirm Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration Award - DENIED, without prejudice. The petition fails to demonstrate the date of service of the arbitration award on the Respondent.
CV-26-003831 - MALDONADOPADILLA, PAOLA vs COELHO, KELLEY MARIE - Respondent's Motion for Award of Mandatory Attorney Fees and Costs - GRANTED in a reduced amount of $7,728 in fees and $265.34 in costs, and unopposed. As the prevailing party on her Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP), Respondent is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees and costs in connection therewith. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 425.16(c)(1).) In that regard, the Court finds that Respondent has submitted sufficient evidence establishing the reasonableness of the time expended based on the declaration of her counsel.