MENOR, et al. vs CHANEL, INC., et al.

Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(f)(1).) “A defendant . . . has met [their] burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established . . . .” (§ 437c(p)(2); see also Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal. App. 4th 582, 587 (“A defendant moving for . . . summary adjudication need not conclusively negate an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Instead, the defendant may show through factually devoid discovery responses that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action . . . .

The plaintiff . . . shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action . . . .” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(p)(2).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action . . . [or] a claim for damages . . . .” (§ 437c(f)(1).)

III.

Discussion

A. Rulings on Objections Defendant’s objections to the Declarations of William E. Longo, Ph.D., Mark Bailey, P.G., and Jerrold L. Abraham, M.D. are OVERRULED. Because the court’s ruling does not rely on the other testimony Defendant objects to, the court need not rule on those objections.

Plaintiffs’ objection to Paragraph 19 of the Burns Declaration is OVERRULED.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment “In the context of a cause of action for asbestos-related latent injuries, the plaintiff must first establish some threshold exposure to the defendant’s defective asbestos-containing products, and must further establish in reasonable medical probability that a particular exposure or series of exposures was a ‘legal cause’ of his injury, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 953, 982–83.)

The Court denies the motion for summary judgment.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV162809: MENOR, et al. vs CHANEL, INC., et al. 08/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by CONOPCO, INC., individually and as successor-in-interest, parent, alter ago, and equitable trust, for CHESEBROUGH-PONDS CO. and CHESEBROUGH-PONDS, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 832961102281 in Department 18 1. Threshold Exposure Defendant seeks to meet its burden of production by pointing to Plaintiffs’ purportedly factually devoid responses to Defendant’s comprehensive discovery requests. The court finds that the special interrogatories (SROGS) propounded on Plaintiffs are sufficiently comprehensive in that they request all facts pertaining to Defendant’s alleged liability and Ms.

Menor’s exposure to asbestos-contaminated talc products for which it is liable. Specific to products manufactured by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ response to Special Interrogatory No. 1 does not identify any products for which Defendant is liable and refers to Ms. Menor’s deposition testimony and Plaintiffs’ responses to Joint Defense Interrogatories. (Def’s Compendium, Exh. C, at 3:16-4:17.) Plaintiff Bernard Menor’s responses to SROGs are similarly vague. Ms. Menor’s deposition testimony identifies White Shoulders body powder and establishes that she used it from about 1983-1992. (Def’s Compendium, Exh.

K at 250:12-250:24.) She was also in the presence of her mother, who used it pretty much every day. (Id. at 255:9-255:22.) Similarly, Ms. Menor recalled using Vaseline brand baby powder from perhaps her birth in 1968 until she moved to the United States in 1992 and that it was one of her “go-to” powders. (Id. at 256:20-262:3.) Ms. Menor’s testimony establishes that she was exposed to White Shoulders and Vaseline brand powders for which Defendant is liable. However, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses and testimony are factually devoid as to whether the products Ms.

Menor was exposed to actually contained asbestos.

The court finds that Defendant shifted the burden to the extent that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses and deposition testimony are factually devoid as to whether any of the talc products she used for which Defendant is liable were contaminated with asbestos. To meet their burden, Plaintiffs cite to Defendant’s responses to Special Interrogatories, which state that Conopco’s White Shoulders brand talc products used talc sourced to South Korea. (PAMF No. 66 and evidence in support.) Conopco’s Vaseline brand talc products were sourced to talc mines in Montana, Italy, Spain, Australia, and/or Alabama. (PAMF No. 67 and evidence in support.)

Plaintiffs also submit affirmative evidence in the form of three expert witness declarations. The Declaration of William E. Longo, Ph.D. asserts that Dr. Longo has tested talc samples from Montana, China, Vermont, Italy, and South Korea. (PAMF No. 130; Longo Decl., ¶¶ 13-45.) Dr. Longo’s testing led to a conclusion that bottles of White Shoulders and Vaseline brand talc products more likely than not contained asbestos and fibrous talc. (PAMF No. 131; Longo Decl., ¶¶ 13-45.) Dr. Longo also declares that he has reviewed published literature regarding talc mines in Alabama, Montana, North Carolina, Vermont, and South Korea, which he testifies shows that amphibole asbestos exists in these mines. (PAMF Nos. 132, 133 and evidence in support.)

The court finds that Dr. Longo’s declaration has adequate foundation for the opinions stated therein, though it does not conclusively establish that the products Ms. Menor used were contaminated with asbestos.

Mark E. Bailey, P.G.’s declaration includes facts regarding testing of a Vaseline brand cosmetic

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV162809: MENOR, et al. vs CHANEL, INC., et al. 08/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by CONOPCO, INC., individually and as successor-in-interest, parent, alter ago, and equitable trust, for CHESEBROUGH-PONDS CO. and CHESEBROUGH-PONDS, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 832961102281 in Department 18 talc bottle which revealed the presence of amphibole asbestos as well as tremolite, actinolite, and richerite asbestos. (PAMF No. 136; Bailey Decl., Exh. 5.) Mr. Bailey also opines that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that talc derived from Montana’s regal mine, Willow Creek mine, and Vermont Hammondsville mine contain asbestos. (PAMF Nos. 137-139; Bailey Delc., Exhs. 2-4.)

The court finds that Mr. Bailey’s declaration has adequate foundation for the opinions stated therein, but as with Dr. Longo’s declaration, this evidence does not conclusively establish that the products Plaintiffs used were contaminated with asbestos.

Finally, Plaintiffs submit the Declaration of Dr. Abraham, pathologist, who opines that Ms. Menor’s cumulative exposure to asbestos and fibrous talc from her and her husband’s use of the above-discussed talcum powder products was most likely the cause of Ms. Menor’s mesothelioma. (PAMF No. 140; Abraham Decl., ¶ 6-22.)

Defendant submits the Declaration of Amanda M. Burns, MSPH, DABT as affirmative evidence to meet its burden. Ms. Burns opines that Ms. Menor’s use of the products at issue here did not contribute to the development of her mesothelioma. (Burns Decl., ¶ 14.) However, the court is not persuaded that Ms. Burns’ opinion is supported by sufficient foundation to refute or contradict the expert testimony submitted by Plaintiffs.

The court finds that, taken together, Plaintiffs’ affirmative evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the talc products used by and in the presence of Ms. Menor contained asbestos in sufficient quantities to be a substantial factor in her mesothelioma diagnosis. Therefore, denial of Defendant’s MSJ is warranted.

C. Motion for Summary Adjudication – Fraud and Punitive Damages

Fraud

Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action alleges four distinct fraud-based causes of action: (1) intentional misrepresentation; (2) fraudulent concealment; (3) conspiracy to commit intentional misrepresentation; and (4) conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment.

“The elements of a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another's reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.) “[A] cause of action for misrepresentation requires an affirmative statement, not an implied assertion.” (RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1092.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV162809: MENOR, et al. vs CHANEL, INC., et al. 08/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by CONOPCO, INC., individually and as successor-in-interest, parent, alter ago, and equitable trust, for CHESEBROUGH-PONDS CO. and CHESEBROUGH-PONDS, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 832961102281 in Department 18 "The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact." (Hambrick v.

Healthcare Partners Med. Grp., Inc. (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 124, 162.) When there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties, “a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1187.)

The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are: (1) formation and operation of the conspiracy; and (2) damage resulting to plaintiff; (3) resulting from a wrongful act done in furtherance of the common design. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1062.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG No. 1 factually devoid as to some elements of Plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims and Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. The Response contains no statement of a specific affirmative misrepresentation of material fact made to anyone who reasonably relied thereon to Plaintiffs’ detriment, no particularized facts tending to show that Defendant engaged in a conspiracy with anyone, and no particularized facts tending to show that Defendant knew that any of the talcum powder products it sold were contaminated with asbestos during the 1974 to 1999 period when Plaintiffs used or were exposed to cosmetic talc products purchased from Defendant.

The facts stated as to Defendant’s knowledge of the dangers of asbestos, even if proven at trial, are too general and conclusory to support a finding of fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, or conspiracy. Similarly, the alleged facts do not support a finding of fraud, malice, or oppression necessary to support a prayer for punitive damages.

Plaintiffs request a continuance on the grounds that they have not yet conducted a deposition of Defendant and discovery propounded on Defendant remains outstanding. Trial is imminent and Plaintiffs do not provide a persuasive reason why this discovery was only sought in mid-July. The court is not inclined to continue this motion given the number of dispositive motions and discovery motions still to be decided prior to trial.

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant’s MSA as to Plaintiffs’ fraud/concealment claim.

Punitive Damages

To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV162809: MENOR, et al. vs CHANEL, INC., et al. 08/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by CONOPCO, INC., individually and as successor-in-interest, parent, alter ago, and equitable trust, for CHESEBROUGH-PONDS CO. and CHESEBROUGH-PONDS, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 832961102281 in Department 18 evidence that the defendant is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).) The definition of “malice” includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (§ 3294(c).) “Despicable conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (See CACI 3946.)

A finding of malice does not require an actual intent to cause harm. “Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.” (Pfiefer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)

Further, a defendant’s “prolonged failure” to take adequate measures to protect people who worked with its products against a known hazard to their health and safety may justify a conclusion that the conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive. (Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 68, 86.) However, the Cal. Supreme Court has stated that by addition of the word “despicable” to Civ. Code § 3294(c), “the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious” disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

A clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to evidence presented by a plaintiff in opposition to a motion for summary adjudication of punitive damages claims. (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1119.) However, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard “does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitive damages at summary [adjudication].” (Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158-1159.) “Summary adjudication ‘on the issue of punitive damages is proper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.’ ” (Ibid.)

Further, a defendant moving for summary adjudication must still make an initial prima facie showing that no disputed issues of material fact exist such that defendant is entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law in order to shift the burden of production to plaintiff to present clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.)

The court GRANTS Defendant’s MSA as to punitive damages. As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ affirmative evidence is too general and conclusory to support a finding of malice, fraud or oppression, warranting summary adjudication.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV162809: MENOR, et al. vs CHANEL, INC., et al. 08/13/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by CONOPCO, INC., individually and as successor-in-interest, parent, alter ago, and equitable trust, for CHESEBROUGH-PONDS CO. and CHESEBROUGH-PONDS, INC. (Defendant) CRS# 832961102281 in Department 18 The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s MSA as to Plaintiffs’ Fraud cause of action and request for punitive damages.

IV. Orders The motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The alternative motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED.

CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERS

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