Demurrer of Defendant Anabel Pamatz to the Complaint
2026CUPA065775: LAURA M BARON, et al. vs MARIA CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, et al. 08/13/2026 in Department 43 Demurrer
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The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. Motion: Demurrer of Defendant Anabel Pamatz to the Complaint Tentative Ruling: The Demurrer of Defendant Anabel Pamatz to the Complaint is OVERRULED. Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to plead a cause of action for wrongful death against the owner of the vehicle, Defendant Anabel Pamatz, because the complaint is not plead with sufficient specificity and only pleads a legal conclusion that Defendant "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that Mr.
Rodriguez was incompetent and/or unfit to operate said motor vehicle," and that the vehicle was used by Mr. Rodriguez with the express or implied consent of said defendant(s). Defendant argues that the complaint should allege a factual basis for these allegations, such as: Whether Rodriguez had a valid driver's license or whether his license had been suspended or revoked; Whether Rodriguez had a history of traffic violations, accidents, or reckless driving;
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2026CUPA065775: LAURA M BARON, et al. vs MARIA CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, et al.
Whether Rodriguez suffered from any physical or mental condition that impaired his ability to drive safely; Whether Rodriguez was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of entrustment or had a history of substance abuse; What relationship existed between Pamatz and Rodriguez; When, where, or under what circumstances Pamatz entrusted the vehicle to Rodriguez; Plaintiff contends that it is sufficient for the complaint to allege that Defendant was the owner of the vehicle and that Defendant the vehicle was used by Rodriguez with Defendants consent.
In California, a plaintiff must plead ultimate facts rather than evidentiary proof or abstract legal conclusions. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App. 3d 1. Also, Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal. 2d 149.) Pleading express or implied consent tracks the language of the of California Vehicle Code § 17150 which states, Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner. As determined by the Second District Court of Appeal in Van Meter v.
Reed (1962) 207 Cal. App. 2d 866. The question next to be considered is whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a cause of action against the owner of the motor vehicle in harmony with the reasoning of the Baugh case. Negligence may be alleged in general terms, which means that it is sufficient to allege that an act was negligently done without stating the particular omission which rendered it negligent. (Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, at 680 [255 P.2d 802].) Consequently, if the allegations hereinabove noted which are based upon section 3601 of the Labor Code are disregarded, the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence against the appellant Reed under the provisions of section 17150 of the Vehicle Code. Van Meter v.
Reed (1962) 207 Cal. App. 2d 866, 869. Because a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the face of the complaint and treats all pleaded facts as true, a demurrer cannot be used to demand detailed factual pleading of how that consent was obtained or communicated. Unlike claims such as fraud, where a heightened pleading standard exists, in a cause of action for negligence, such as for wrongful death, it is sufficient to plead ultimate facts such as the existence of consent. (See Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v.
General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 216-217.) For the foregoing reasons the demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendant shall file an answer to the complaint on or before August 29, 2026.
2026CUPA065775: LAURA M BARON, et al. vs MARIA CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ, et al.
Plaintiff is ordered to serve notice of the Courts ruling.
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