MOTION TO QUASH
or postjudgment motion involves collateral statutory rights, then the court may retain jurisdiction to determine and enforce those rights.” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal. App. 5th 1009, 1022. Emphasis added and internal citations and quotation marks omitted.
In this case, the GAL has a statutory right to fees pursuant to Probate Code section 1003(c) providing that the reasonable expenses of the guardian ad litem, including compensation and attorney’s fees, shall be determined by the court and paid as the court orders, either out of the property of the estate involved or by the petitioner or from any other source as the court orders. (see Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) ___ Cal.5th ___ S290188; July 16, 2026.)
Accordingly, and based on the record presented and the applicable legal principles, the court finds that the GAL’s request/petition for fees is a collateral matter relating to a collateral statutory right, and that the court has jurisdiction to schedule a trial setting conference on the GAL’s petition for those fees.
The Motion to Vacate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(d) and Code of Civil Procedure section 430.80 (ROA 235) is DENIED.
The attorney for the minor child is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.
2 Sansky-Trust 30-2025-01487738 MOTION TO QUASH
Respondent Heather Sansky’s Motion to Quash Petitioner Angelie Hand’s Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records (ROA 32) is DENIED.
Respondent seeks to quash subpoenas issued by Petitioner to Providence Mission Hospital Mission Viejo, UCI Health Irvine, Hoag Hospital, St. Joseph’s Hospital City of Orange, Mission Hospital Laguna Beach, and Kaiser Permanente Alton/San Canyon Medical seeking the medical records of Bonnie Christine Sansky (Decedent) from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 2015. Respondent argues the subpoenas should be quashed because they: (1) seek irrelevant documents; (2) fail to describe
the requested documents with sufficient particularity; (3) violate Decedent’s constitutionally protected privacy rights; and (4) violate the physician-patient privilege (Evid. Code, § 992
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Sufficient Particularity. Each subpoena seeks “All Medical Records regarding Bonnie Christine Sansky from January 1, 1990-December 31, 2015. Date of Birth February 20, 1949.” The court finds that the subpoenas sufficiently describe the requested documents.
Privacy. Respondent argues the subpoenas should be quashed because they seek documents protected by the right of privacy. The subpoenas seek documents relating to Decedent. It is well settled that Decedent’s right of privacy ceased with her death. (Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc. (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3rd 59, 62 [“It is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded. . . Further, the right does not survive but dies with the person”].)
Physician-Patient Privilege. Respondent argues the subpoenas should be quashed because they call for documents protected by the physician-patient privilege. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 994, a patient “has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and physician if the privilege is claimed by” [¶] (a) The holder of the privilege; [¶] (b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privilege; or [¶] (c) The person who has the physician at the time of the confidential communication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if he or she is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure.”
The holder of the privilege is the patient, a guardian or conservator of the patient (if any) or the “personal representative” of the patient if the patient is dead. (Evid. Code, § 993.) In this case, the patient is dead, so the privilege can only be asserted by Decedent’s “personal representative.” Respondent has not been appointed a personal representative and, accordingly, cannot assert the privilege on Decedent’s behalf.
Relevance. The scope of discovery is very broad. (See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. C. v. Lee (2011) 193 Cal. App. 4th 34, 40.) It is well settled that “[a]ny doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery." (Mercury
Interactive Cop. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal. App. 4th 60, 98.) As the California Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 541: “Section 2017.010 and other statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.] This means that ‘disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.’”
Although the period addressed by the subpoena’s is very broad, the court finds that such broad period does not exceed the scope of discovery in light of the allegations of the petition.
The motion to quash is DENIED.
Petitioner is directed to give notice.