The Standard Fire Insurance Company vs. KIA America, INC.

(Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 1). On December 30, 2025, Gallo propounded his third set of requests for admissions by email on plaintiff. These requests took the total number of requests propounded to 666. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 2). After Plaintiff requested that they be withdrawn and Gallo refused, Plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order, which was granted on June 25, 2026. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶¶ 2, 3).

On May 29, 2026, Gallo propounded his fourth set of requests for admissions on Plaintiff. This set took the total number of requests for admissions propounded by Gallo to Plaintiff to 739. Plaintiff requested that Gallo withdraw these requests, and Gallo refused. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 4). After this court granted the previous motion for protective order, Plaintiff again requested that the requests for admissions be withdrawn, and again, Gallo refused. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 4).

As this court found in its previous ruling, 666 requests for admissions in a case relating to water intrusion following the sale of real property is grossly excessive. Likewise, the fourth set of requests for admissions is also grossly excessive. Defendant did not oppose, and, therefore, failed to justify why the fourth set of requests for admissions is necessary after Plaintiff has already responded to 400+ requests for admissions to date.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion.

Plaintiff shall give notice. 5 The Standard Fire The Demurrer to Complaint brought by Defendant Kia America, Inc. Insurance is SUSTAINED, as to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action asserted by Company vs. KIA Plaintiff The Standard Fire Insurance Company (“Travelers”), without leave America, INC. to amend.

The sole issue raised within this demurrer is Plaintiff Travelers standing to pursue Song-Beverly claims.

Initially, it is undisputed that Plaintiff Travelers does not, independently, have standing under the Song-Beverly Act: “The prerequisite for standing to assert statutorily-based causes of action are determined from the statutory language, as well as the underlying legislative intent and the purpose of the statute.” (Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.)

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, “[a]ny buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (a).) Similarly, “[a]ny buyer of consumer goods injured by a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,” has certain statutory remedies available. (Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (c).) For purposes of these provisions, “buyer” means “any individual who buys consumer goods from a

person engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer goods at retail.” (Civ. Code, § 1791, subd. (b).)

The Song-Beverly Act is “manifestly a remedial measure, intended for the protection of the consumer; it should be given a construction calculated to bring its benefits into action.” (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 915.)

Per the Complaint, Plaintiff Sammy Maya purchased the relevant vehicle in California. (¶1, ¶4, ¶9, ¶57 and ¶68 of Complaint.) Plaintiff Travelers merely insured the vehicle. (¶2 and ¶21 of Complaint.)

Based on the above, Travelers is not a buyer for purposes of the Song-Beverly Act. Consequently, the question turns to whether Travelers could acquire the right to pursue Song-Beverly claims, via subrogation.

“Subrogation is the ‘substitution of another person in place of the creditor or claimant to whose rights he or she succeeds in relation to the debt or claim.’” (Interstate Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 23, 31-32.) “In the case of insurance, subrogation takes the form of an insurer’s right to be put in the position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to the insured for a loss which the insurer has both insured and paid.” (Id. at p. 32.) “The subrogated insurer is said to ‘stand in the shoes’ of its insured, because it has no greater rights than the insured and is subject to the same defenses assertable against the insured.” (Ibid.)

Relying on the above principles, Plaintiff Travelers asserts it has stepped fully into the shoes of Plaintiff Maya, such that it is entitled to the same Song- Beverly remedies that Plaintiff Maya would be entitled to.

Defendant, in contrast, asserts that Song-Beverly claims are not capable of subrogation.

In support of this assertion, Defendant cites Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, which addressed whether a buyer of a used vehicle obtained the right to assert Song-Beverly claims, via assignment pursuant to Civil Code section 954. (Id. at p. 925.) Per Civil Code section 954, “[a] thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.” (Civ. Code, § 954.)

As noted by the Dagher Court, “[a] cause of action for breach of contract is an assignable right,” however, claims “founded upon wrongs of a purely personal nature, such as slander, assault and battery, negligent personal injuries..., malicious prosecution, and others of like nature,” are not transferable or assignable. (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 925.) Similarly, “damages for emotional distress or punitive damages are not assignable (because they are founded upon wrongs of a purely personal nature.)” (Id. at p. 926 [internal quotations cleaned up].)

Thereafter, the Court in Dagher explained: “Even though assignability of a claim is the rule, highly personalized rights of recovery are not assignable. [Citation]. Likewise, the [Song-Beverly Act] specifies in great detail those types of buyers and sellers who are subject to its provisions, and only those buyers and sellers can properly assert its protection.” (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 926.)

“Since the Act creates more and different statutory rights (e.g. implied warranties) than the express warranty contractual transfer could have conferred on Plaintiff, he would have to individually qualify under the Act’s definitions of buyer and seller and consumer goods, to assert those additional enforcement remedies.” Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 926.)

In responding to Dagher, Plaintiff concedes this authority addresses assignment and transferability of Song-Beverly Act claims but nonetheless argues that subrogation substantially differs from assignment. (Opposition: 5:19-6:11.)

Similar to subrogation, however, “[t]he assignee ‘stands in the shoes’ of the assignor, taking his or her rights and remedies, subject to any defenses that the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the assignment.” (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 925.)

Additionally, case law makes clear that assignability is an element of equitable subrogation. Per Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1279 (cited by Plaintiff), an essential element of “an insurer’s cause of action for equitable subrogation” is that “the insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the defendant which the insured could have asserted for its own benefit had it not been compensated for its loss by the insurer.” (Id. at p. 1292.) Similarly, “[t]he right of subrogation is purely derivative” and “[a]n insurer entitled to subrogation is in the same position as an assignee of the insured’s claim....” (Ibid.; See also Berg v. Pulte Home Corp. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 277, 285, fn. 3 [listing assignability as an element of subrogation].)

Likewise, “it has long been held that subrogation is the equivalent of an equitable assignment.” (Royal Indem. Co. v. Security Truck Lines (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 61, 64.)

Indeed, case law treats the concepts similarly: “While subrogation and assignment have certain technical differences, each operates to transfer from one person to another a cause of action against a third, and the reasons of policy which make certain causes of action nonassignable would seem to operate as forcefully against the transfer of such causes of action by subrogation.” (Royal Indem. Co. v. Security Truck Lines (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 61, 64, quoting Fifield Manor v. Finston (1960) 54 Cal.2d 632.)

Based on all the above, Song-Beverly claims cannot be transferred, assigned or subrogated and, consequently, Plaintiff Travelers lacks standing to assert the same.

Moreover, leave to amend is denied: A court should sustain a demurrer without leave to amend where there is no “reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) Additionally, leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law. (Lawrence v. Bank of Am. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436.)

1. Motion to Strike

The Motion to Strike brought by Defendant Kia America, Inc. is MOOT, given the accompanying order on the Demurrer.

Case Management Conference is continued to November 19, 2026, at 09:00 am.

Moving party to give notice.

6 Corey vs. The Plaintiff Jacie Ruelas Corey’s motion for in camera review and to seal certain Regents of the documents is DENIED in part. University of California The court grants Plaintiff’s request for in camera review and has reviewed the documents lodged with the court with this motion in camera. The court will not entertain any further stand-alone requests for in camera review that is not specifically related to a pending motion.

The court denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s request to seal and/or for a protective order as not ripe and procedurally improper. However, the court does not require Plaintiff to publicly file the documents lodged with the motion at this time and Plaintiff may withdraw the lodged material.

Here, Plaintiff seeks to seal and issue a protective order over certain medical records and Plaintiff’s notes on said medical records. The motion is not tied to any pending discovery motion, a pending motion for which these documents must be filed as evidence, but sealed, etc. It appears that Plaintiff is seeking a blanket seal of these documents for any use in this case in the future. The court finds that Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient procedural or substantive basis to do so.

“Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c); In re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1079.) “A record must not be filed under seal without a court order. The court must not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).)

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