Adjemian vs. Gallo

2. continues the hearing on the motions to compel set for August 20, 2026 to October 29, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. in Department C10, and 3. advances Defendant Regents’ motion to stay, which is currently set for hearing on February 25, 2027. (ROA 347.) That February 25, 2027 hearing date on Defendant Regents’ motion to stay is advanced to October 15, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. in Department C10 to be heard concurrently with Defendant Apple’s motion to stay.

No further briefing shall be permitted on the motions to compel, except that Plaintiff shall file amended separate statements consistent with the above discussion, and Defendants may file separate statements in response thereto.

Plaintiff shall file and serve notice of this ruling. 4 Adjemian vs. Gallo Plaintiff Kevork Adjemian’s motion for protective order is GRANTED.

The court awards Plaintiff sanctions against Defendant Rafael Gallo in the amount of $612.50. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.080, subd. (d)).

Authority

A protective order may be obtained if the relief is sought “promptly”. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.080(a) [protective order for requests for admissions]).

The burden is on the moving party to establish “good cause” for whatever order is sought. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 (interrogatories); Stadish v. Super. Ct. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145 (document requests).) “Good cause” requires specific facts demonstrating unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819).

Merits

Plaintiff moves for an order excusing him from responding to Defendant Gallo’s fourth set of requests for admissions.

Plaintiff sets forth the following in support of his contention that good cause requires this order:

This case is based on the sale of certain real property by defendant Rafael Gallo to plaintiff Kevork Adjemian. As is alleged in the complaint, Adjemian purchased the property and, after doing so and taking possession discovered water intrusion below the exterior decks of the home and into the interior living space. Adjemian learned that Gallo had replaced the decks without permits and without the necessary waterproofing. Adjemian contends that these facts should have been disclosed to him but were not.

(Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 1). On December 30, 2025, Gallo propounded his third set of requests for admissions by email on plaintiff. These requests took the total number of requests propounded to 666. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 2). After Plaintiff requested that they be withdrawn and Gallo refused, Plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order, which was granted on June 25, 2026. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶¶ 2, 3).

On May 29, 2026, Gallo propounded his fourth set of requests for admissions on Plaintiff. This set took the total number of requests for admissions propounded by Gallo to Plaintiff to 739. Plaintiff requested that Gallo withdraw these requests, and Gallo refused. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 4). After this court granted the previous motion for protective order, Plaintiff again requested that the requests for admissions be withdrawn, and again, Gallo refused. (Decl. of Quinn, ¶ 4).

As this court found in its previous ruling, 666 requests for admissions in a case relating to water intrusion following the sale of real property is grossly excessive. Likewise, the fourth set of requests for admissions is also grossly excessive. Defendant did not oppose, and, therefore, failed to justify why the fourth set of requests for admissions is necessary after Plaintiff has already responded to 400+ requests for admissions to date.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion.

Plaintiff shall give notice. 5 The Standard Fire The Demurrer to Complaint brought by Defendant Kia America, Inc. Insurance is SUSTAINED, as to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action asserted by Company vs. KIA Plaintiff The Standard Fire Insurance Company (“Travelers”), without leave America, INC. to amend.

The sole issue raised within this demurrer is Plaintiff Travelers standing to pursue Song-Beverly claims.

Initially, it is undisputed that Plaintiff Travelers does not, independently, have standing under the Song-Beverly Act: “The prerequisite for standing to assert statutorily-based causes of action are determined from the statutory language, as well as the underlying legislative intent and the purpose of the statute.” (Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.)

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, “[a]ny buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (a).) Similarly, “[a]ny buyer of consumer goods injured by a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,” has certain statutory remedies available. (Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (c).) For purposes of these provisions, “buyer” means “any individual who buys consumer goods from a

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