Chan vs. H Mart Irvine Northpark LLC

As a final alternative, and in addition to monetary sanctions, Plaintiff requests that the Court impose evidentiary sanctions by precluding Defendants from introducing any evidence as to liability and causation. Id. at p.17.

Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion, or, alternatively, grant the parties additional time to meet and confer to address Plaintiff’s concerns. ROA 79, p.3.

The Court notes that Defendants filed an untimely opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on August 3, 2026. ROA 90; see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1005(b) (“[a]ll papers opposing a motion . . . shall be filed with the court . . . at least nine court days, and all reply papers at least five court days before a hearing” unless a “court, or judge thereof” prescribes a shorter time.). While the Court elects not to consider Defendants’ untimely filed papers, Defendants’ timely filed Opposition (ROA 79) is duly considered. Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1300(d) (“If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate.”).

I. Relevant Timeline of Events

On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendants with Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Depositions of Person/s Most Qualified (“PMQ”) for HM Inc. and/or HM Co., and Request for Sanctions in the amount of $10,575. ROA 40, pp.

2, 20. The Court promptly ordered the parties to attend an Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”) facilitated by the Court to reach an informal resolution to the parties’ discovery dispute. ROA 45. The Court’s order set the IDC for April 8, 2026. Id.

On March 16, 2026, the parties stipulated to continue the IDC until May 5, 2026. ROA 52.

On May 5, 2026, the parties attended the IDC as ordered. ROA 59. Therein, the Court noted that Defendants’ PMQs were not qualified to testify on behalf of Defendants. Id. Accordingly, the Court ordered the depositions of Defendants’ PMQs to proceed by no later than July 5, 2026. Id. Additionally, the Court ordered Plaintiff’s Motion withdrawn as moot and that all future discovery related hearings be taken off calendar. Id. The Court did not issue sanctions. Id.

On May 11, 2026, Plaintiff emailed Attorney Matthew Stein to identify mutually agreeable dates for the depositions to proceed consistent with said order. ROA 66, Exh.

3.

Having received no reply from M. Stein, on June 8, 2026, Plaintiff served amended notices of Deposition of Defendants’ PMQs. ROA 66, pp. 55, 73. Plaintiff’s notice set the Deposition of HM Inc.’s PMQ to occur on June 30, 2026, and the deposition of HM Co.’s PMQ to occur on July 1, 2026. ROA 66, pp. 38, 56.

On June 30, 2026, HM Inc. again produced a witness who was not qualified to discuss the topics provided in Plaintiff’s notice. ROA 66, pp. 3, 5; ROA 33, Exh. 5, pp 77- 83.

On July 1, 2026, HM Co. also produced a witness who was not qualified to discuss the topics provided in Plaintiff’s notice. ROA 66, pp. 3, 29; ROA 66, Exh. 6, pp. 131-136.

II. Discretionary Sanctions for Misuse of the Discovery Process

“California discovery law authorizes a range of penalties,

including monetary, issue, evidence, and terminating sanctions, for conduct amounting to ‘misuse of the discovery process.’” Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 967, 991 (2009); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.030(b)-(d), 2030.290(c), 2031.300(c).

“The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. Doppes, supra, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 992 (citing Reedy v. Bussell, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1294 (2007). In choosing a sanction, “[t]he trial court should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and its effect on the party seeking discovery.” Doppes, supra, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 992.

Under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2023.030, courts may impose terminating sanctions by way of striking all or parts of the pleadings, staying proceedings by the offending party until the court’s discovery orders are obeyed, dismissing all or part of the offender's action, or rendering a judgment by default against the offending party. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.030(d).

“The courts have long recognized that the terminating sanction is a drastic penalty and should be used sparingly.” Lopez v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y., 246 Cal. App. 4th 566, 604 (2016). Proportionality is critical when it comes to terminating sanctions because they altogether deny the non-compliant party a hearing on the merits and thus implicate due process. Id.

To ensure proportionality, trial courts should generally take an “incremental” approach—that is, they should “attempt[] less severe alternative[] [sanctions]” unless the “record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective.” Id. at 604 (emphasis added).

While a decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly, “where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem, 128 Cal. App. 4th 262, 279-280 (2005). Under this standard, trial

courts have properly imposed terminating sanctions when parties have willfully disobeyed even just one discovery order. See Lang v. Hochman, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1244 (2000) (citing Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1611 (1994)).

“Only two facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the [nonmonetary] sanction: (i) there must be a failure to comply . . . and (ii) the failure must be willful.” Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 141 Cal. App. 3d 901, 904 (1983).

Willfulness in the context of nonmonetary sanctions means a “conscious or intentional failure to act, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary noncompliance . . . .” Deyo v. Kilbourne, 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 787-788 (1978). “Lack of diligence may be deemed willful in the sense that the party understood his obligation, had the ability to comply, and failed to comply.” Deyo, supra, 84 Cal. App. 3d at p. 787. See Housing Auth. v. Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 366, 372-73 (1972) (stating that a court may “justifiably conclude that [a party] ha[s] no intention of being deposed and would continue to engage in evasive tactics to achieve that end” where the party has already failed to appear for deposition and respond to discovery requests, including by disobeying a court order to do so).

Here, as outlined supra, the Court issued a clear order for Defendants to produce PMQs who could competently testify to the issues noticed by Plaintiff. ROA 59. In good faith, the Court did not issue sanctions upon Defendants, despite Defendants’ previously having failed to produce qualified PMQs for Plaintiff’s properly noticed depositions. See ROA 32, ¶ 13.

Despite the Court’s efforts to resolve the parties’ deposition disputes informally, Defendant still refused to comply. The Court is convinced that Defendants have no intention of being deposed and will exhaust all efforts, at the parties’ and the Court’s expense, to achieve that end. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s discovery misuse is willful and that monetary and nonmonetary sanctions are appropriate to prevent future and ongoing abuses.

III. Assigning Liability for Monetary Discovery Sanctions

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2023.030 permits a court to impose monetary sanctions on “one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct . . .” or any party who “unsuccessfully assert[s] that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.030(a). Courts shall impose monetary sanctions absent a finding “that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification.” Id.

When the misconduct is clearly attributable to one party, courts should generally sanction only that party. However, when monetary sanctions are sought against an attorney for client misconduct, the court must find that the attorney advised the client to engage in the sanctionable conduct. Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 771, 799 (2020) (emphasis added).

The burden then shifts to the attorney to prove that they did not provide such advice. Id. (citing Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle, 20 Cal. App. 4th 256, 260-261 (1993)); compare Corns v. Miller, 181 Cal. App. 3d 195, 200-201 (1986) (a court did not err in ordering monetary sanctions against an attorney where the attorney did not submit an opposition to the motion for sanctions, did not appear at the hearing, and failed to discharge his burden of proving he did not counsel disobedience) with Kwan Software Eng’g, Inc. v. Hennings, 58 Cal. App. 5th 57, 83 (2020) (finding substantial evidence that attorneys did not advise disobedience where attorneys provided multiple declarations, under penalty of perjury, in addition to e-mails and testimony in their defense).

If the client engaged in the misconduct, for example, by refusing to answer discovery, hiding documents, or failing to appear for deposition, then sanctions should be imposed upon them. See Ghanooni, supra, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 261 (finding no liability for counsel for monetary sanctions where client refused to submit to x-rays and attorney’s declarations showed attorney attempted to convince client

to comply).

If the attorney is responsible, for instance, by instructing a client not to answer without substantial justification, failing to meet and confer in good faith, or failing to provide timely responses, the sanction can be imposed directly on the attorney. See generally Ghanooni, supra, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 260-261; see generally Ellis v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., 218 Cal. App. 4th 853, 879-80 (2013); see generally Deck v. Developers Inv. Co., Inc., 89 Cal. App. 5th 808, 829-832 (2023).

If the Court finds that both share responsibility, then sanctions can be imposed jointly and severally. See generally Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 5th 771, 799 (2020).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege, and the Court does not find, that Defendants’ failure to produce a qualified PMQ to respond to Plaintiff’s Notices of Deposition is in any way attributable to client misconduct. Indeed, the Court finds that the record shows unequivocally that the misconduct is attributable to Defendant’s counsel’s gamesmanship and failure to obey court orders. Accordingly, monetary sanctions are appropriate upon Defendants’ counsel only.

IV. Determining a Reasonable Sanctions Amount

Three principles guide the award and amount of attorney’s fees and costs imposed as a discovery sanction. See Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal. App. 5th at 790-91 (compulsion, causation, and reasonableness).

“The amount of monetary sanctions is limited to the ‘reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees’ that a party incurred as a result of the discovery abuse.” Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal. App. 5th at 791 (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.030(a)). The principle of reasonableness means a trial court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award. Id., (citing Parker v. Wolters Kluwer U.S., Inc., 149 Cal. App. 4th 285, 294 (2007)).

“After a motion to compel discovery has been filed, further

expenses incurred in meeting and conferring on the discovery dispute, whether it be through private mediation or normal channels of communication, are not compensable as discovery sanctions.” In re Marriage of Moore, 102 Cal. App. 5th 1275, 1301 (2024) (emphasis added).

Having considered the foregoing principles in light of Plaintiff’s calculation of the expenses incurred in bringing this motion, the Court finds that Defendant’s counsel is liable for the reasonable sanctions amount of $34,801.94, owed to Plaintiff’s counsel.

V. Reporting Requirements for Discovery Sanctions

California Business and Professions Code Section 6068 imposes a duty upon licensed attorneys to self-report to the State Bar, in writing, and within thirty (30) days of receiving notice of a court’s order imposing “judicial sanctions against the attorney, except for sanctions for failure to make discovery or monetary sanctions of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(o)(3); See also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6086.7 (placing the same reporting requirements upon the courts).

The California State Bar Court reads these exceptions narrowly and has determined that monetary discovery sanctions of $1,000 or more are reportable where the sanction is not for failure to make discovery. See Matter of Rubin, 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 797, 808 (2021) (finding that an attorney had an independent duty to report sanctions of $2,335 to the State Bar for unsuccessfully opposing a motion for a protective order). Accordingly, a monetary sanction is not exempt from reporting merely because it arises in a discovery proceeding.

California Rules of Court, Rule 10.609 states that a “judge issuing the order triggers the notification requirement under California Business and Professions Code Section 6068.7 is responsible for notifying the State Bar . . . and may direct court staff” to do so. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 10.609(a).

Here, the Court finds that the sanctions imposed by this

order are not attributable to Defendants’ counsel’s failure to make discovery; rather, they are attributable to Defendant’s counsel’s failure to follow a court order to provide discovery. Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2025.450(a) and 2023.010(d) with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2023.010(g). Thus, the sanctions imposed herein will trigger Defendant’s counsel’s duty to self-report to the State Bar.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for sanctions is GRANTED and evidentiary sanctions are IMPOSED as follows: Defendants H Mart Inc. and H Mart Companies, Inc. are precluded from introducing any evidence as to liability and causation for Plaintiff’s injuries.

Additionally, the Court IMPOSES monetary sanctions upon Defendants' counsel of record, Armijo & Morovati LLP, in the total collective amount of $34,801.94, due and payable to Plaintiff’s counsel, Law Offices of Alexis B. Djivre, no later than sixty (60) days after receiving notice of this Order.

The Court orders Clerk to give notice to the parties and to report sanctions imposed upon Defendants’ counsel to the State Bar.

2. 30-2026- Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Defendant Jeffrey 01550158-CU- Mandell’s (“Defendant”) Deposition Subpoena for the BT-CJC Production of Business Records (“Motion”) brought by BodEv, Inc. vs. Plaintiff BodEV, Inc. (“Plaintiff”). ROA 35 Mandell The underlying controversy stems from the termination of business dealings between current and previous officers of Plaintiff and consists of claims for declaratory judgment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, conversion, unfair competition, common law unfair competition, intentional interference with existing contract, intentional interference with prospective economic damage, and breach of non-disclosure agreement. ROA 2.

Plaintiff seeks an order, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1985.6, 1987.1, 2025.410, and 2017.020, quashing Defendant’s deposition subpoena for