Tyreece Baldon et al. v. Jake Ta et al.

Plaintiff Tyreece Lamar Baldon (Plaintiff) was employed by defendant Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc. (Bluegreen) from July 28, 2022, until their termination on April 3, 2025. The original and still operative complaint alleges “Plaintiff is African American/Hispanic/Latino, identifies as non-binary, and has disabilities including generalized anxiety disorder, depression, panic attacks, and insomnia.” (Complaint at ¶ 16.) The complaint alleges that from April 2024 through June 2024, Plaintiff’s coworker defendant Jake Ta (Ta) subjected Plaintiff to severe harassment.

The complaint alleges Ta called Plaintiff a “faggot,” making discriminatory comments about Plaintiff’s appearance and gender identity, and told Plaintiff to “be a real man.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) The complaint alleges Plaintiff’s supervisor, defendant Christopher Stewart (Stewart), interfered with and prevented Plaintiff from reporting Ta’s wrongful conduct to human resources. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The complaint further alleges that throughout their employment, Defendants refused to use Plaintiff’s chosen name “Ty” in company systems and communications. (Id. at ¶ 26.)

Plaintiff reported the foregoing conduct to human resources. (See Complaint at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff took medical leave in August 2024 as a result of the ongoing harassment and discrimination. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment in April 2025 while Plaintiff was on leave. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges the “termination was pretextual and done in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and requests for accommodation.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff filed the complaint in August 2025. It alleges thirteen causes of action arising under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), including: (1) race discrimination; (2) gender and sexual orientation discrimination; (3) disability discrimination and failure to accommodate; (4) retaliation; (5) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (6) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; (7) interference and retaliation; (8) harassment; (9) constructive discharge; (10) wrongful termination; (11) failure to engage in good faith interactive process; (12) retaliation for requesting/taking California Family Rights Act leave in violation of Government Code section 12945.2; and (13) failure to provide reasonable disability accommodation.

Defendants Bluegreen, Hilton Grand Vacations Company LLC, and Ta (collectively, Defendants) now petition to compel arbitration based on an Arbitration Agreement (the Agreement) Defendants argue Plaintiff signed electronically on July 27, 2022. The court will deny the petition to compel arbitration based on the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402).

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

Defendants object to Plaintiff’s evidence submitted in support of their opposition. The court rules on those objections as follows:

Objection Nos. 1-28 are OVERRULED. These paragraphs of Plaintiff’s declaration are relevant to the execution of the Agreement.

Objection Nos. 29-32 are OVERRULED. Defendants have produced two versions of the Arbitration Agreement and did not clarify which one controls until filing their reply brief.

Objection No. 33, 34, 35 are SUSTAINED. Plaintiff draws improper legal conclusions about whether they agreed to arbitrate and give up their right to pursue their claims in court.

Objection Nos. 36 & 37 are OVERRULED. Defendants have attached both versions of the Arbitration Agreement to their moving papers.

Objection Nos. 38-40, 42, 43, and 44 are DISREGARDED. The court does not rely on the exhibits challenged by those objections.

Objection No. 41 is OVERRUELD. Defendants rely on the same screenshot depicting the acknowledgement page of the Arbitration Agreement bearing Plaintiff’s employee name and identification number.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT APPLIES

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) controls, based on the language of the Agreement and because Defendants’ operations affect interstate commerce. The Agreement provides “[t]he parties agree that the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) applies to this Agreement because the Company’s business involves interstate commerce. This Agreement is to be enforced under the FAA, and not individual state substantive and procedural laws regarding the enforcement of arbitration agreements.” Accordingly, pursuant to the Agreement, the California Arbitration Act (CAA) does not apply.

The basic coverage provision of the FAA “makes the law applicable to contracts evidencing a transaction ‘involving commerce’ (9 U.S.C. § 2), which language reflects that Congress intended the law’s coverage to extend to the full reach of its commerce clause power.” (Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co. (2009) 33 Cal.App.5th 274, 279, internal citations omitted.) “Congress’ Commerce Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal control.’” (Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57, quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co. (1948) 334 U.S. 219, 236.)

Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce because “Bluegreen Vacations operates a points-based vacation club, through which it markets and sells vacation ownership interests and club memberships. Bluegreen Vacations promotes these products and services through in-store kiosks and marketing activities at Bass Pro Shops locations throughout the United States.” (Declaration of Michelle Miller at ¶ 2.) Given the broad reach of the Commerce Clause, the court concludes that Defendant’s operations affect interstate commerce. And “[e]mployment contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA.” (EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 289.)

Under the FAA, the court’s role is limited to determining “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and if it does (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) To determine “whether a valid contract to arbitrate exists,” courts apply “ordinary state 16

law principles that govern contract formation.” (Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 1089, 1093, citations omitted; see also Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1165, 1170.)

ANALYSIS

There is a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate

Defendants lodged two versions of the Arbitration Agreement with their petition to compel arbitration. Defendants clarify on reply that the version attached to the Declaration of Lonnie D. Giamela is the Agreement they seek to enforce. That version includes a footer titled “BLUEGREEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 7-18.” Defendants clarify that the Declaration of Michelle Miller and the accompanying screenshots pertain to this Agreement. The court will construe the version of the Agreement attached to the Giamela declaration alongside the exhibits attached to the Miller declaration. The version of Agreement Defendants seek to enforce does not contain the limitation (contained in the other version of the agreement) that arbitration shall not apply to claims for sexual harassment or sexual assault. This version of the Agreement also does not contain a signature block for Bluegreen.

“A proceeding to compel arbitration ‘ “is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract.” ’ ” (Juen Alain Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978.) The “ ‘ “party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any defense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘An essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent.’ ” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd, LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 173.) “ ‘Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.’ ” (Ibid.)

“A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as whether a party signs the agreement.” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 777.) And under Civil Code section 1633.7, “an electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature.” (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) The authenticity of an electronic signature may be established by detailing the “security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement.” (Id. at p. 1062.) “An arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v.

Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Bluegreen’s assent is conveyed by the Agreement itself. The Agreement is part of a policy drafted by Bluegreen, is titled “Bluegreen Entities Arbitration Agreement”, and is being relied on by Defendants. (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 [noting that the arbitration agreement was conveyed to the employee by the agreement itself because it was part of a policy drafted by the employer on the company’s letterhead and accepted by the employee as a condition of employment].)

Regarding Plaintiff’s assent, Michelle Miller, the former Senior HRS Product Analyst for Bluegreen at the time of Plaintiff’s hire, declares that Bluegreen’s policy was to provide all newly hired employees an arbitration agreement to review and sign. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 3.) Onboarding documents were emailed, and employees could sign at their own pace with no execution deadline. (Ibid.) To transmit the onboarding paperwork, Bluegreen used “Dayforce”, a password-protected portal. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 5.)

Dayforce emails the employee’s personal address a secure link with first-time login credentials. (Ibid.) The employee must reset the password on initial login. (Ibid.) Each document is reviewed electronically and signed by checking an acknowledgment box and entering the date. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 6.) Dayforce’s audit trail automatically records the employee’s name, document executed, and the exact date/time of execution. It would reflect a different signer’s name if anyone else signed the documents. (Ibid.)

Miller declares Plaintiff was the only person who could have logged into their Dayforce account. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 10.) Their unique username and password and assigned employee ID were used to execute the Arbitration Agreement. (Ibid.) According to Miller, the records reflect that Plaintiff checked the acknowledgment box, entered the date, and thereby electronically signed the Agreement. (Ibid.) She declares that because of Dayforce’s safeguards and company business practices, no one within Bluegreen or Hilton Grand Vacations could have signed the Arbitration Agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 11.)

There are two relevant exhibits: a copy of the Agreement Defendants seek to enforce (ex. B to the Giamela dec.), and screenshots of an audit trail of Plaintiff’s Dayforce account (ex. B to the Miller dec.).

The Agreement’s last page provides, “By clicking ‘I Accept’, you are: (a) acknowledging receipt of this document; and (b) agreeing that I am submitting my signature electronically and using an electronic signature to demonstrate my acceptance of this Arbitration Agreement.” (Declaration of Lonnie D. Giamela, Ex. B at Ex. A, p. 4.) The Agreement further provides “[y]ou acknowledge that your electronic signature is legally binding as a handwritten ink signature.” (Ibid.) This version of the Agreement has no “Accept” button or other method of signing the document.

The audit trail shows that Plaintiff’s first-time access email was sent to ty.baldon@bluegreenvacations.com. (Miller Decl., Ex. B, Screenshot 1.) While this reflects a company email address, Miller maintains that is consistent with company policy because Plaintiff was hired as a manager. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Managerial employees are issued company email accounts to complete onboarding. (Ibid.) Records show Plaintiff logged into Dayforce on July 26, 2022, and was required to reset their password, which they did. (Miller Decl., Ex.

B, Screenshot 2.) Defendants attach a screenshot of the acknowledgement section of the Agreement dated July 27, 2022, bearing Plaintiff’s name and employee number. (Id., Screenshot 5.) The checkbox is marked for the text, “I accept and acknowledge the company policy above.” (Ibid.) Defendants also attach a screenshot of the workflow audit trail showing when the Agreement was completed. (Id., Screenshot 4.) According to these records, Plaintiff executed the Arbitration Agreement on the day before their start date on July 27, 2022, at 8:27 p.m., along with 11 other onboarding documents. (Id., Screenshots 3 & 6.)

The foregoing evidence is adequate to find mutual assent. Plaintiff declares they do not recall signing the Agreement, did not use or was not familiar with Dayforce, and did not have knowledge of or access to the employee email account. (Declaration of Tyreece Lamar Baldon at ¶¶ 4, 10, 15.) But “[a]n arbitration clause within a contract may be binding on a party even if the party never actually read the clause.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) And the audit trail provides credible evidence that contradicts Plaintiff’s self-serving declaration statements. There is a valid agreement to arbitrate.

The EFAA Precludes the Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Claims

The scope of the Agreement is broad enough to cover Plaintiff’s claims. The Agreement applies to disputes “arising out of or related to the Employee’s application for employment, employment, or termination of employment with the company.” (Giamela Decl., Ex. B at Ex. A, § B, ¶ 1(a).) The enumerated disputes include, inter alia, “. . . retaliation, any other tort, contract, equitable, statutory, or constitutional claim . . any claims of discrimination or harassment prohibited by applicable law, including statutory and/or common law claims of discrimination or harassment on the basis of age, race, national origin, religion, disability, sex/gender, color, or citizenship.” (Id., Ex. B. at Ex. A, § B, ¶ 1(b).) Plaintiff has sued Defendants for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination and harassment.

But the Agreement must be considered in light of the EFAA. The EFAA provides that “at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, “no predispute arbitration agreement . . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.” (9 U.S.C. § 402, subd. (a).)

“There is a split among federal district courts in and outside the Ninth Circuit about the appropriate standard for determining ‘the allegations that are necessary to invoke the EFAA in the first place and to determine whether the statute is applicable to the case.’” (MacKay v. PetSmart, Inc. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) EDCV 25-1626 JGB (DTBx), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168963, citing Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2024) 757 F.Supp. 3d 498 (Diaz- Roa).) Some courts have relied on the pleading standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, while others have relied on the plausibility standard. (Van De Hey v. EPAM Sys. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 28, 2025) 24-cv-08800-RFL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48775 at p. 8.)

A recent Court of Appeal decision affirmed a trial court’s order denying a petition to compel arbitration on similar facts. (Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 732, 744.) Decloedt sued his former employers and coworkers, alleging among other things FEHA violations of harassment because of his sexual orientation. (Id. at p. 738.) The trial court denied a petition to compel arbitration, finding that Decloedt had alleged a claim of sexual harassment under EFAA. The Decloedt court affirmed.

The court found that “harassment on the basis of sexual orientation amounts to sexual harassment under FEHA.” (Id. at p. 741.) “[A]lthough ‘homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex,’ ‘discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex’ for the purposes of title VII.” (Decloedt, at p. 742. quoting Bostok v. Clayton County (2020) 590 U.S. 644, 669.) “Assuming arguendo the pleading 19

standard in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) applies,” the court further concluded that “Decloedt sufficiently alleged [a defendant] subjected him to severe or pervasive harassment because of his sexual orientation.” (Id. at p. 744.)

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1) prohibits “harassment” based upon “sex” or “sexual orientation.” “Courts have recognized two theories of actionable sexual harassment under FEHA. The first is quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances. The second is hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.” (Mokler v. County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 141, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Plaintiff alleges harassment based on a hostile work environment.

To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, [the plaintiff] must show “that (1) [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff] was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [plaintiff's] protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff's] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment.” (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 581.) In sum, “[a] claim for hostile environment sexual harassment exists under the FEHA where the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome conduct or comments because of his or her sex and the result was harassment so severe or pervasive that the conditions of plaintiff’s employment were altered.” (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 114.)

“Sexually harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C); see Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1240 [“California courts have recognized that a sexual motive or interest is not required for sexual harassment under the FEHA.”]; Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 114; Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1564.) “In every case, however, the plaintiff must show a discriminatory intent or motivation based on gender.” (Pantoja, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 114.) Although sex discrimination and sexual harassment are distinct causes of action, FEHA sill “regard[s] the prohibition against sexual harassment part and parcel of the proscription against sexual discrimination.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 278.)

“Whether the conduct of the alleged harassers was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working environment depends on the totality of the circumstances. ‘These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’ [Citations.] ‘Common sense, and an appropriate sensibility to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing...and conduct [that] a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.’ ” (Rehmani v.

Super. Ct. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 951-952.) “A single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (b).)

“FEHA imposes two standards of employer liability for sexual harassment, depending on whether the person engaging in the harassment is the victim’s supervisor or a nonsupervisory coemployee. The employer is liable for harassment by a nonsupervisory employee only if the employer (a) knew or should have known of the harassing conduct and (b) failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” (State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1040-1041.)

The complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for harassment on the basis of sexual orientation under FEHA. The complaint alleges that from April 2024 to June 2024, Ta subjected Plaintiff to severe harassment. The complaint alleges Ta used homophobic slurs, including “faggot”; made discriminatory comments about Plaintiff’s appearance and gender identity; and told Plaintiff to “be a real man.” (Complaint at ¶ 23.) The complaint alleges “Ta also engaged in workplace sabotage by damaging Plaintiff’s equipment, causing marketing materials to go missing, stealing promotional tickets, and recruiting staff to competitors.” (Ibid.)

The complaint alleges Plaintiff’s supervisor, Stewart, was aware of Ta’s wrongful conduct and prevented Plaintiff from reporting this behavior to human resources. (Complaint at ¶ 25.) The complaint alleges that throughout Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants refused to use Plaintiff’s chosen name “Ty” in company systems and communications. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Consistent with Decloedt, the court concludes the EFAA precludes arbitration of this action.

The statutory text of the EFAA invalidates an arbitration agreement with respect to the entire case, and not just the specific sexual harassment cause of action. (Doe v. Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 573-577.) “By its plain language, then, the statute applies to the entire case, not merely to the sexual assault or sexual harassment claims alleged as part of the case. It is significant, moreover, that the statute does not require that the pendant claims arise out of the sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute; it is enough that the case relates to the sexual assault or sexual harassment claims.” (Id. at p. 577.) The arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to each cause of action alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. The petition to compel arbitration is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

The petition to compel arbitration is DENIED.

The court will prepare the order.

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