Ruthann Deadmond v. Ford Motor Company et al.

This is an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act originally brought by plaintiff Ruthann Deadmond (Plaintiff) against defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford), Jim Charlon Ford, Inc., and Doe defendants. The lawsuit is based on Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2021 Ford Escape (subject vehicle) in December 2021. As part of the purchase, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Ford.

The original and still operative complaint was filed in December 2024. It alleges six causes of action: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d) (against Ford only); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b) (against Ford only); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) (against Ford only); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (against Ford only); (5) negligent repair (against Jim Charlon Ford only); and (6) fraudulent inducement—concealment (against Ford only). A copy of the warranty agreement is attached to the complaint as exhibit A.

The complaint alleges that unspecified “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, engine defects, transmission defects, electrical defects; among other defects and nonconformities.” (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Ford answered the complaint in January 2025. Plaintiff later dismissed Jim Charlon Ford from the case. As a practical matter, that also functioned as a dismissal of the fifth cause of action because it was alleged against only Jim Charlon Ford.

At issue is Ford’s motion for summary judgment, filed in May 2026, opposed by Plaintiff. This case is currently set for trial on September 14, 2026. For the reasons stated here, the court will grant the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD—SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The pleadings limit the issues presented for summary judgment or summary adjudication. Such a motion may not be granted or denied based on issues not raised by the pleadings. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258 (Laabs); Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73 (Nieto).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)

A motion for summary judgment or adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of an entire cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an “issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); McCaskey v. California State Auto. Ass’n (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 975; Palm Spring Villas II Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 288.)

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” “The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; internal citations omitted.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable finder of fact to find the underlying fact in favor 5 of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

While the same standards of admissibility govern both sides’ supporting evidence, the opposition evidence is liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly construed. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) The evidence must be liberally construed in support of the opposing party, resolving any doubts in favor of that party. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037 (Yanowitz).)

A reply “shall not include any new evidentiary matter, additional material facts, or separate statement submitted with the reply and not presented in the moving papers or opposing papers.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(4); Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-38; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.)

DISCUSSION

Ford moves for summary judgment, and alternatively for summary adjudication of each cause of action alleged against it.

First and Fourth Causes of Action

Ford contends that both the first cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d), and the fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability fail for the same reason—Plaintiff failed to present the subject vehicle for even a single “warranty complaint” repair. (See notice of motion at p. 1:7-10 and 18-20.)

As to the first cause of action, a vehicle manufacturer who has made an express warranty is obligated (through its authorized representative) to repair any nonconformities covered by that warranty that substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the vehicle within a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2.) If the manufacturer or its representative fails to do so, the manufacturer “shall either replace the [vehicle] or reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.” (Civ. Code, § 1793.2, subd. (d).)

A plaintiff pursuing an action for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act has the burden to establish: (1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle; (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair of a noncomformity; and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2; Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101 (Oregel).)

The fourth cause of action is not alleged as a violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. But it is expressly based on the Act, as shown by its references to Civil Code sections 1791.1, 1794, and 1794.5. (See complaint at ¶¶ 40-44.) “Under the implied merchantability warranty, ‘every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.’” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545, 6 quoting Civ.

Code, § 1792.) “The warranty ‘“arises by operation of law”’ and therefore applies despite its omission from a purchase contract.” (Id.) “Merchantability, as pertinent here, means that the goods ‘[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description,’ and are ‘fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.’” (Ibid., quoting Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (a).) To assert a breach of implied warranty claim properly, a plaintiff must allege a breach of warranty, occurring while the warranty is valid, and bring suit within the limitations period. (Mexia v.

Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 (Mexia).) The “implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale.” (Id. at p. 1304.) Thus, if a product is sold with a latent defect, the implied warranty is breached “by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery.” (Id. at p. 1305.) Under Civil Code section 1791.1, subdivision (c), the duration of the implied warranty “shall be coextensive in duration with an express warranty,” but “in no event” shall it “have a duration of less than 60 days nor more than one year following the sale of new consumer goods to a retail buyer.”

Neither the first nor the fourth cause of action identifies any specific defect (latent or otherwise) in the subject vehicle that violated a warranty provision. (See complaint at ¶¶ 26-31 and 40-44.) Nor do any prior allegations incorporated by reference.

Ford’s argument on this point depends on exhibits C-E to the declaration of Trina Clayton, counsel for Ford, and the declaration of Jonathan Clarke, an engineer employed by Ford who is currently a Design Analysis Engineer in the Automotive Safety Office. (See Ford undisputed material fact (UMF) no. 8, citing exhibits C-E and paragraph 15 of the Clarke declaration).

Clarke describes exhibits C-E, copies of service records for three occasions the subject vehicle was brought in for service, April 26, 2022, September 21, 2022, and May 21, 2023. Those visits were for proactive recalls for: (1) right hand engine oil water separator; (2) front brake pad replacement; and (3) drain tube and PCM program. Clarke declares that each “repair order reflects that the Subject Vehicle was not experiencing any condition related to the recall’s issuance at the time the recall was performed. Rather, the recall was completed proactively and in the absence of corresponding concern.” (Clarke Decl., ¶ 15.)

That evidence is sufficient to meet Ford’s initial burden as to these two causes of action. When a lemon law plaintiff alleges breach of an express warranty, courts have determined that repairs performed pursuant to manufacturer recalls or service action campaigns do not establish the required nonconformity element of the claim unless the plaintiff pleads and proves that the subject vehicle actually suffered from the defects that were the aim of those recalls and service action campaigns. (See, e.g., Gutierrez v.

Carmax Auto Superstores Cal. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1248; McGee v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2020) 612 F.Supp.3d 1051, 1059; Adams v. FCA US LLC (C.D. Cal. 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188899, *15-16 [“[B]ecause Plaintiff experienced no defect in her Jeep, only potential defects that were the subject of the recall notices (and before any defect manifested), Plaintiff cannot satisfy the nonconformity element” of her breach of express warranty claim under the Song- Beverly Act].) Because Plaintiff never brought the subject vehicle in for service of any warranty defect within one year of sale, she also cannot show a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

The burden then shifts to Plaintiff. On the first cause of action, the opposition contends that paragraphs 7-8 of Plaintiff’s declaration and Plaintiff’s exhibits C and D show that triable issues remain. (See opposition at p. 4:20-21.) But paragraphs 7 and 8 of Plaintiff’s declaration are lacking in detail. They state:

7. I presented the Vehicle to Ford’s authorized repair facility, Jim Charlon Ford, Inc., on several occasions for warranty repair of these defects. A true and correct copy of the repair orders is attached as Exhibit C to the Attorney Declaration.

8. In addition to the above repair visits, I also presented the Vehicle to the dealership for service related to manufacturer recalls affecting the Vehicle. A true and correct copy of the recall orders is attached as Exhibit D to the Attorney Declaration.

(Plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the motion.)

The reference to “these defects” is a reference to paragraph 6 of Plaintiff’s declaration, which states that the Subject Vehicle suffered from “hesitation on acceleration and jerking,” “illumination of the check engine light and a fuel injector leaking oil onto the engine,” “sudden automatic breaking without cause, illumination of various dashboard warning lights and brake system malfunctions.” None of those defects are alleged in the first and fourth causes of action, or anywhere else in the complaint.

There are no exhibits C or D to any “Attorney Declaration.” The only declaration from an attorney in opposition to the motion, from Shaneela Marlett, references only attached exhibits E and F. There are documents attached to Plaintiff’s declaration with cover pages designating them as exhibits A-D. Those documents are arguably unauthenticated because Plaintiff’s declaration makes no reference to any exhibits attached to her own declaration, and instead refers only to exhibits to an “Attorney Declaration.” (Evid. Code, § 1401(a) [“Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received into evidence.”].)

Assuming for purposes of argument that they can be considered authenticated and admissible, exhibits C and D to Plaintiff’s declaration do not raise any triable issue as to the first or the fourth cause of action. Exhibit C consists of copies of records from four times the subject vehicle was brought in for service. Three of those occasions, April 26, 2022, September 21, 2022, and May 21, 2023, are the same visits described in the Clarke declaration for proactive recalls. The fourth visit, on July 25, 2023, was to a dealership in Oklahoma to have a tire that had developed a bubble replaced. Exhibit D consists of multiple copies of the proactive recall notices.

The complaint does not allege that the subject vehicle experienced any defects relating to the right hand engine oil water separator (the April 26, 2023 recall), the front brake pad (the September 21, 2022 recall), or the drain tube or PCM program (the May 21, 2023 recall). The first and fourth causes of action fail to identify any specific defect, much less a defect the subject vehicle actually had that was covered by an express warranty provision. “Declarations in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not a substitute for amending the pleadings to raise additional theories of liability.” (Nativi v.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 290 (Nativi), internal citation omitted; see also California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 637, fn. 3 (Lawlor) [“[a] party may not oppose a summary judgment motion based on a claim, theory, or defense that is not alleged in the 8 pleadings,” and “[e]vidence offered on an unpleaded claim, theory, or defense is irrelevant because it is outside the scope of the pleadings”].)

Plaintiff’s declaration and the opposition fail to describe anything resembling the experience of the plaintiffs in Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, or Schreidel v. American Honda Motor Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1242, decisions cited in the opposition. (Opposition at p. 5:4-14.) The consumers in those cases experienced persistent problems with their vehicles that the authorized repair facilities never repaired. In Oregel, the plaintiff began experiencing an oil leak almost immediately after leasing the vehicle.

No authorized repair facility was ever able to fix it. The plaintiff’s homeowner’s association and work colleagues notified him of the ongoing oil leak that continued despite repeated visits to authorized repair facilities. Eventually, the plaintiff stopped using the car entirely and kept it in his garage. (Oregel, at pp. 1098-1099.) The facts in Schreider are similar: the plaintiff’s manual transmission vehicle would not shift, causing that plaintiff to experience long stalls on the freeway. The authorized repair facility was never able to repair the vehicle, and the plaintiff eventually traded it in (after which Honda replaced the clutch to prepare it for resale). (Schreider, at pp. 1247-1248.)

The opposition also fails to raise any triable issue as to the fourth cause of action. (See opposition at pp. 7:1-8:3.) The fourth cause of action fails to allege that the subject vehicle had any identified latent defect, and Ford’s evidence shows that it was ever brought in for any kind of service that could reasonably be considered service for a latent defect. The opposition fails to respond to the argument being made.

Summary adjudication of the first and fourth causes of action is granted.

Second Cause of Action: Civil Code Section 1973.2, subdivision (b)

Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b), states:

Where those service and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties, service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the manufacturer or its representative in the state. Unless the buyer agrees in writing to the contrary, the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days.

The second cause of action consists of boilerplate allegations that do not identify any service visit or visits that collectively took more than 30 days. (See complaint at ¶¶ 32-36.)

Ford’s argument against the second cause of action is essentially the same as that made against the first and fourth: because the subject vehicle was never taken into service for a warranty complaint repair, no such repair took longer than 30 days. Ford’s evidence, the Clayton and Clarke declarations, is sufficient to meet its burden to show that the subject vehicle was seen for service in California only for proactive recalls, and for a total of no more than 8 days. (See UMFs 1-8.)

When the burden shifts, Plaintiff is unable to raise any triable issue of material fact. As already discussed, even assuming the documents attached to Plaintiff’s declaration are 9 admissible, they are not evidence that the subject vehicle was ever taken in for service in California for a warranty complaint repair.

Summary adjudication of the second cause of action is granted.

Third Cause of Action: Civil Code Section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3)

Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) states:

Every manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has made an express warranty shall ... [m]ake available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period.

The third cause of action fails to identify any occasion in which the Subject Vehicle was bought in “to effect repairs” where sufficient literature and parts were not available. (See complaint at ¶¶ 37-39.)

Ford’s evidence, the Clayton and Clarke declarations, establishes that the records from the April 26, 2022, September 21, 2022, and May 21, 2023, proactive recall visits do not support the third cause of action. Ford also argues that Plaintiff has no evidence to support it based on her factually devoid discovery responses. To obtain summary judgment or adjudication on the basis that a plaintiff has no evidence to establish an essential element of a claim a moving defendant must support such a motion with discovery admissions or other admissible evidence following extensive discovery showing that “plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855.)

It is not enough for a moving defendant to show merely that a plaintiff currently “has no evidence” on a key element of plaintiff’s claim. The moving defendant must also produce evidence showing plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support that claim. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891, citing Aguilar [“the absence of evidence to support a plaintiff’s claim is insufficient to meet the moving defendant’s initial burden of production. The defendant must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”].) “Such evidence may consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the plaintiff’s factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.” (Lona v.

Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 110.)

Ford’s evidence on this point, Plaintiff’s October 2025 responses to written discovery, is sufficient to meet its initial burden to show that Plaintiff has no evidence to support the third cause of action’s vague allegations. (See UMF 14; exhibit F to the Clayton declaration.)

When the burden shifts, Plaintiff is unable to raise any triable issues of material fact. The opposition’s contends that Plaintiff’s declaration raises triable issues. But the purported defects listed in Plaintiff’s declaration are untethered to any allegations actually made in the complaint. (Nativi, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 290; Lawlor, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 637, fn. 3.) That parts needed for proactive recalls may not have been immediately available when notices went out also does not raise a triable issue because proactive recalls are not warranty repairs. And the complaint does not allege that the subject vehicle actually 10 experienced any defects relating to the right hand engine oil water separator (the April 26, 2023 recall), the front brake pad (the September 21, 2022 recall), or the drain tube or PCM program (the May 21, 2023 recall).

Summary adjudication of the third cause of action is granted.

Sixth Cause of Action: Fraudulent Inducement—Concealment

“The elements of fraudulent concealment are: (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if the plaintiff had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.” (Burch v.

CertainTeed Corp. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 341, 348, citing Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-311 (Bigler).) “With respect to concealment, there are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.

The latter three circumstances presuppose the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise. This relationship has been described as a transaction, such as that between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.” (Id. at pp. 349-350, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

The sixth causes of action alleges that the subject vehicle suffered from an “Engine Defect” (described for the first time in the sixth cause of action) that Ford knowingly failed to disclose to Plaintiff. (See complaint at ¶¶ 50-79.)

Ford contends that Plaintiff has no evidence that the subject vehicle had an engine defect; that Ford had any knowledge of such a defect in the subject vehicle prior to Plaintiff’s purchase; or that Ford failed to disclose such a defect. Ford’s evidence is sufficient to meet its initial burden on this point. The three service records indicate that the Subject Vehicle was never brought in for service for the alleged “Engine Defect” or for any other engine trouble. Plaintiff’s factually devoid responses to written discovery indicate that she has no evidence to support the sixth cause of action’s allegations. (See UMFs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15, as well as the Clarke and Clayton declarations.)

When the burden shifts, Plaintiff is unable to raise any triable issue of material fact on this point. The Marlett declaration (and attached exhibits E and F) does not raise any triable issue as to whether the subject vehicle in fact had any defect, much less that Ford had knowledge of an “Engine Defect” in that particular vehicle that it failed to disclose to Plaintiff before purchase.

Plaintiff’s own declaration also fails to raise any triable issues of material fact as to the existence of an “Engine Defect” in the subject vehicle, Ford’s knowledge, or concealment. Her declaration is irrelevant to the extent that it seeks to raise issues not alleged in the complaint. 11 (Nativi, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 290; Lawlor, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 637, fn. 3.) Plaintiff’s declaration is also disregarded to the extent it contradicts her factually devoid discovery responses. (Shin v.

Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12 [“a party cannot create an issue of fact by a declaration which contradicts his prior discovery responses.”]) Assuming for purposes of argument that they are properly authenticated and admissible, the documents attached to Plaintiff’s declaration do not provide any support for the sixth cause of action. The exhibits actually contradict Plaintiff’s statement that the subject vehicle was brought in for service of an engine defect or any other warranty issue.

Summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action is granted.

OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE

Objections to evidence made in connection with a motion for summary judgment or adjudication must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. “Unless otherwise excused by the Court on a showing of good cause, all written objections to evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be served and filed at the same time as the objecting party’s opposition or reply papers are served and filed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(a).) An objecting litigant must file two documents, evidentiary objections and a separate proposed order on the objections.

Both documents must be in one of the two approved formats set forth in the rule. Courts are not required to decide objections that do not fully comply with the rule. (See Vineyard Spring Estates v. Super. Ct. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 633, 642 [trial courts only have a duty to rule on evidentiary objections presented in proper format]; Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1.) “Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Ford has submitted objections to Plaintiff’s declaration and the declaration of Shaneela Marlett with its reply. Because those objections do not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, the court does not decide them.

CONCLUSION

Ford’s motion for summary adjudication of the complaint’s first, second, third, fourth and sixth causes of action is granted. Ford is ordered to lodge a proposed judgment.

The September 14, 2026, trial date and all other future court dates are vacated.

The court will prepare the order.

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