Sandra Ramirez v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 865, 880.) The person seeking an award of attorney’s fees "is not necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services according to [his] own notion or to the full extent claimed by [him]. [Citations.]" (Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 950.)

The basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395, citing Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.)

A. Number of Hours Billed

A review of each billing entry shows that the time billed by the attorney timekeepers is reasonable. Counsel billed only 58.7 hours for over one year of work on the case. The attached time records show that the billing entries are reasonable. (Kirnos Decl., Ex. A.) Defendant has not opposed the fees motion or made any attempt to show that the requested hours are excessive, padded, unnecessary, or duplicative. Therefore, the court intends to approve the full amount of time spent on the case.

B. Reasonable Hourly Compensation

Reasonable hourly compensation is the "hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community conducting noncontingent litigation of the same type" (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.) Ordinarily, "'the value of an attorney's time . . . is reflected in his normal billing rate.'" (Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal. App. 3d 747, 761.)

The "experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court." (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) Based on a consideration of various factors, the trial court may rely on its own expertise and knowledge to calculate reasonable attorney fees. (Niederer v. Ferreira (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1507.) "When the trial court is informed of the extent and nature of the services rendered, it may rely on its own experience and knowledge in determining their reasonable value." (In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal. App. 3d 290, 300.) The court is not limited to the affidavits submitted by the attorney. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal. App. 3d 618, 625.)

Here, plaintiffs’ counsel seeks hourly rates of $200 to $600. Counsel’s rates are reasonable based on their skill, background, and experience. Defendants have not opposed the motion or attempt to show that the requested rates are unreasonable. Therefore, the court intends to approve the requested rates. Thus, the court sets the total lodestar fees at $23,540.50.

C. Multiplier

Plaintiffs seek a multiplier of 1.5.

“[T]he statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees, including use of fee multipliers. Since our Supreme Court has held that the lodestar adjustment 6

method is the prevailing rule for statutory attorney fee awards to be applied in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we conclude it is applicable to attorney fee awards under section 1794, subdivision (d).” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818–819, citation omitted.)

“The touchstone figure may then be augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award. As the Supreme Court subsequently explained, the initial lodestar amount is based on the reasonable rate for noncontingent litigation of the same type, which amount may then be enhanced (e.g., through use of a so-called multiplier) to account for factors such as the contingent nature of the case: ‘The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.

In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’” (Id. at p. 819, citations omitted, italics in original.)

Here, plaintiffs’ counsel worked on the case on a contingency basis, which supports application of a lodestar multiplier to compensate counsel for the risk that they would not be paid if plaintiff did not prevail on her claims. The case also involved some specialized skill, as “lemon law” cases are a technical and specialized area of law. Counsel also obtained good results for their client, as they were able to obtain a settlement of $47,000 after almost a year and half of litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel also worked on the case for 58.7 hours over the course of sixteen months, during which time counsel was precluded from working on other cases to some extent. Therefore, a multiplier is warranted under the circumstances.

However, the plaintiffs’ request for a multiplier of 1.5 is excessive, as the issues of the case were not extremely complex or difficult, the time spent by counsel was not extensive, and the results obtained were good but not exceptional. Therefore, the court will only apply a multiplier of 1.25 rather than 1.5.

D. Total Attorney’s Fees Awarded

Applying a 1.25 multiplier to the lodestar fees, the court intends to award total fees of $29,425.63.

4. Costs

Plaintiffs seek costs and expenses of $7,493.48. Plaintiffs’ memo of costs is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the costs were reasonably necessary to the litigation. Thus, the burden is on defendant to show that the costs were not reasonably incurred or that they are unreasonable in amount. Defendant has not objected to the requested costs. Therefore, the court intends to approve the requested costs in the full amount of $7,493.48.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: JS on 8/10/2026. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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