Rick Simmons, et al v. Ernest Elmer, Inc., et al

TENTATIVE RULING FOR AUGUST 12, 2026 Department R12 - Judge Kory Mathewson Rick Simmons, et al v. Ernest Elmer, Inc., et al – CIVRS2601998 Motion(s): Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action Movant(s): Defendant Jeffery Padgett Respondent(s): Plaintiffs Rick Simmons and Alma Simmons Ruling: Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED and the matter is STAYED. A status of Arbitration Hearing is scheduled for _________. Defendant to provide Order and give notice. ______________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court is Defendant Padgett’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claim under the arbitration provision contained in the Purchase Agreement. Plaintiffs do not technically oppose arbitration but argue Padgett has not complied with the procedural requirements for initiating the arbitration under AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules. Defendant Padgett replies.

On June, 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply arguing that they have not ‘refused’ to arbitrate. Since there is no legal authority for Plaintiffs to have filed a sur-reply, it was not considered by the Court.

Defendant Padgett references the arbitration provision in the Purchase Agreement attached to the complaint and argues that equitable estoppel provides a basis to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Agreement includes an arbitration provision that covers their claim against Defendant Padgett. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that AAA’s rules require a claimant to file a Demand for Arbitration with the AAA to initiate an arbitration proceeding. Relying on La Pietra v. Freed (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 1025 (La Pietra), Plaintiffs assert that until Padget files the required demand, they have not “refused” to arbitrate, and Padgett cannot compel their compliance with the agreement to arbitrate before making a demand.

On reply, Padgett argues La Pietra is inapplicable. The La Pietra Court held the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration was premature because although the plaintiff had initially filed a complaint, plaintiff subsequently agreed to arbitration by appearing in the arbitration proceedings. (La Pietra, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 1030.) Padgett argues the motion to compel is appropriate because Plaintiff’s filing of a lawsuit, rather than initiating arbitration, “affirmatively establishes [Plaintiff’s] refusal to arbitrate the controversy.” (Hyundai Amco America, Inc. v. S3H, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 572, 578 (Hyundai Amco America).)

Plaintiffs’ argument is based on their assertion that the Court must determine whether the AAA’s procedural rules have been followed before compelling the matter to arbitration. Such is not the case. The Court determines whether there is a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties that covers the claims at issue. In Hyundai Amco America, the Court found the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, where the trial court found the defendant failed to demonstrate it had first made a demand to arbitrate before bringing the motion to compel arbitration. The Court stated: “Arbitration can be refused without a formal demand ever having been made. [The plaintiff’s]

filing of a lawsuit rather than commencing arbitration proceedings as required by the agreement affirmatively establishes [the plaintiff’s] refusal to arbitrate the controversy.” (Id. at p. 577.)

Here, the parties agree that an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between them that covers Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant Padgett. Therefore, as in Hyundai Amco America, the Court grants Padgett’s motion to compel arbitration and stays the matter.

Dated: August 12, 2026

____________________________ Judge Kory Mathewson

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