DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants “failed to report and did hide and conceal from Plaintiffs, their parents/guardians, law enforcement authorities, civil authorities and others, the true facts and relevant information necessary to bring THE PERPETRATORS to justice for the sexual

25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

misconduct he [sic] committed with minors, as well as protect minors under their care, including Plaintiffs.” (Complaint, ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants implemented various measures designed to, or which effectively, made THE PERPETRATORS’ conduct harder to detect. (Complaint, ¶ 56.)

The complaint asserts thirteen causes of action.[2] At issue in this demurrer are the seventh cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) and the eighth cause of action for Sexual Harassment (Civ. Code § 51.9.)

Sierra Vista demurs to these two causes of action on the ground that Plaintiffs fail to state sufficient facts.

UHS’ joinder to the demurrer is GRANTED.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer and a motion to strike “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank v.

Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616 n.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.)

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25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

“Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Analysis

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state sufficient facts for the IIED and sexual harassment causes of action because Defendants cannot be held vicariously liable for the torts allegedly committed by their employees, and that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts supporting Defendants’ ratification of their employees’ conduct.

Vicarious Liability

“The rule of respondeat superior is familiar and simply stated: an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment. [Citation.]” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296.) “Equally well established, if somewhat surprising on first encounter, is the principle that an employee’s willful, malicious and even criminal torts may fall within the scope of his or her employment for purposes of respondeat superior, even though the employer has not authorized the employee to commit crimes or intentional torts.” (Id. at pp. 296-297.)

“The scope of employment has been broadly interpreted by the courts of this state.” (John Y. v. Chaparral Treatment Center (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 565, 575.) “Employer liability has been imposed when the employee was not pursuing the aim of the employment at the time of the tort, when the employee’s acts were willful or malicious, and even when the acts were against the employer’s rules or policies and conferred no benefit upon it. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“‘Despite the broad range of acts that may give rise to the imposition of vicarious liability, before such liability will be imposed on the employer there must be a connection between the employee’s intentional tort and the employee’s work.’ [Citation.]” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1015.) “The connection or causal nexus required for respondeat superior liability is the tort must have been engendered by or arise from the work.” (Ibid.) “The required connection has been described as (1) the incident leading to injury must be an ‘outgrowth’ of the employment; (2) the risk of tortious injury is inherent in the working environment; (3) the risk of tortious injury is typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise [the employer] has undertaken or (4) the tort was, in a general way, foreseeable from

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

the employee’s duties.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

“These various terms have been condensed into a two-prong disjunctive test.” (Crouch, supra, at p. 1015.) “‘The conduct of an employee falls within the scope of his or her employment if the conduct either (1) is required by or incidental to the employee’s duties, or (2) it is reasonably foreseeable in light of the employer’s business.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“‘[F]oreseeability’ in this context must be distinguished from ‘foreseeability’ as a test for negligence.” (Bailey v. Filco, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1559.) “In the latter sense ‘foreseeable’ means a level of probability which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions whereas ‘foreseeability’ as a test for respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among the other costs of the employer’s business.” (Ibid.) “In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was one ‘that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental’ to the enterprise undertaken by the employer. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

The determination of whether an employee’s acts are within the course and scope of employment is usually a question of fact. (Mary M v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 213.)

Applying these principles, courts in California have held on several occasions that employers were not liable for the sexual assaults or other sexual misconduct committed in particular cases by their employees. Defendants cite a number of these opinions in their moving papers, including John Y. v. Chaparral Treatment Center, supra; Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, supra; and Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992.

In all of the authorities cited by Defendants, however, the court made its ruling based on evidence, either on summary judgment or after trial. This case is only at the pleading stage, and the Court finds that “foreseeability and policy rationales weigh in favor of allowing the complaint to move forward on the scope of employment question.” (Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2016) 184 F.Supp.3d 774, 784.)[3]

In an analogous case, a federal district court applying California law stated, “Like a police officer who rapes a detained woman, an employee who throws a hammer at a fellow worker in a fit of irritation, or an asylum officer who abuses his role to corner female immigrants and molest them, sexual assault [of minor patients at a mental and behavioral health treatment center by medical staff who had a position of authority and trust over Plaintiffs] may be incidental to the operation of [Sierra Vista’s] business.” (Doe, supra, at p. 785.) “At the very least, the pleadings present a close enough call that the Court finds no reason to deviate from the ordinary rule that ‘the determination whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment presents a question of fact . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 785-786.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the Perpetrators were acting within the scope of employment when they sexually assaulted them at the pleading stage to overcome Defendants’ demurrer on this ground.

Ratification

An employer may be liable for an employee’s act where the employer subsequently ratifies the originally unauthorized tort. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110.) “Ratification is not itself a tort, but a doctrine that holds the ratifying party liable for the tort committed by another party.” (Ratcliff v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 982, 1002.) “It is the voluntary election by a party to adopt, as its own, an act purportedly done on its behalf by another, the effect of which is to treat the act as originally authorized by the ratifier.” (Id., at pp. 1002-1003.) The failure to investigate or respond to charges that an employee has committed an intentional tort or the failure to discharge the employee may be evidence of ratification. (C.R., supra, at p. 1110.) Generally, ratification is a question of fact. (Ibid.)

The demurrer is OVERRULED. Plaintiffs’ allegations in paragraphs 50, and 53-56 referenced above, are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to allege that Defendants ratified the perpetrators’ conduct.

IIED

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.)

A defendant acts with reckless disregard in causing a plaintiff emotional distress if the defendant “knew that emotional distress would probably result from their conduct” or “gave little or no thought to the probable effects of their conduct.” (CACI No. 1603.)

Additionally, the defendant’s alleged conduct “must be . . . directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of the plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware. The requirement that the defendant’s conduct be directed primarily at the plaintiff is a factor which distinguishes intentional infliction of emotional distress from the negligent infliction of such injury.” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Christensen v. Super. Ct. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 905.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

Here, Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that Plaintiffs have neither alleged any “intentional conduct” by Defendants, nor that any such conduct “was specifically directed against Plaintiffs.” (MPA, 9:22-26.)

As stated above, a defendant does not need to intend to cause emotional distress to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim can be premised on a reckless disregard theory. (See, e.g., CACI Nos. 1600, 1603.) Therefore, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs do not allege any intentional misconduct by them is immaterial.

However, the Court agrees with Defendants’ alternative argument that Plaintiffs have not alleged that any conduct by Defendants was directed primarily at them or done with the knowledge of their presence and of a substantial certainty that they would suffer emotional injury. (See Christensen v. Super. Ct., supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 906.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is SUSTAINED for this reason.

Conclusion

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action for sexual harassment under Civil Code section 51.9 is overruled. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a respondeat superior theory of vicarious liability and ratification.

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is sustained for the failure to allege that Defendants’ conduct was directed at Plaintiffs or done in their presence, of whom Defendants were aware.

Leave to amend is granted since this is the first challenge to the pleadings. Plaintiffs may file a First Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies raised in the demurrer no later than July 24, 2026. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiffs are directed to present the clerk with a copy of this ruling at the time the First Amended Complaint is filed to facilitate its filing.

Defendants may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the First Amended Complaint, 35 days if served by mail.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

Moving counsel’s notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact Plaintiffs’ counsel and UHS’ counsel and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact Plaintiffs’ counsel and UHS’ counsel prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV018904: DOE, et al. vs BHC SIERRA VISTA HOSPITAL, INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION, et al. 07/14/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in Department 16C

signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

[1] Sierra Vista and UHS are collectively referred to herein as “Defendants.” [2] On September 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Dismissal with this Court seeking

dismissal of their causes of action for Violations of the Unruh Act (Count 9), Bane Act (Count 10), Unfair Business Practices (Count 11), and Constructive Fraud (Count 12). [3] Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc. was decided by the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California. The court denied, in part, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs, two Uber passengers, had sufficiently stated tort claims against Uber for sexual assaults they allegedly suffered by Uber drivers. Applying California law, the court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the drivers were acting within the scope of employment when they assaulted Plaintiffs. This Court is not bound by a decision of a lower federal court on an issue of state law. However, the Court finds its analysis in deciding whether a complaint sufficiently alleges respondeat superior liability at the pleading stage to be persuasive.