GOODLEY vs AECOM, et al.

25CV145867: GOODLEY vs AECOM, et al. 08/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION (Defendant) CRS# 650252882800 in Department 18

Tentative Ruling - 08/10/2026 Patrick McKinney

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION on 06/02/2026 is Granted.

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Judith Sjoberg, individually and as successor-in-interest to Paul C. Goodley, deceased (“Plaintiff”), filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on December 23, 2025 following the passing of decedent Paul Goodley on November 29, 2025. The FAC alleges that decedent was exposed to asbestos fibers which caused his mesothelioma diagnosis. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Parker-Hannifin Corporation, as successor-in-interest to Sacomo-Sierra Company (“Defendant” or “Parker”) supplied asbestos-containing gaskets or seals for gas chromatographs to codefendant Varian Medical Systems, Inc. (“Varian”) and laboratory ovens supplied by codefendant VWR International, LLC (“VWR”).

Decedent worked at General Cable, a Monsanto research center, Abbott Laboratories, and Hewlett-Packard. His work involved using laboratory ovens and gas chromatographs, which required manipulating asbestos-containing gaskets. Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks evidence that decedent worked with asbestos-containing materials for which it is liable.

II. Legal Standard “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action . . . [or] one or more claims for damages . . . if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit . . . [or] that there is no merit to a claim for [punitive damages] . . . .” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(f)(1).) “A defendant . . . has met [their] burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established . . . .” (§ 437c(p)(2); see also Collin v.

CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal. App. 4th 582, 587 (“A defendant moving for . . . summary adjudication need not conclusively negate an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Instead, the defendant may show through factually devoid discovery responses that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”).) “Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action . . . .

The plaintiff . . . shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action . . . .” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(p)(2).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action . . . [or] a claim for damages . . . .” (§ 437c(f)(1).) 25CV145867: GOODLEY vs AECOM, et al. 08/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION (Defendant) CRS# 650252882800 in Department 18 III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s objections to the deposition testimony of Paul Goodley, Victor Sagues, Peter Sagues, and Lewis Samuels are OVERRULED.

The court grants Defendant’s MSJ.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence establishing a triable issue of fact as to threshold exposure to its products. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s responses to its comprehensive discovery and deposition testimony are “factually devoid” as to threshold exposure and/or substantial factor causation. (See Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 107.) The court finds that Defendant propounded sufficiently comprehensive discovery requests on Plaintiff, particularly Defendant’s Special Interrogatories (“SROGs”).

Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s SROG No. 2 (Defendant’s “state all facts” interrogatory) alleges that decedent was exposed to asbestos attributable to Defendant through his work as a laboratory scientist from beginning in 1966. He worked with laboratory ovens and gas chromatographs incorporating asbestos-containing asbestos produced by Defendant, which he manipulated, causing dust to fly out of the oven doors. (Def’s Exhibit D at 3:14-3:24.) Plaintiff’s response to SROG No. 2 also indicated that decedent observed gaskets on the doors of the gas chromatographs he worked with, and if they had gone bad and need to be changed out.

Decedent would change out those gaskets maybe once a year. (Id. at 5:16-5:25.) Later, decedent worked at HP beginning in 1980, where he was tasked with designing gas chromatographs and mass spectrometers, which were to be coupled to be a marketplace product. (Id. at 7:1-7:3.) He recalled working with laboratory ovens including brands VWR and others. (Id. at 7:11:7:14.)

Plaintiff’s response to SROG 2 also refers to the testimony of Richard Dykman, who worked for VWR from about 1956-1992. However, none of Plaintiff’s references to Mr. Dykman’s testimony establish that Parker supplied asbestos-containing gaskets to VWR. Plaintiff’s assertions on this topic are entirely conclusory. Plaintiff’s response to SROG 2 also refers to the deposition of Peter Sagues, son of Victor Sagues, founder of Sacomo. Peter Sagues worked for Sagues and Parker from 1965 until 1980. This testimony tends to establish that Parker/Sacomo were made aware of the dangers of asbestos through OSHA regulations and took measures to reduce dust in its facilities. (Id. at 10:1-11:18.)

None of this testimony tends to establish that Defendant supplied asbestos to which decedent was exposed. Plaintiff’s response to SROG 2 also describes Parker’s acquisition of Sacomo, which had previously purchased Plant Rubber & Asbestos Works. Again, none of the facts alleged therein relate to decedent’s alleged exposure to asbestos attributable to Parker. None of the remainder of Plaintiff’s response to SROG 2 implicates Defendant. Nor does decedent’s deposition testimony. The court thus finds that Plaintiff’s responses to discovery and deposition testimony are factually devoid as to threshold exposure.

The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV145867: GOODLEY vs AECOM, et al. 08/11/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION (Defendant) CRS# 650252882800 in Department 18 Plaintiff submits affirmative evidence in the form of the deposition of Peter Sagues, taken on September 3, 2012 in an earlier asbestos case. This testimony establishes that Varian was a customer of Sacomo. Mr. Sagues testified that Defendant was the only manufacturer on the West Coast that could braid products from blue asbestos. (PAMF No. 47.)

Mr. Sagues also testified that Sacomo supplied asbestos rope gasket to Varian and, to his knowledge, there was no competition for Varian’s business. (PAMF Nos. 53, 58.) While this testimony tends to establish that Sacomo/Parker supplied at least some asbestos or asbestos-containing products to Varian, any assertion that decedent was exposed to Defendant-supplied asbestos products remains speculative in nature. The court finds Plaintiff’s affirmative evidence far too speculative to create a triable issue of fact as to threshold exposure, warranting summary judgment.

IV. Order Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

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